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Abstract 
 
The thesis analyses the theme of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the banking 
industry. In particular, drawing from the theoretical foundations of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and considering the peculiarities of the banking business model, the 
work provides empirical evidence on the determinants and effects of bank social 
responsibility (BSR). The work is organized in five chapters.  
The first chapter aims to frame the concept of CSR, providing an overview of its historical 
and theoretical evolution. In particular, the work discusses the conceptualizations and 
definitions that authors and institutions have proposed between the 1950s and the 2000s. 
Afterward, the chapter describes four of the most adopted theoretical foundations of CSR, 
namely agency theory, stakeholder theory, resource-based view, and social legitimacy 
theory. Moreover, chapter 1 discusses the potential benefits of CSR engagement. In 
particular, it analyses the positive effects that firm’s engagement in CSR has in terms of 
better relationships with customers and employees, eco-efficiency, risk reduction, lower 
cost of capital and better corporate reputation. Finally, the chapter refers to the concept 
of corporate social performance and its relation to financial performance.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the characteristics of the bank’s engagement in socially responsible 
initiatives. It describes the motives that make the investigation of bank social 
responsibility (BSR) a peculiar and relevant issue in the field of study on business 
sustainability. More in particular, in the first part the chapter discusses the role of BSR as 
a means to restore the bank’s reputation and stakeholder trust. In the second part, it 
analyses BSR in light of the role that banks assume for the socio-economic development 
of countries. Finally, in the last part, the chapter provides a review of the previous 
empirical investigations conducted in the field of study on CSR banking. 
Chapter 3, instead, describes the overall structure of the empirical analysis adopted in 
chapters 4 and 5. The chapter also describes the data collection method and the sample of 
148 banks, adopted to perform the analysis.  
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to demonstrate the existence of a relationship between 
financial performance, bank’s corporate governance characteristics and BSR. In 
particular, drawing from slack of resource theory, the study argues that prior bank’s 
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financial performance positively affect the BSR. On the other hand, in light of the agency 
theory and stakeholder theory perspectives, the research aims to demonstrate that several 
characteristics of the bank’s board of directors affect the bank’s propensity to engage in 
CSR. The study adopts a panel data methodology for doubly censored variables to test 
the research hypotheses. The results show that the higher is the Net interest income and 
the Margin of interest, the higher is the bank’s propensity to engage in CSR. On the other 
hand, the study finds that the activity intensity, diversity, independence of the bank’s 
board of directors positively predict BSR.  
Finally, chapter 5 aims to verify the relationship between the banks' engagement in CSR 
activities and client loyalty (CL). The work considers several dimension of CSR 
engagement. In particular, in addition to an overall indicator of BSR, the empirical 
analysis evaluates the impact that the “community-related” dimension of CSR and the 
socially responsible profile of the bank’s product have on CL. In order to verify the 
research hypotheses, the chapter adopts a descriptive, univariate and multivariate 
analysis. With reference to this latter, the study applies a two-step Heckman model to 
treat the endogeneity bias. The results show the existence of a positive impact of CL on 
the overall measure of BSR and on the bank’s product responsibility, whilst no 
statistically significant relations are found with reference to the community dimension of 
CSR. The work also shows that the socially responsible profile of the bank’s products 
matters more for large banks rather than small banks. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Banking Industry, Financial Performance, 
Corporate Governance, Client loyalty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Over the last decades, the world community has been paying increasing attention to 
sustainable development. This latter includes global relevant issues, related to economic 
development, social equity, environmental protection (Drexhage and Murphy, 2010), 
which involve the interest of the scientific arena, governments, and international 
institutions. The United Nations sustainable development goals, for the period 2015-
2030, address challenges concerning poverty alleviation, environmental degradation, 
prosperity, peace, and justice. In this sense, among the most relevant initiatives, the Paris 
agreements (COP21) have set new stringent criteria to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
The International Trade Center reports more than 230 sustainability standards, applicable 
in more than 80 sectors and 180 countries, covering worker and labor rights, food safety 
and business ethics1.  
This changing and evolving environment have heightened the expectations towards the 
business world, conducting to rethink to the role that corporations should take in 
addressing global challenges. Business is shaping and responding to these changes. In 
particular, several initiatives regarding the concept of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) have emerged as a response to the growing global attention to societal and 
environmental issues. In 2003, the World Bank stated that CSR is the commitment of 
business to sustainable economic development working with stakeholders and society to 
improve the quality of life.  
As recognized by Reverte (2016), the objective of CSR is to make corporate activities 
sustainable from the economic, social and ecological point of view. In this sense, CSR 
becomes for companies an increasingly relevant item to design more sustainable 
corporate strategies. In this context, among the various economic sectors, the banking 
industry assumes a special position to foster sustainable economic growth. In 2011, the 
European Commission in its communication on CSR explicitly refers to the inclusion of 
ethical and socially responsible criteria in the business models of financial institutions. 
By its very nature, banking industry assumes a central role in the socio-economic 
development of countries (e.g. Levine, 2005). Banks finance businesses, supporting the 
                                                          
1 http://www.intracen.org/itc/market-info-tools/voluntary-standards/standardsmap/ 
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growth of the economy at the local and national level. Orienting the allocation of capital, 
banks have the responsibility to take into account the social and environmental 
implications of their lending decisions (Thomson and Cowton, 2004). Moreover, banks 
provide their financial and non-financial support across several areas, including 
community care, education, and many other fields (EBF, 2013). In line with these 
arguments, bank engagement in CSR activities appears a timely and highly relevant topic.  
However, despite the relevance of the phenomenon, the amount of papers investigating 
the CSR banking is still moderate (McDonald, 2015).    
Thus, the aim of the current thesis is to contribute to the understanding of how banks 
integrate the principles of CSR within their business models. In particular, the work is 
organized in five chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of CSR 
conceptualizations. In the first part, it discusses the historical evolution and the 
definitional aspect of CSR. Afterward, the chapter focuses on the perspectives that have 
been most widely adopted in literature to theoretically frame CSR engagement. Finally, 
the chapter examines the concept of corporate social performance and its relation with 
financial performance. 
The second chapter describes the peculiarities that characterize the implementation of 
CSR programs within the banking industry. Firstly, the chapter analyzes the role of CSR 
as a means to rebuild the loss of confidence towards the banking system in the years 
following the financial crisis. Secondly, the banks' engagement in CSR activities is 
examined in light of the connections between banks' activities and economic growth. 
Finally, the chapter proposes a review of the previous empirical works conducted on bank 
social responsibility.  
The third chapter, instead, indicates the main characteristics of the empirical research 
conducted in chapters 4 and 5. Furthermore, it reports the data collection procedure and 
the description of the examined sample of banks. 
Chapter 4, instead, focuses on the empirical analysis of the factors determining the bank's 
engagement in CSR activities. In particular, drawing from the slack of resource theory, 
agency theory and stakeholder theory the chapter investigates the impact that financial 
performance and several characteristics of the board of directors have on bank’s 
engagement in CSR.  
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Finally, considering different theoretical perspectives, such as the legitimacy theory, 
social legitimacy theory, signaling theory, chapter 5 investigates the impact that several 
dimensions of CSR have on bank customers' loyalty. 
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CHAPTER 1 – Corporate Social Responsibility: Historical evolution and theoretical 
perspectives   
 
 
Summary: 1.1. Introduction; 1.2 Origins and evolutions of Corporate 
Social Responsibility; 1.3 Definitions of Corporate Social 
Responsibility; 1.4 Theoretical perspectives of Corporate Social 
Responsibility; 1.4.1 Agency Theory; 1.4.2 Stakeholder Theory; 1.4.3 
Resource-Based View; 1.4.4 Social Legitimacy Theory; 1.5 Benefits of 
Corporate Social Responsibility; 1.6 Corporate Social performance; 1.7 
The Relationship Between Corporate Social Performance And Financial 
Performance.    
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an overview of the concept of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). In particular, in the first part (Section 1.2) the chapter proposes a 
decade-by-decade historical examination of CSR conceptualizations. The analysis 
describes and discusses the contributions that have marked the evolution of CSR between 
the 1950s and 2000s. Section 1.3, instead, discusses the definitional issues that 
characterize CSR, providing some of the most relevant CSR's definitions proposed in 
recent years by academics and institutions. 
The central part of the chapter (Section 1.4) analyzes the theories that have been most 
frequently adopted to frame and explain CSR. Each theoretical perspective is described 
and discussed in connection with CSR. 
Section 1.5, on the other hand, focuses on the possible benefits that the implementation 
of CSR programs can generate. Specifically, it analyzes how CSR activities are perceived 
by customers and employees, the effects of CSR on the cost of capital, on the reduction 
of risk, on corporate reputation and on the eco-efficiency of corporate processes and 
products. Finally, the last part of the chapter analyzes the concept of corporate social 
performance (Section 1.6) and its relationship with financial performance (Section 1.7).  
  
10 
 
 
1.2 Origins and evolutions of Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
The idea that business has responsibilities towards society going beyond wealth 
maximization has been around for centuries (Carroll, 1999; 2016). The social 
responsibility of business has long been a particular interest to many Puritan and 
Protestant writers (Lee, 2008). Some authors argue that the first traces of socially 
responsible actions, at the firm level, date back to the mid-1800s, during the Industrial 
Revolution, when some corporations undertook welfare policies towards their employees 
(Visser, 2010). However, despite these first signals of social concerns, a more evolved 
form of "corporate social responsibility" represents a relatively modern concept. In fact, 
it began to develop remarkably only during the years following World War II, gaining 
particular momentum during the 1950s and 1960s. Therefore, the objective of this section 
is to provide an overview of corporate social responsibility conceptualizations over time, 
providing a decade-by-decade examination. 
 
The 1950s  
 
Previous literature converges in considering the work of Bowen (1953), as the first 
systematic conceptualization of the relationship between corporations and society (e.g. 
Carroll 1979, Preston 1975). In 1999, Carroll described Bowen as the “Father of 
Corporate Social Responsibility”. According to Bowen, even though CSR is not a 
panacea for society, it may play a key role in business decisions. In particular, among the 
several questions posed in his seminal book, two appear of special note, namely, (1) what 
are the responsibilities that businesses have towards society and (2) how society can 
promote CSR. With reference to the first question, the author defined social responsibility 
as the obligations of businessmen in pursuing activities and in taking decisions that are 
desirable, in terms of objectives and values for society. On the other hand, he argued that 
institutional changes may persuade and favor corporate managers’ involvement in 
socially responsible initiatives.  
In 1954, in the wake of Bowen's work, Drucker in his book "The Practice of Management" 
included public responsibility among the eight main business objectives. Frederick 
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(2006), instead, noted that the three core concepts about CSR in the 1950s included (a) 
the idea of the manager as public trustee, (b) the balancing of competing claims to 
corporate resources, and (c) business support of good causes.  
At the end of the fifties, in parallel to the theses supporting CSR, some authors began to 
challenge the usefulness of social responsibility for business. In this direction, for 
instance, Levitt (1958) warned the business world about the potential dangers of CSR. 
 
The 1960s  
 
The common argument, of the theses in opposition to the CSR, suggested that engagement 
in social issues occurs to the detriment of organizations’ economic results (Ackerman 
1973). In this sense, Milton Friedman (1962; 1970) proposed one of the most prominent 
criticisms. He claimed that the sole responsibility of a corporation is to generate profit for 
its owners. According to Friedman's perspective, CSR engagement represented a threat 
to the achievement of the firm's main objective.  
However, despite the contrasting viewpoints, the CSR conceptual constructs have 
continued to grow in popularity, fueling a considerable debate, driven by academics and 
social movements. The CSR literature expanded significantly, focusing on what social 
responsibility actually meant for business and society. At beginning of the 1960s, Davis 
(1960) defined CSR as "businessmen's decisions and actions taken for reasons that go, at 
least partially, beyond the firm's direct economic or technical interest". The author also 
referred to the concept of "iron law of responsibility", according to which companies that 
ignore social responsibilities may lose their social power. In the same year, Frederick 
(1960) argued that firms should invest resources also for broad social goals. McGuire, 
within the book "Business and Society" (1963), confirmed that the company must go 
beyond the mere wealth maximization, explicitly formalizing that it has economic, legal 
and social obligations to society. A few years later, Walton (1967) contended that 
managers must keep in mind the close relationship that exists between corporation and 
society in pursuing corporate goals. The author emphasized that corporate social 
responsibility is not limited to the fulfillment of legal obligations, since it also includes a 
certain degree of voluntarism, which does not necessarily lead to direct measurable 
economic outcomes. 
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The 1970s  
 
Alongside with the conceptual development of CSR, big corporations began to introduce 
the first important applications of CSR principles, through the definition of corporate 
ethical rules or CSR codes (e.g., the Sullivan Principles at General Motors in 1971).  
Also institutions began to formalize their interest in the phenomenon. For instance, in 
1971, the Committee for Economic Development provided its definition of CSR, 
articulated in three concentric circles. The inner circle includes the basic responsibilities 
that the business need to fulfill, in order to execute the economic function. The 
intermediate circle considers the exercise of the economic function, with a certain degree 
of sensitivity to social values. Finally, the outer circle, which includes the two previous 
circles, encompasses the responsibility that the firm should assume, in order to contribute 
to the improvement of the social environment. 
During the seventies, also academics provided some relevant conceptualizations. For 
instance, Johnson (1971) suggested that companies should include economic, social, 
environmental, and employee-related considerations in strategic decision-making. Steiner 
(1971) recognized that the company, even remaining a fundamentally economic 
institution, has a responsibility to help society to achieve its goals. According to Steiner, 
social responsibilities should be included in the way managers approach the decision-
making process. He also argued that larger a company becomes, the greater is its 
responsibility toward society. Two years later, Davis (1973) intervened in the CSR 
debate. He asserted that CSR refers to the consideration of aspects that go beyond the 
narrow economic function and involves responsibilities not limited to the fulfillment of 
legal obligations. Consistently with Steiner (1971), Davis contended that managers’ 
decision-making process must take into account, not only economic results but also the 
impact that business decisions have on the external social system. Fitch (1976) defined 
CSR as an approach to solve social issues caused by wholly or in part by corporations. 
Zenisek (1979) revisited the conceptualization of CSR continuum proposed by Walton 
(1967), according to which the CSR varies from minimum responsibility to maximum 
responsibility. In particular, the author stated that Walton's model lacked any basis for 
empirical investigation. Based on these considerations, Zenisek developed an advanced 
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model of CSR continuum, which attempted to take into account the degree of congruence 
between business ethics and private sector expectations. More specifically, the author 
proposed a framework that, dividing the managerial attitudes into four phases of growing 
commitment towards social issues, would have facilitated the CSR measurement and 
research in the future. Other authors stressed that it is important, not only that companies 
were socially responsible, but also how they were responding to the social environment 
(Ackerman, 1973). In this sense, Frederick (1978) proposed a distinction between CSR 
and corporate social responsiveness. The first refers to the socially responsible profile of 
the company, while the second refers to the company's ability to respond to social 
expectations. 
 
The 1980s  
 
During the eighties, grew the awareness that CSR is not only a range of responsibilities, 
that companies are called to respect, but also a choice that can reward in terms of 
economic outcomes (Rusconi, 2007). Based on this idea, in this decade, several authors 
began to be interested in empirically investigating whether socially responsible firms 
were also profitable firms (e.g. Cochran and Wood, 1984; Aupperle et al., 1985).  
However, even though these years were mostly characterized by empirical research, 
authors also proposed a few alternative CSR conceptualizations (Dalton and Cosier, 
1982). For instance, Jones (1980) argued that CSR should not be framed as a set of 
outcomes, but as a set of processes. The author suggested that CSR processes should be 
fair processes, in which the interests of all the parts have the opportunity to be heard. A 
few years later, Strand (1983) proposed a systems model, of organizational adaptation 
and response to the social environment, which considers simultaneously the concepts of 
social responsibility and social responsiveness. A further relevant contribution is 
provided by Epstein (1987). Combining the constructs of business ethics, corporate social 
responsibility, and corporate social responsibility, he introduced the concept of 
"Corporate Social Policy Process". The latter is defined as the institutionalization of 
processes that favor the inclusion of moral considerations within individual and 
organizational choices. According to Epstein's perspective, the definition of such 
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processes should allow the firm's leaders to anticipate and to proactively respond to the 
evolving expectations of internal and external stakeholders. 
However, in this decade, a breakthrough in the evolution of CSR was the emergence of 
stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984). This latter has become one of the dominant 
theoretical paradigms to explain the companies'engagement in CSR initiatives. As 
recognized by Carroll (1999), stakeholder theory has allowed to better define social 
expectations, identifying the individuals or groups of individuals that the company should 
consider in its CSR programs. The stakeholder model has represented a response to the 
lack of practicality of previous theoretical models (Lee, 2008). More narrowly indicating 
the members of the social system to whom the company must be responsive, the 
stakeholder theory approach provides a fundamental contribution in terms of 
operationalization and orientation of companies’ engagement in CSR. 
 
The 1990s 
 
The 1990s began with one of the models that has marked the historical evolution of the 
CSR concept, the Carroll's CSR pyramid (1991). In particular, based on his previous four-
part definition of CSR (Carroll, 1979), the author proposed a graphical representation in 
the form of a pyramid (Figure 1), in which at each level corresponds a specific 
responsibility of the business. Carroll's four categories of responsibilities have been 
adopted both for further theoretical developments (e.g. Wartick and Cochran 1985; Wood 
1991) and empirical analysis (e.g. Burton and Hegarty 1999; Clarkson 1995). At the first 
level of the pyramid, Carroll (1991) placed economic responsibility, since it is a 
fundamental requirement for the existence and survival of the organization. Although it 
may appear unusual to include the economic dimension in a CSR model, as suggested by 
Carroll in a later contribution (2016), society expects that business organizations are able 
to sustain themselves and be profitable. The second level of the pyramid reported legal 
responsibilities, since society defines the laws and regulatory boundaries within which 
the company is expected to operate. The third level, instead, includes ethical 
responsibilities. Carroll argues that businesses should operate in a fair way, adopting 
those decisions that, even if not required by law, are expected by society. At the last level 
of the pyramid, the author proposes philanthropic responsibilities. These latter refer to the 
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activities that the company undertakes discretionally to address social issues. 
Philanthropic responsibilities are not strictly required by the community, they appear to 
be driven by the organization's intent to do what is good for society. 
 
 
Figure 1. Carroll's pyramid of CSR.
 
 
 
Over the 1990s, stakeholder theory has gradually moved to the center of the debate on 
CSR. Clarkson (1995) distinguished between social issues and stakeholder issues. The 
former are those issues involving public interest, to the extent that they require legislative 
regulation. On the other hand, those issues for which there is no legislation or regulation 
are likely to be stakeholder issues. The author argued that only after identifying the type 
of issue, managers can choose the appropriate approach to address it. In the same year, 
Jones (1995) suggested that the adoption of a CSR approach in stakeholder management 
helps to create trustworthy, cooperative relationships and not opportunistic relationship, 
which in turn foster the achievement of a competitive advantage. Other examples include 
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the work of Rowley (1997), who proposed a network model of CSR to examine the 
characteristics of company's stakeholders; Berman et al. (1999) who distinguished 
between a strategic and intrinsic stakeholder model, based on business logics of CSR and 
on moral aspects of CSR, respectively.  
Scholars' attempts to explain CSR through the lens of stakeholder management (e.g. 
Rowley, 1997; Berman et al., 1999) have led to identify multiple categories of CSR, 
depending on the stakeholders to which are directed socially responsible initiatives (Lee, 
2008). 
 
 
The 2000s 
 
 
The 2000s began with several corporate scandals (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia 
Communications, Parmalat) followed by the Wall Street's financial scandals of 2008. 
These events, on the one hand, have highlighted the existence of a questionable business 
ethics, on the other hand, have fueled the need to devote further attention to the moral 
standards adopted within business models and financial transactions. The interest of the 
academic world to CSR, also fueled by these events, has continued to grow in the 2000s. 
During these years, scholars have proposed alternatives and overlapped concepts to CSR 
(Carroll and Shabana, 2010). 
Carroll and Schwartz (2008) proposed an attempt to systematize several concepts within 
a single integrated framework, defined as VBA model (Figure 2). In particular, the 
authors argue that the five most common constructs referred to the relation between 
business and society (i.e. corporate social responsibility, business ethics, stakeholder 
management, sustainability and corporate citizenship) have three common concepts in 
common. 
According to the authors, all these constructs require that the organizations are able to (1) 
create social value, (2) balancing the interests of the various stakeholders and (3) 
demonstrating a sufficient degree of accountability2. Carroll and Schwartz suggested that 
the adoption of a proper role of business in society stems from the business's ability to 
                                                          
2 For accountability the authors refer to the business’s capability to acknowledge responsibility for their 
actions and decisions and take steps to rectify failures or prevent them in the future. 
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combine these three elements. The main contribution of the VBA model consists in being 
able to bring together several concepts, in a single framework, based on aspects common 
to each of them. 
 
Figure 2. Carroll and Schwartz’s VBA model. 
 
Other authors have proposed different categorizations of CSR. For examples, Husted and 
De Jesus Salazar (2006) distinguished between strategic, altruistic and coerced CSR. Wu 
and Shen (2013), instead, in addition to the strategic and altruistic approach referred to 
greenwashing CSR. Among the other categories, scholars have shown particular interest 
to strategic CSR. This latter, which has already been studied in the late 1990s (e.g. Porter 
and van der Linde, 1995; Russo and Fouts, 1997), finds a conceptual consolidation in the 
2000s.  
In this area, Baron (2001) suggested that strategic CSR represents a profit-maximization 
strategy. The author argued that the firm should seize CSR opportunities in the same way 
that it seize other opportunities to increase profits.  In their essay "The Competitive 
Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy", Porter and Kramer (2002) argued that corporate 
expenditures often produce benefits only for business, while charitable contributions 
generate only social benefits. The authors contended that only when corporate 
expenditures produce both economic and social benefits, creating a "convergence of 
interests", corporate philanthropy can be defined as strategic (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Porter and Kramer (2002). 
 
 
A few years later, Bagnoli and Watts (2003) argued that the company's propensity to 
strategically engage in CSR is inversely related to the intensity of market competition. 
Porter and Kramer (2006), instead, suggested that the definition of a strategic corporate 
social agenda looks beyond the community expectations, in order to achieve both social 
and economic benefits. Several other authors have recognized that strategic CSR 
engagement supports the achievement of competitive advantage (e.g. McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2001; Galbreath, 2006). The underlying idea is that CSR may generate benefits 
ranging from the creation of productive relationships with stakeholders (Bhattacharya and 
Sen, 2004) to the improvement of corporate reputation (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990) and 
financial performance (e.g. Waddock and Graves, 1997), which in turn may conduct to 
competitive advantage. 
 
 
 
1.3 Definitions of corporate social responsibility  
 
 
Despite the huge amount of research dedicated to CSR, there is still no strong consensus 
about its definition (McWilliams and Siegel, 2006). The difficulties, encountered in 
identifying a univocal CSR definition, may be attributed to several reasons. First, CSR is 
an internally complex (Moon et al., 2005) and dynamic phenomenon (Carroll, 1999), 
whose contents may change depending on the contest of application (Matten and Moon, 
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2008). Secondly, over the years, several terms have been used to identify the same 
construct (Sprinkle and Maines, 2010) or, in other cases, CSR has been used as a 
synonymous for other types business-society relations (Matten and Crane, 2005). This 
terminology inconsistency has made even harder to converge towards a common CSR 
definition. Examples of the most frequently adopted CSR-related terms include corporate 
citizenship (Matten and Crane, 2005; Carroll and Buchholtz, 2008), business ethics 
(Epstein, 1987), corporate social responsiveness (Frederick, 1978; Wartick and Cochran 
1985; Wood 1991), sustainability (Matten and Moon 2004). The lack of a definitional 
convergence is evident by looking to the numerous attempts made by scholars and 
institutions over the years (Dahlsrud, 2008).  
In general, the early definitions made a generic reference to the impact of the company's 
activities have on society (e.g. Davis, 1973). In recent years, despite the definitional 
issues, some prominent definitions have been provided by institutions and academics. For 
instance, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (2000) refers to CSR 
as “the commitment of a business to contribute to sustainable economic development, 
working with employees, their families, the local community and society at large to 
improve the quality of life”. 
A few years later, the European Commission (2002) argued that “Corporate social 
responsibility is about companies having responsibilities and taking actions beyond their 
legal obligations Environmental and economic/business aims”. Among scholars, for 
examples, Hopkins (2003) suggested that CSR concerns with treating the stakeholders of 
the firm ethically or in a responsible manner; Renneboog et al. (2008), instead, identifies 
CSR in the corporate decisions fostering social, corporate governance, ethical and 
environmental issues. In summary, even though each CSR definitions presents its own 
peculiarities, as recognized by Dahlsrud, 2008, the main part of them relates to the way 
companies manage relationships with stakeholders. 
 
 
 
1.4 Theoretical perspectives of Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
The current paragraph intends to provide an overview of some of the most adopted 
theoretical perspectives to explain and firms' engagement in CSR. In particular, the 
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subsections 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.3, 1.4.4 discuss agency theory, stakeholder theory, resource-
based view, and social legitimacy theory, respectively. 
 
 
1.4.1 Agency Theory 
 
 
Agency theory is one of the most dated theories in the fields of study of management and 
economics (Frynas and Yamahaki, 2017). It analyses the relationship between principals 
(individuals or organizations that confer a mandate to other subjects) and agents 
(individuals or organizations appointed to carry out the mandate received). In particular, 
it focuses on the so-called agency problems, which occur when principals and agents have 
different goals or not cooperative behaviors (Ross, 1973), and on how agency problems 
can be overcome through governance mechanisms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Eisenhardt, 1985). As argued by Jensen and Meckling (1976), if both principals and 
agents are utility maximizers, there are good reasons to believe that the agent will act to 
pursue his/her objectives that might be not consistent with those of the principal. 
Following Eisenhardts’s (1985) literature review, scholars identify two possible 
interconnected agency problems. The first refers to the possibility that the objectives of 
principals and of agents conflict. The second refers to the difficulties or costs that the 
principal must sustain to verify that the objectives and the actions of the agent are 
consistent with the mandate conferred. 
The previous literature identifies two conditions related to agency problems: moral hazard 
(Arrow, 1970; Ross, 1973) and adverse selection (e.g. Arrow, 1985). Both concerns the 
agent’s behavior. In particular, moral hazard refers to the possible lack of commitment of 
the agent. In fact, he/she might execute his/her mandate by not proposing the agreed effort 
(Holmstrom, 1979). The adverse selection, instead, concerns the misrepresentation by the 
agent of his/her abilities. For instance, when the parts define the mandate agreement, the 
agent may claim to have skills and competencies that he/she does not actually possess.  
Both moral hazard and adverse selection are linked to the existence of information 
asymmetry. The principal, in fact, is often unable to completely verify the agent’s abilities 
at the hiring time and to adequately monitor the agent’s work over time. 
In this context, the principal has to sustain costs, namely agency costs, in order to reduce 
or eliminate the effects of the agent’s opportunistic behavior. The more are the 
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information available to the agent compared to the principal the higher are the agency 
costs (Deckop et al., 2006). These latter may embrace the costs linked to the research of 
an adequate agent, to the control of the agent’s behavior, to the loss due to the inefficient 
choices of the agent. Following Jensen and Meckling, there are three main categories of 
agency costs: monitoring costs (costs associated with the controlling of the agent’s 
performance), bonding costs (costs sustained to set up the systems that regulate the 
relationships between principal and agent) and residual loss (costs due to inefficient agent 
decisions). 
The literature identifies several mechanisms to address agents' behavioral opportunism, 
such as incentive structures, monitoring mechanisms, and governing structures. These 
mechanisms should allow reducing the opportunism to an efficient level, in which the 
benefits of delegating are higher than its costs (Jones, 1995). Following Eisenhardts 
(1989), two main approaches may be adopted to address agency problems. On one hand, 
principals may use information systems, such as reporting procedures, budgeting systems, 
the board of directors. Investing in these systems allows the principal to monitor and be 
regularly informed about the agent's behavior. The adoption of such mechanisms, 
improving the information available to the principal regarding the activities actually 
carried out, should limit the potential opportunistic behavior of the agent. On the other 
hand, the principal may adopt "outcome-based" contracts, which allow connecting the 
agent’s remuneration to the achievement of specific objectives. The adoption of such 
contract, aligning the preferences of agents to those of principal, may help to reduce the 
conflicts of self-interest between them.  
Over the years, the agency theory perspective has been used to theoretically frame several 
principal-agents relationships such as employer-employee, lawyer-client, buyer-supplier, 
corporate’s owner-manager (Harris and Raviv,1978). Even though it has found 
application in several areas of study such as accounting (e.g., Ronen and Balachandran, 
1995), marketing (e.g., Tate et al., 2010), political science (e.g., Hammond and Knott, 
1996), sociology (e.g., Eccles, 1985), most frequently agency theory has been applied in 
finance (e.g., Jensen, 1986) or to organizational phenomena such as board relationships 
(e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983), ownership and financing structures (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
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In particular, among the several studies, that have analyzed agency theory at an 
organizational level, a significant contribution has been provided by the authors who have 
examined the relationship between corporate’s owners (principal) and managers (agent). 
In this case, the problem of agency between owners and managers refers to the separation 
of ownership from control. In particular, the owners delegate the managers to manage the 
firm in the interests of the owners. However, managers may be more interested in their 
personal objectives, such as the maximization of their compensation. The lack of 
consistency, between the interests of owners and those the managers, generates agency 
problems. This type of principal-agent relationship has attracted the attention of scholars 
since the time of Adam Smith (1776). He noted that the managers of an organization may 
pursue different objectives from those of the owners. Recent literature converges in 
identifying the work of Berle and Means (1932) “The modern corporation and private 
property” as the seminal study investigating the agency problems existing between firm’s 
owners and managers. During the sixties and seventies, the literature analyzed the agency 
problems in terms of the division of risk between owners and managers (Arrow, 1970). 
Specifically, authors argue that owners invest their wealth and take risks in order to obtain 
economic benefits, managers, instead, are risk-averse and work to maximize personal 
benefits. The agency theorists assert that this different risk aversion creates the conditions 
for the emergence of agency problems. Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined the company 
as a set of contractual relations between the people involved in the organization. From 
this angle, the agency relationship represents a contract between owners and managers, 
in which each of the parties works for their own self-interest, laying the conditions for the 
existence of agency problems. Fama and Jensen (1983) studied agency problems from 
the perspective of the firm's decision-making process. In particular, they noted that 
agency problems may arise since who take decisions within the organization are not the 
real risk bearers of their decisions.  
With reference to CSR, Friedman (1970), one of the most prominent agency theorists, 
states that social issues are not a concern of firms. They should be solved by free market 
forces or by governmental institutions. According to Friedman’s positions, the only 
responsibility of the managers is to increase the shareholders’ wealth. 
Following this reasoning line, CSR may underly an agency problem between managers 
and shareholders (e.g. McWilliams et al., 2006). In fact, managers may undertake CSR 
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activities, at the expense of shareholders, in order to pursue their own interests (Barnea 
and Rubin, 2010). 
In this sense, CSR would represent a waste of resources that would be better spent on 
increasing firm efficiency. Some studies, over the years, have supported this thesis. For 
example, Galaskiewicz (1985) demonstrated that CEOs adopt philanthropy strategies 
only to gain support from the local community. Atkinson and Galaskiewicz (1988) 
confirmed the negative relationship between ownership and corporate philanthropy. They 
show that the higher the proportion of stocks owned by the CEO, the less the company 
engages in philanthropic causes. Wright and Ferris (1997) interpreted as agency problem 
the negative relationship between the announcement of divestment of assets in South 
Africa and the stock price reaction. Considering CSR engagement from the perspective 
principal-agent relationship, Barnea and Rubin (2010) demonstrate that managers tend to 
overinvest in CSR to improve their reputation as good citizens.  One of the major 
criticisms to the agency theorists' view of CSR comes from stakeholder theory (Freeman, 
1984). This latter, differently from the agency theory perspective, contend that CSR 
initiatives support the development of trust relationships with stakeholders, which in turn 
favor the achievement of better economic results.  
Also several empirical studies have challenged Friedman’s position. For instance, Oh et 
al. (2011) highlighted that institutional shareholders with long-term orientation tend to 
support the firm’s CSR engagement. Deckop et al. (2006) argue that planning CSR 
activities requires long-term decisions characterized by high information asymmetries 
between principal and agent. Given these characteristics of CSR investments, the authors 
assert that a properly structured CEO remuneration system is fundamental to incentivize 
CEO to improve corporate social performance. In their empirical analysis, they find that 
the short-term CEO remuneration is negatively related to corporate social performance, 
while the long-term CEO remuneration is positively related to corporate social 
performance. 
 
 
1.4.2 Stakeholder Theory 
 
The term stakeholder seems to have been introduced during the 1960s to indicate that 
there are other parties, in addition to shareholders, that hold a "stake" in the decision 
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making of corporations (Goodpaster, 1991). Nevertheless the first relevant ideas related 
to stakeholder management date back to the work of the Standford Research Institute 
(1960), a formalization of the stakeholder theory was proposed only during 80', with the 
contributions of and Freeman (1984). 
Freeman (1984), in his pioneer book on stakeholder theory, entitled “Strategic 
Management: A Stakeholder Approach”, defines stakeholders as any individual or group 
of individuals who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's 
objectives. Clarkson (1995), instead, after defining the stakeholders as groups of 
individuals who have interests, claims or ownership rights in a company, distinguishes 
between primary stakeholders and secondary stakeholders. The first are stakeholders 
whose presence is necessary for the survival of the company. Secondary stakeholder, 
instead, are firm’s constituents that influence, or are influenced by the company, but are 
not decisive for its survival. In an effort to understand which stakeholders do really count, 
Mitchell et al. (1997) proposed that the relevance of stakeholders depends on three 
attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. Sirgy (2002), considering the organization 
boundaries, identifies external, internal and distal stakeholders. He argued that the 
survival of the organization depends on the extent to which it is able to organize its 
internal stakeholders (i.e. management, staff) and to exchange value with external 
stakeholders (e.i. customers, shareholders, distributors, suppliers, creditors, local 
community).  
The central tenet of stakeholder theory is that firm’s duties are not limited to shareholders 
since they include responsibilities towards the multiple stakeholders' groups (Freeman, 
1984). Following Donaldson and Preston (1995), stakeholder theory presents three 
perspectives. First, it is descriptive, since it identifies the corporation as a constellation of 
interests and describes how to manage stakeholder relationship. Second, it is instrumental, 
since it identifies a framework for analyzing the links between stakeholder management 
and the achievement of business results. Finally, it is normative, as it requires the 
acceptance that stakeholders are individuals or groups of individuals having interests in 
the corporation, which deserve attention. 
As acknowledged by Lee (2008), due to its emphasis on the relational aspect, the 
stakeholder theory presents several connections with CSR. Prior literature recognizes that 
investments in CSR activities are one of the most important mechanisms through which 
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the company may develop good relations with stakeholders (Barnett and Salomon, 2012) 
and create stakeholder value (Peloza and Shang, 2011). Also Bhattacharya et al. (2009) 
identify CSR policies as crucial part of the dialogue between organizations and their 
community of stakeholder. Freeman and Velamuri (2006) assert that the adoption of a 
stakeholder-oriented approach to CSR implies the integration of business ethics and 
societal considerations in the management decision-making process, which may create 
value for investors, customers, employees, suppliers, communities.  
Numerous contributions argued that CSR can be a means to reshape corporate strategy 
and to effectively address stakeholder claims (e.g. Peloza and Shang, 2011). For 
examples, good social performance may favor the retention of valuable employees (e.g. 
Greening and Turban, 2000), favoring their identification with the firm (e.g. Kim et al., 
2010). Other empirical studies demonstrate that CSR may attract customers (e.g. 
Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004), creating a positive perception of corporate’s image and 
products (e.g. Romani et al., 2013) and improving corporate reputation (e.g. Brammer 
and Millington, 2005). 
However, CSR is a heterogeneous concept (Godfrey et al., 2008), that may have a 
different meaning in different places and in different times (Campbell, 2007). Thus, CSR 
initiatives may be positively perceived by some stakeholders and negatively by others 
(Aguilera et al., 2007). In this sense, it appears crucial for firms to understand 
stakeholders’ expectations and to adequately address them, in order to benefit from CSR 
investments (Barnett and Salomon, 2012).  
 
 
1.4.3 Resource-Based View 
 
The intellectual origins of the resource-based view (RBV) date back to Edith Penrose 
(1959), who identified the firm as “a pool of resources”. Looking at its historical 
evolution, RBV takes its first steps in opposition to previous studies in the strategic 
management field, based on the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, according to 
which the success of a company entirely depends on its interactions with the external 
environment (Porter, 1980). Conner (1991), in its comparison between RBV and the 
major theoretical streams related to industrial organization economics, avers that the 
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resource-based perspective presents a strong heritage from previous theories, but also 
some relevant differences. For examples, the RBW identifies the firm an input-combiner 
as in the neoclassical perfect competition theory, however, differently from this latter 
resource-based perspective rejects the assumptions of perfect resource mobility and 
divisibility. Similarly to transaction cost theory, asset specificity represents a critical 
aspect of RBW; however this latter focuses on deployment and combination of specific 
inputs rather than on avoidance of opportunistic behaviors.  
RBV theorists propose a strategic perspective that mainly refers to companies internal 
resources and capabilities (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Rumelt (1984) in its comments 
on RBW asserts that the firm’s competitive position is defined by a bundle of unique 
resources and relationships, and the task of management is to renew and to adjust 
resources as time and competition erode their value. In this sense, managers are called to 
assemble and develop the capabilities needed to capture as much as possible from the 
available resources (Mathews, 2002). 
In 1986, Barney attempted to identify under what conditions the company's resources 
become valuable. In particular, he noted that the definition of a viable competitive 
strategy needs not only the possession of valuable resources but also their appropriate 
application to the external environment. 
In its simplest interpretation, RBV examines the relations between a firm’s internal 
characteristics and its performance. In particular, this theoretical view argues that the 
possession of valuable, rare and inimitable resources can lead the firm to a sustainable 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). According to Collis and Montgomery (1999), 
resources cannot be evaluated in isolation, because their value strongly depends also on 
the interplay with market forces. In order to investigate the extent to which internal 
resources can contribute to the attainment of competitive advantage, Barney (1997) 
proposed the VRIO framework. This model asks if the resources of the company are 
valuable, rare, difficult to imitate, and exploited by the organization. The author states 
that the presence and combination of these four requirements increase the contribution of 
internal resources to the firm’s performance. According to this reading key, the firm’s 
capabilities to acquire and to adequately manage resources conduct to superior 
performance and competitive advantage.   
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Following Mathews (2002), resources are the basic elements through which companies 
transform inputs into outputs. However, resources are not productive on their own, and 
they can favor the achievement of competitive advantage to the extent to which they are 
used by firms to perform their business activities. Russo and Fouts (1997) argue that it is 
necessary to consider the firms’ capabilities to assemble, integrate and manage the bundle 
of resources. Barney (1995) defines capabilities as the skills that firms develop to manage 
resources. Resources and capabilities are used by companies to develop their strategies 
and to pursue their objectives. As recognized by Conner (1991), for any given input the 
degree to which it will be specific changes across firms because firms themselves are 
unique. Thus, considering that each firm presents its own bundle of resources and 
capabilities, the ability to implement strategies will thus vary across firms. 
According to Grant (1991), the firm’s resources can be classified into tangible resources 
and intangible resources. These latter are non-physical factors that are used to produce 
goods or provide services. They include intellectual property assets, organizational assets, 
and reputational assets. Tangible resources, instead, are physical or financial assets that 
are easier to imitate or substitute than intangible ones, even if they are valuable and rare. 
In fact, intangible resources and capabilities are built within the organization over time 
and cannot be acquired on markets, making them difficult to imitate and highly relevant 
to achieve the competitive advantage.  
With reference to the business sustainability literature, the number of studies on CSR 
which adopt a resource-based lens has grown in recent years (e.g. Russo and Fouts, 1997; 
Brik et al., 2011). In general, these studies argue that capabilities related to investment in 
CSR can lead to firm-specific economic benefits for firms (e.g. McWilliams and Siegel, 
2006). The undertaking of CSR initiatives can be considered as an investment in 
capabilities that may allow the firm to differentiate itself from competitors. In this sense, 
RBV may help to better explain how firms strategies contribute to developing and using 
internal capabilities related to social issues to obtain superior economic results (Frynas 
and Yamahaki, 2016). Among the others, these CSR-related capabilities include green 
innovations (Chen et al., 2006), stakeholder management (Torugsa et al., 2012), positive 
reputation (Laurenco et al., 2014). 
Russo and Fouts (1997) assert that RBW represents a relevant theoretical reading key for 
analyzing how CSR engagement influences company results for two main reasons. First 
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of all, RBW has a strong focus on firm performance. Second, the resource-based 
perspective explicitly recognizes the high relevance of some intangible resources that are 
closely related to CSR activities, such as corporate culture (e.g. Brammer et al., 2007) or 
firm’s reputation (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004). 
Within the field of studies on CSR, authors have also frequently discussed the RBW to 
explain the relationship between CSR engagement and financial performance (Orlitzky 
et al. 2003). Following Branco and Rodrigues (2008), the investment in CSR activities 
may develop relevant firm’s intangible resources, which in turn may favor the 
achievement of superior financial performance. In this sense, for example, socially 
responsible engagement may enhance corporate reputation (Dell’Atti et al., 2017; 
Forcadell and Aracil, 2017), which can help to create strong and trust relationships with 
external stakeholders (De Castro et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2010). Engagement in CSR 
activities has also relevant consequences on the improvement of internal resources and 
capabilities related to know-how and corporate culture (Collier and Esteban, 2007). 
However, despite the growing adoption of RBV as a theoretical perspective to frame 
firms’ engagement in socially responsible issues, only a few studies empirically 
demonstrate that CSR-related capabilities can lead to competitive advantages for firms 
(e.g. Chen et al., 2006; Lourenco et al., 2014). Moreover, as recognized by Frynas and 
Yamahaki (2016), it is not obvious that CSR engagement leads to a sustainable 
competitive advantage since socially responsible activities are visible and imitable by 
competitors.    
 
 
 
1.4.4 Social Legitimacy Theory   
 
 
According to Suchman (1995) legitimacy can be defined as ‘a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’. Oliver (1996), one 
year later, argues that legitimacy can be understood as the conformation with social 
norms, values, and expectations.  
The basic assumption of the legitimacy theory is that companies operate on the basis of a 
social contract with society (Donaldson, 1982). The objective of the firm is to act 
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congruently with social values and community expectations (Branco and Rodrigues, 
2008) to obtain the approval of society, necessary to generate rewards and ensure the 
survival of the organization (Deegan and Rankin, 1996). Following this theoretical line, 
firms do not have their own right to exist, they exist to the extent to which society 
attributes them the legitimacy to operate. Therefore, in this perspective, companies 
attempt to fulfill the social contract in order to legitimize their existence, and society 
allows companies to continue to operate to the extent to which they meet social 
expectations (Cormier and Gordon, 2001). 
As argued by Dowling and Pfeffer (1975), since organizations are heavily dependent on 
acceptance by the environment, they engage more in activities that allow “to connect” the 
organization with its environment. The firm’s research for legitimacy represents a 
continuous process aimed at aligning the objectives of business with those of society 
(Deegan, 2002). In this sense, an important specification is offered by Lindblom (1994), 
who distinguishes between legitimacy and legitimation. The author states that the former 
represents a static status or condition that exists when the value system of an entity is 
consistent with that of the social context to which it belongs. When there is a disparity 
between the two value systems, the legitimacy to operate of the entity can be threatened. 
Legitimation, instead, represents a dynamic process underlying the static condition of 
legitimacy, constituted by the actions that the company carries out to develop its 
legitimacy to operate. 
In line with the evolution of social values over time, businesses are continuously called 
to show that their operations are legitimated and that they are good corporate citizens 
(Deegan 2000). In literature, the discussion of social legitimacy theory is usually divided 
into two macro areas: institutional and strategic. The institutional perspective (Di Maggio 
and Powel, 1983; Westphal et al., 1997) adopts a normative approach, in which legitimacy 
is understood as a set of beliefs (Suchman, 1995). According to this approach, legitimacy 
is not the result of interactions between business and society, rather, external institutions 
define beliefs, behaviors, customs that permeate the organization in every respect 
(Suchman, 1995). Through the absorption of "institutional myths", organizations become 
isomorphic with the institutional environment and acquire legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). Within this approach, legitimacy and institutionalization appear as synonymous, 
since both phenomena empower organizations by making them seem natural and socially 
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accepted (Suchman, 1995). However, one of the main criticisms of this perspective is that 
it presents a static and constrained vision of legitimacy (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983). 
Scholars assert that institutional forces play a key role in directing and constraining 
organizations to prioritize certain values rather than others (Sonpar et al., 2009). From a 
strategic point of view (Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995), legitimacy is understood in a more 
dynamic and instrumental logic. Legitimation, according to this view, is purposive and 
calculated (Suchman, 1995). The strategic approach to social legitimacy theory present 
connections with other theoretical perspectives, such as the resource dependence theory 
or the stakeholder theory (Sonpar et al., 2009). Gray et al. (1995) argue that legitimacy 
theory and stakeholder theory present overlapping perspectives. Legitimacy theory refers 
to the interactions between the firm and society in general, stakeholder theory refers to 
interactions between the firm and a particular group of individuals within society (Deegan 
and Unermann, 2006). The higher is the relevance of stakeholders, the more the company 
has to adapt its conduct. In this context, the engagement in CSR activities may represent 
a successful means for negotiating relationships with key stakeholders (Roberts, 1992). 
Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) resource dependence theory proposes that organizations 
depend on their surroundings to obtain the resources necessary for survival. The more 
critical and important the resources are for the firm, the greater the dependence it has on 
the subjects who have the resources. From a strategic point of view, managers should 
provide rationalizations and explanations of corporate activities to constituents within and 
outside the organization's boundaries, in order to acquire, maintain and develop 
legitimacy (Pfeffer, 1981). In other terms, organizations through the assumption of 
behaviors, decisions, communication policies, that are consistent with symbols and values 
shared in the environment in which they operate, legitimate themselves within society 
(Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). 
However, the organization’s environment can provide not only resources but also threats 
(Perrow, 1970). In fact, firm’s legitimation to operate may be threatened by the external 
actors that consider the organization’s social values and norms not consistent with those 
of the environmental context in which it operates (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Dowling 
and Pfeffer, 1975). Firms that conflict with their environment may be difficult to enter 
into processes of social exchange since their partners do not rely on their compliance with 
social rules (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006). Examples of negative reaction by external firm’s 
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constituents may include a boycott of the company's products; boycott by suppliers of 
labor and financial capital; definition of laws that prohibit the business activities, which 
do not conform to the expectations of the society (Chan et al., 2014). Lindblom (1994) 
identifies four strategies that the company may adopt to develop its legitimation. First, 
when the organization recognizes the existence of a legitimacy gap, it may try to inform 
relevant stakeholders about the change in performance or activities. Second, if the 
legitimacy gap has developed on the basis of misperceptions, the organization may try to 
modify the perceptions of the firm's constituents, without actually modifying its behavior. 
Third, when the organization is aware of having legitimacy gaps in certain activities, it 
may try to shift the attention of the social context on other issues. For example, if the firm 
is involved in pollution-related issues, may try to manipulate the attention of the public 
highlighting its involvement in charitable associations. Fourth, if the organization realizes 
that the expectations of the social context in which it operates are incorrect, it can try to 
modify external expectations, in order to better align them with its performance. As 
argued also by Ashfort and Gibbs (1990), several mechanisms can improve substantive 
or symbolic legitimation. For example, the organization may change the role of 
performance (i.e. attempting to meet the performance expectations of key constituents); 
alter resource dependencies (i.e. modifying the mix or the degree of resource dependence 
upon its constituents); conform to institutional paradigms; expose socially acceptable 
goals. Authors recognize that the adoption of CSR initiatives may represent a mechanism 
to restore corporate legitimacy (Deegan et al., 2002; Chen et al., 2008). Empirical studies, 
adopting a legitimacy theory perspective, suggest that CSR can bring benefits, in terms 
of better corporate ratings, stakeholder appeal, and better reputation (Chan et al. 2014). 
Within the field of studies on CSR, corporate social disclosure has often been considered 
as a means to reinforce corporate legitimacy, providing the opportunity to communicate 
to stakeholders that the company strategies are in line with societal expectations (Clarke 
and Gibson-Sweet, 1999). According to Brennan et al., (2013), CSR communication can 
be conceptualized as means that trigger an interactive dialogue of reciprocal influence 
between the company and its audience.  
Other authors also suggest that CSR communication may be useful to respond to the 
corporate crisis (e.g. O’Donovan 2002). Corporate crisis involves a conflict between the 
firm and its constituents and may stem from several factors, such as the violation of norms 
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and values, the failure to meet stakeholders’ expectations, scarce social or environmental 
performance. In this compound, corporate social disclosure may be used to persuade the 
community of stakeholders that the company is realigning its conduct to the norms and 
values shared in the society (Elsbach, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
1.5 Benefits of Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Previous literature shows that the company’s investment in CSR initiatives may provide 
numerous opportunities and may create favorable conditions for the achievement of a 
competitive advantage (e.g. Porter and Kramer, 2006; Carroll and Shabana, 2010; Barnett 
and Salomon, 2012). Despite prior studies have mainly focused on the effects that CSR 
engagement has on financial performance (e.g. Waddock and Graves, 1997), there are 
many other ways for businesses to benefit from CSR (Burke and Logsdon, 1996). 
The current paragraph aims to provide an overview of the main benefits that CSR can 
generate for business. CSR engagement has been frequently considered a valuable means 
to improve the dialogue with the community and to establish long-term fiduciary 
relationships with stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995). In line with these arguments, a 
significant number of previous studies has investigated the effects that CSR policies have 
on stakeholders (e.g. Bhattacharya et al., 2009). 
 
• Customers responses to CSR 
 
As argued by Bhattacharya and Sen (2004), among the various stakeholders' 
categories, customers represent a stakeholder group that appears to be particularly 
susceptible to companies' CSR programs. Sen and Bhattacharya (2001) found that 
customers are willing to pay a higher price for products of socially responsible 
companies and pay less for products of companies not engaged in CSR. Creyer 
and Ross (1996), instead, asserted that individuals tend to punish unethical 
corporate behaviors. Romani et al. (2013) through an experimental setting show 
that CSR induces to show positive opinions about the company and to actively 
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participate in the firms’actions. Other authors indicate that undertaking CSR 
initiatives have a positive impact on consumers’ purchase intent (e.g. Mohr and 
Webb, 2005) and customer satisfaction (e.g. Bhattacharya and Sen 2004). Recent 
studies also empirically demonstrate a positive relationship between CSR and 
customer loyalty (Garcia de los Salmones et al., 2005). CSR can be used to 
differentiate products or services, creating a positive image of the company brand 
(e.g. Tang et al., 2012). Peloza and Shang (2011), in their literature review, noted 
that the relationship between CSR and consumer responses is mediated by other 
variables. In this sense, for examples, Brown and Dacin (1997) revealed that CSR 
engagement affects consumers' perceptions through influencing consumers' 
evaluation of the firm; similarly Garcia de los Salmones et al. (2009) highlighted 
that CSR initiatives improve consumers’ general evaluation, which in turn affects 
their loyalty; Marin et al. (2009), adopting a sample of real customers, 
demonstrated that CSR allows the development of a positive image of the 
company, which leads consumers to develop greater loyalty to the company's 
products.  
In this area, a substantial part of literature identifies the consumer identification 
with the company as mediating factor between CSR and consumers’ responses. 
In particular, scholars argue that CSR initiatives may induce customers to develop 
a sense of connection and to identify with the company (e.g. Curras-Perez et al., 
2009). Individuals tend to identify themselves with those organizations that share 
with them common values and traits (Sen and Bhattacharya 2001). Previous 
studies show that the adoption of CSR programs may enhance the corporate 
identity’s attractiveness and favor the customers’ identification with the firm (e.g. 
Lichtenstein et al., 2004). The identification with the company represents a form 
of emotional connection between the client and the organization (Deng and Xu, 
2017). This emotional connection may trigger the consumer's willingness to 
contribute to the achievement of the company's objectives, for examples: being 
loyal to the company's products (Bhattacharya and Sen 2003; Lichtenstein et al., 
2004); spreading favorable information on the company (Alsop 2002); providing 
suggestions for the development of the company (Wu and Tsai 2007). 
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• Employee responses to CSR 
 
Even though to a lesser extent than external stakeholders (Larson et al., 2008), the 
effects of CSR on internal stakeholders have been widely investigated in recent 
years (Kim et al., 2010). Among the different categories of internal stakeholders, 
many studies have treated the effects that CSR policies have on employees. As 
argued by Aguilera et al. (2007) employees are essential to any discussion 
regarding antecedents and consequences of CSR. In particular, previous literature 
acknowledges that employees’ CSR perceptions are closely related to their 
commitment within the organization (Brammer et al., 2007) and job satisfaction 
(Valentine and Fleischman, 2008). Greening and Turban (2000), drawing on 
social identity theory and signaling theory, show that firms may use CSR 
initiatives to attract quality and talented workforce. The authors argue that job 
applicants do not have complete information about the working environment 
within the organization, therefore they interpret the information they receive as 
signals of the working conditions. Greening and Turban suggest that CSR 
engagement may influence job applicants’ perception of the organization and may 
increase the attractiveness of the employer. In addition, they argue that 
undertaking socially responsible initiatives may favor the consumers’ self-
identification with the values of the organization. Most empirical studies have 
shown that CSR engagement favors employees’ identification with the 
organization (Farooq et al., 2013). Kim et al. (2010) demonstrate the relationship 
between CSR and employees’ identification with the organization is mediated by 
external prestige and organizational trust, respectively. Hameed et al. (2016), 
instead, observe that internal and external CSR, operating through different 
mediating mechanisms, positively affect employees’ identification. Other studies 
have found that CSR perceptions positively influence job applicants’ propensity 
to choose the company (Brammer et al., 2015). 
Bhattacharya et al. (2008) state that CSR can be understood as a form of internal 
marketing that allows to acquire and retain employees. In particular, they assert 
that considering employees as internal customers, CSR may be used to define a 
"job product", which includes the salary, benefits, and responsibilities. In this 
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sense, the real challenge for managers is the understanding of employees’ needs 
and consequently to orient the CSR initiatives in the right direction. Rodrigo and 
Arenas (2008) show that company’s undertaking of CSR activities develops 
several attitudes among employees, such as greater identification with the 
organization, greater importance attributed to the work performed, a sense of 
social justice. Du et al. (2015) recognizing that employees have multi-faceted job 
needs argue that CSR activities may be an effective mechanism to fulfill their 
needs. They confirm that CSR programs increase job satisfaction and reduce 
turnover intention. Caligiuri et al. (2013), instead, found that the employees' 
perception of the firm's commitment to volunteerism programs enhances their 
work engagement. Finally, several recent researchers have shown the existence of 
a positive relationship between CSR perceptions and work engagement (e.g., Lin 
et al., 2010). 
 
• CSR and corporate reputation 
 
Over the last two decades, authors have frequently considered CSR as a strategic 
tool to improve corporate reputation (e.g. Fombrun, 1990). This latter is closely 
related to the perceptions stakeholders have of corporate image. Scholars argue 
that corporate reputation may be understood as the collective opinion of an 
organization held by its stakeholders (Brammer and Millington, 2005). Fombrun 
(1990) defined corporate reputation as "A perceptual representation of a 
company's past actions and future prospects, that is, the firm's overall appeal to all 
of its key constituents when compared with other leading rivals”. The key element 
of the Fombrun’s definition is the stakeholder perceptions of corporate’s actions 
(Wartick 2002). Companies are continuously and increasingly evaluated on both 
financial and social performance. This growing attention to corporate conduct, 
combined with the greater information available via electronic channels, puts 
companies under considerable scrutiny by stakeholders (Waddock, 2000). In this 
context, more than ever, corporate reputation appears as one of the most valuable 
intangible assets (Hall, 1993). 
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Previous literature widely recognizes that the undertaking of socially responsible 
initiatives may be a strategic lever to build the corporate reputation (e.g. Turban 
and Greening 1997). 
Fombrun et al. (2000) suggest that CSR initiatives may be considered as real 
options. The author states that socially responsible initiatives, on the one hand, act 
as "safety net" that protects companies against reputational risk, on the other hand, 
they act as "platform opportunities" since they generate reputational capital, 
loyalty and social legitimacy. Gardberg and Fombrun (2006) document that 
engagement in socially responsible activities can encourage the development of 
intangible assets for two reasons. First, they state that investments in CSR, acting 
similarly to those in R&D and advertising, represent a differentiation strategy that 
helps companies to build brand image and reputation (e.g. Varadarajan and 
Menon, 1988). Secondly, the authors assert that socially responsible initiatives 
favor the integration between the company and the stakeholders, creating 
sociocognitive connections between them. 
Recent empirical investigations confirm that CSR represents an essential strategic 
resource to achieve competitive advantage (Deephouse 2000), through the 
building and the maintaining of positive corporate reputation (e.g. Lee et al., 
2017). For examples, Bramner and Millington (2005) point out that companies 
more engaged in philanthropic activities have a better reputation than less engaged 
ones. Lai et al. (2010) find that corporate reputation partially mediates the 
relationship between CSR and brand performance. Taghian et al. (2015) 
demonstrate that a positive relationship between the CSR constructs and corporate 
reputation, which in turn influences market share. 
 
 
• Eco-efficiency 
 
Corporate environmental performance is widely considered a relevant component 
of CSR (Renneboog et al., 2008). Previous literature recognizes that 
environmental performance can be an important source of competitive advantage 
(e.g. Porter, 2002). Guenster et al. (2011) define corporate eco-efficiency as the 
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approach through which companies create more value with fewer environmental 
resources. Other things being equal, scholars argue that firms engaged in 
environmentally responsible practices may reach higher levels of operational 
efficiency than peers (e.g., Marti-Ballester, 2015). Several studies document how 
the adoption of eco-friendly practices may conduct to cost saving, due to the 
reduction of the material utilization per unit product, reduction of energy and 
water consumption, use of recycled materials, introduction of alternative source 
of energy (e.g. Reverte et al., 2016). According to Porter and Linde (1995), the 
company’s attention to the environmental domain of performance triggers eco-
innovation processes, whose benefits may offset the costs associated with 
environmental standards' compliance. Following the OECD' s (2009) 
classification,  eco-innovation refers to four areas: natural resource management, 
pollution management, adoption of clean technologies and the supply of eco-
friendly products and services. Some studies suggest that environmental 
regulations can stimulate companies to carry out eco-innovations, which in turn 
can take a key role to support the achievement of a competitive advantage (Porter 
and Linde, 1995). For instance, Kemp and Horbach (2007) recognize how 
effective product and process-innovations may reduce the number of resources 
needed for production, generating cost advantages. Arundel and Kemp (2009) 
suggested that the effect of eco-innovations on competitiveness varies according 
to the type of innovation. In particular, product eco-innovations can bring benefits 
in terms of product differentiation on the market (Kammerer, 2009). On the other 
hand, process eco-innovations aim to increase production and logistics efficiency, 
thereby generating cost savings. 
Finally, the key role of the environmental dimension of business performance in 
pursuing competitive advantage is supported by ample empirical evidence that 
demonstrates the existence of a positive relationship between eco-efficiency and 
financial performance (e.g. Dong et al., 2014; Marti-Ballester, 2015; Reverte et 
al., 2016). 
 
• Risk reduction 
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In the last three decades, several studies have investigated the impact that CSR 
policies have on risk exposure (e.g. McGuire et al. 1988, McWilliams and Siegel 
2001). In this area, most of the works supported the hypothesis that CSR is 
negatively related to firm risk (e.g. Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001). Among the 
perspectives adopted to explain the existence of a negative relationship, the 
authors have often argued that CSR programs can generate moral capital, 
understood as the relational goodwill of the company (Adler and Kwon, 2002), 
which in turn provides some sort of insurance against risk exposure (Godfrey, 
2005). 
At the foundation of this view, there is the argument that certain business activities 
may have a negative impact among the various stakeholders, who can react by 
"punishing" the company with actions ranging from boycotting products to 
badmouthing. Against this backdrop, CSR activities may dispose of stakeholders 
to hold beliefs about the firm which mitigate their reactions to negative events 
(Godfrey et al., 2008), thereby reducing a firm's risk exposure. Thus, according to 
this reasoning line, firms more engaged in CSR initiatives, mitigating the 
stakeholders' assessment of corporate actions, benefit from a higher protection 
against risk exposure.  
In recent years, among the most significant works proposed on the theme, it is 
noteworthy to mention the Orlitzky and Benjamin's (2001) meta-analysis, 
according to which firms with better corporate social performance are less risky. 
Also Salama et al. (2011), adopting a sample of UK companies between 1994 and 
2006, show that companies with better environmental performance present a 
lower systematic financial risk. A few years later, Cai et al., (2016), analyzing a 
U.S. sample from 1991 to 2012, confirm that CSR engagement is inversely related 
to firm risk. Bouslah et al., (2018), drawing from a sample of non-financial U.S. 
firms covering the period 1991–2012, demonstrate that social performance 
reduces volatility during the financial crisis. 
 
• Cost of Capital  
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An emerging line of research in the field of study on business sustainability refers 
to the impact that CSR has on the firm's cost of financing. In fact, over the years, 
several empirical studies have investigated the relationship between CSR and the 
cost of both equity and debt capital. For instance, Bassen et al., (2006), 
considering a sample of 44 companies, document that the undertaking of socially 
responsible initiatives reduces the firm’s risk exposure and the cost of capital. 
Menz (2010), analyzing a panel of 498 bonds over 38 months, found a positive 
relationship between CSR and bond spreads in Europe. Goss and Roberts (2011), 
instead, using a sample of 3996 loans, show that firms with social responsibility 
concerns pay higher interest rates on private bank debt than more socially 
responsible firms. Cheng et al., (2014) demonstrate that better stakeholder 
engagement and higher transparency on corporate social performance assume a 
key role in reducing the market frictions that may complicate access to funding. 
With reference to equity capital, El Ghoul et al. (2011) propose two main reasons 
that may support the existence of an inverse relationship between CSR and equity 
financing. On one hand, they assert that the companies more engaged in CSR are 
characterized by less severe information asymmetries, since socially responsible 
firms tend to disclose more information to promote their image of good citizen to 
stakeholders (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). Based on this argument, the authors 
sustain that higher information availability may lead to a cheaper cost of equity 
capital. 
On the other hand, considering that the cost of equity represents the rate of return 
that the market applies to the company's future cash flows, and drawing on the 
thesis that CSR reduces the level of the company’s risk (e.g. El Ghoul et al. (2011) 
expect that socially responsible companies to benefit from lower equity’s costs. 
Attig et al. (2013), instead, investigating the relationship between CSR and firms’ 
credit rating, identify three lines of reasoning that may explain the relationship 
between CSR and the cost of capital. First, drawing from the assumptions that 
socially responsible activities (1) favor the creation of favorable relations with 
stakeholders (e.g. Waddock and Graves, 1997), (2) enhance company reputation 
(e.g. Fombrun and Shanley, 1990), (3) support the pursuit of a competitive 
advantage (e.g. Porter and Kramer, 2006) and (4) improve financial performance 
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(e.g. Barnett and Salomon, 2012), they state that companies engaged in CSR 
should be perceived more positively by credit analysts, that thereby should be 
induced to assign to a lower probability to default. Secondly, since companies 
invest in socially responsible activities using internal financial resources, Attig et 
al. (2013) argue that the engagement in CSR may reduce their perceived risk of 
financial distress, signaling an efficient allocation of resources. Third, the authors 
sustain that credit analysts may perceive CSR investments as a sort of insurance 
against the potential costs of being socially irresponsible (Herremans and 
Akathaporn, 1993). A few years later, also El Ghoul et al. (2018) have recognized 
that CSR may be viewed as a hedging device. In particular, they argue that CSR 
may be considered as a tool for reducing both the probability and the costs 
associated with adverse events. 
 
 
 
 
1.6 Corporate Social performance 
 
 
Alongside with the evolution of CSR, in the mid-1970s, the concept of corporate social 
performance (CSP) emerged with particular emphasis. The latter, unlike the broader 
reference to CSR, tends to focus more on processes and outcomes of socially responsible 
initiatives. In particular, one of the first systematic models of CSP was provided by Sethi 
(1975). In his model, Sethi identifies three levels of CSP. The first level, defined as "social 
obligation", refers to the conduct of the company in response to market forces and social 
obligations. The second level, namely social responsibility, concerns the consistency of 
the company's behavior with the prevailing social norms, values, and expectations of 
performance. Finally, the third level, defined as social responsiveness, includes the ability 
of the company to adapt its behavior to social needs. 
In the late seventies, another landmark framework was provided by Carroll (1979). The 
author proposed a three-dimensional model, which included (1) social issues, i.e. the 
definition of social claims that the organization intends to satisfy; (2) corporate social 
responsiveness, i.e. the attitude that the company adopts to deal with social issues 
(reactive, defensive, accommodate or proactive); (3) social responsibility, i.e. the 
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responsibilities that the company is called to assume. In particular, with reference to this 
last point, Carroll divided the social responsibilities of the firm in four areas: economic, 
legal, ethical and philanthropic. With reference to the economic dimension, he refers to 
the responsibilities that the company has towards its shareholders, employees, and 
customers. The legal sphere of CSR, instead, requires that companies operate in 
compliance with the framework of the law. Finally, the areas of ethical and philanthropic 
responsibilities refer to the company's ethical conduct and to the voluntary commitment 
towards philanthropic issues, respectively. 
One of the most appreciated aspects of this model, which made it a reference point for 
further conceptual developments (e.g. Wood 1991) and empirical investigations (e.g. 
Wartick and Cochran 1985) is its ability to combine different aspects of performance in 
a single integrative framework. As recognized by Lee (2008), Carroll proposes a model 
through which the company's strategic response to social issues can be identified and 
evaluated (Lee, 2008).  
Moreover, over the years, CSR studies have been characterized by two conflicting lines 
of thought. On the one hand, some authors have claimed that the only responsibility of 
firms is to make profit (Levitt 1958; Friedman, 1962, 1970), on the other hand, others 
have suggested that they have broader responsibilities towards society (e.g. McGuire 
1963). In this sense, Carroll's model, including economic and social responsibility in a 
single framework, represents a moment of convergence between two opposing theoretical 
perspectives. 
The proposal of CSP models, over the years, can be interpreted as the attempt to 
operationalize the more generic concept of CSR, focusing more on the results that CSR 
engagement can generate. In this direction, new CSP conceptualizations were proposed 
during the 1980s. For instance, Wartick and Cochran (1985) presented an upgraded 
version of Carroll's three-dimensional model (1979). Differently from Carroll's 
framework, in addition to the identification of social areas to which the company must 
respond, Wartick and Cochran (1985) include the policies that the firm should adopt to 
address social issues. In 1991, Wood provided another model that has marked the 
evolution of CSP studies. She reformulated the concept of social performance, proposing 
a framework with three dimensions: the principles of CSR, the processes of corporate 
social responsibility and the outcomes of corporate behavior (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Wood's CSP model. 
         
    Principles of Corporate Social Responsibility     
       Institutional principle: legitimacy      
       Organizational principle: public responsibility     
       Individual principle: managerial discretion     
    Processes of Corporate Social Responsivness     
       Environmental assessment     
       Stakeholder management Issues management     
    Outcome of Corporate Behavior     
       Social impacts     
       Social programs      
       Social policies     
          
 
In the first dimension, Wood (1991) includes: (a) the principle of legitimation, according 
to which the organization through an appropriate use of power legitimizes its existence 
as an institution in the social environment in which it operates; (b) the principle of public 
responsibility, according to which companies are responsible for the outcomes related to 
their involvement in the society; (c) the principle of managerial discretion, which refers 
to the manager as moral actors of the organization. In the second dimension (the processes 
of corporate social responsibility), on the other hand, she includes the assessment of the 
environment in which the company operates, the management of relations with 
stakeholders and the definition of procedures useful for dealing with social problems. 
Finally, in the third dimension (outcomes of corporate behavior) Wood reports, on one 
hand, the social impact, on the other hand, the definition of the resources to be invested 
in social policies and programs. Over the years, a research area that has developed 
considerably concerns the relationship between CSP and financial performance (Orlitzky 
et al., 2003). The next section provides an overview of the investigations that have 
analyzed the connections between CSP and financial performance. 
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1.7 The relationship between corporate social performance and financial performance 
 
 
The research regarding the link between CSP and corporate financial performance (CFP) 
arose convincingly up to the early 1980s (e.g. Aupperle et al., 1985). One of the main 
argument within this area of research refers to the direction of the causation. In fact, even 
more recent studies argue that it is still not possible to categorically state if better CSR 
drives better CFP or better CFP improves CSR (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Rivera et 
al., 2017). In this sense, a seminal study has been proposed by Waddock and Graves 
(1997), who hypothesized that social performance is both a predictor and a consequence 
of financial performance. On one side, drawing from the slack of resource theory, the 
authors assert that firms with a better financial performance are expected to have a greater 
availability of resources (slack), which provide them the opportunity to invest more in 
socially responsible activities and to improve the corporate social performance. In fact, 
as argued by McGuire et al. (1988), CSR investments often depend on the discretion of 
managers, whose decisions can be strictly related to the availability of excess resources. 
The perspective of the slack resource theory has been discussed and confirmed by other 
studies (Brammer and Millington, 2005; Julian and Ofori-Dankwa, 2013). Also several 
recent empirical works have adopted this theoretical view to investigate if and how CSR 
determine better financial outcomes. For instance, Amato and Amato (2007) 
hypothesized that the resource slack, measured with the ROA, contributes to increase the 
firm's philanthropic initiatives. Brammer and Millington (2008) argued that the 
availability of financial resources significantly contributes to corporate charitable 
donations. 
On the other hand, Waddock and Graves (1997) state that CSR can be an antecedent of 
better financial performance. In particular, considering that attention to the social domain 
of business improves relations with stakeholders (e.g. Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995), they expect a better CSP results in a better overall firm performance. 
Several empirical studies confirm that CSR represents a positive predictor of accounting 
based measures of financial performance (Orlitzky et al., 2003). For example, Turban and 
Greening (1996), adopting a sample of U.S. firms, demonstrate that CSR is positively 
associated with ROA. Similarly, Galbreath (2006) using a sample of Australian firms, 
highlights a positive impact of CSR on ROA and ROE. Other works also empirically 
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confirm the significant positive impact of CSR on market-based measures, such as stock 
returns, fund returns, and Tobin’s Q (Seifert et al., 2003; Karpoff et al., 2005). 
However, other studies argue that CSR can have a negative impact on the firm's economic 
outcomes (e.g. Wright and Ferris, 1997). These authors often referred to the agency theory 
(Friedman, 1970; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), to explain the existence of a negative 
relationship. In particular, agency theory argues that the sole objective of the company is 
to generate profit for shareholders. Therefore, following this logic, agency theorists claim 
that investing in social issues represents an unjustified cost, which subtracts resources to 
the pursuit of the main goal of wealth maximization. Barnea and Rubin (2010) provide a 
further explanation of the negative impact that CSR may have on financial performance. 
In particular, they sustain that managers might over-invest in CSR just to improve their 
image of "good citizens". According to the authors, this managers' behavior might lead to 
costs that are not strategically justified, thereby negatively affecting the wealth of the 
shareholders. 
The relationship between CSR and financial performance can be explained also by 
looking at the way in which organizations understand and develop CSR. Kim et al. (2012) 
identify two main types of approaches to CSR. First, firms may strategically engage in 
CSR, investing a significant amount of resources in socially responsible initiatives. 
Alternatively, they may adopt a symbolic or a "greenwashing" approach (Christmann and 
Taylor, 2006) to CSR, aimed only to improve the corporate image or to address emerging 
social issues. With reference to this latter approach, according to Tang et al. (2012), the 
undertaking of sporadic CSR activities, without continuity over time, generates a negative 
effect on the firm's financial performance. As recognized also by Husted et al. (2015), 
socially responsible initiatives contribute to create value to the extent to which firms adopt 
a strategic approach to CSR. Following this reasoning line, companies not substantially 
and strategically engaged in the social domain may experience a negative effect of CSR 
activities on their financial performance. 
Some empirical investigations confirm that the engagement in CSR initiatives may 
negatively impact CFP. In this sense, Cowen et al. (1987)  find a negative relationship 
between CSR and ROE. A few years later, Dooley and Lerner (1994) and Turban and 
Greening (1996), using the KLD ratings, demonstrate that CSR negatively impacts on 
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ROA. Similarly, other studies adopting market-based measures also confirm that CSR 
engagement may have a negative effect on financial outcomes (Brammer et al., 2007). 
Other authors have also highlighted the existence of mixed relationships. For example, 
Brammer and Millington (2007) demonstrate that firms with both unusually high and low 
social performance have higher financial performance than other firms. Barnett and 
Salomon (2012) suggest that the ability to profit from social activities stems from the 
firm’s stakeholder influence capacity. In particular, the authors argue that for firms not 
equipped with the adequate capacity to influence stakeholder, the costs associated with 
the CSR investment are higher than their benefits. Accordingly, they find that firms with 
low social performance have higher CFP than firms with moderate social performance, 
but firms with high social performance have the highest CFP.  
In summary, despite the extensive empirical evidence, previous studies have shown 
conflicting results on the relationship between social and financial performance (e.g. 
Orlitzky et al., 2003; Reverte et al., 2016). 
The lack of convergent results has been attributed to several reasons. Some scholars have 
referred to the use of non-consistent and not reliable social performance measures 
(García-Castro et al., 2010; Surroca et al., 2010), or to problems of model specification 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). Other authors have claimed that previous investigations 
are mainly focused on short-term indicators, while CSR needs a long-term perspective to 
influence financial performance (Ittner and Larcker, 1998). Another possible reason is 
that prior literature has mainly focused on financial performance measures, neglecting the 
non-financial outcomes of CSR such as corporate reputation, increased employee 
motivation, customer satisfaction etc. (Reverte et al., 2016). 
However, a possible explanation, of inconclusive results, that is gaining momentum refers 
to the omission of variables that may mediate or moderate the relationship between CSR 
and financial performance (García-Castro et al., 2010; Rivera et al. 2017). In the last few 
years, several empirical works were proposed to address this point. For instance, Surroca 
et al. (2010), adopting a sample of 599 companies from 28 countries, find that the 
relationship between corporate responsibility and financial performance is mediated by 
the firm’s intangible resources. More recently, Agan et al. (2016) suggest that CSR 
positively influences environmental supplier development, which in turn has a positive 
impact on firms’ financial performance and competitive advantage. Reverte et al. (2016), 
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applying the structural equation modeling approach to a sample of 133 Spanish 
companies, show that in the manufacturing sector the innovation mediates the impact of 
CSR on financial performance. Rivera et al. (2017), instead, demonstrate that companies 
keeping a consistent approach to CSR, before and throughout the financial crisis, 
experience a positive impact of socially responsible engagement on CFP. Wang et al.  
(2017), defining the “CSR governance” as the control mechanisms through which firms 
engage in CSR and the “CSR outcomes” as the results that companies achieve in the 
social domain, demonstrate that CSR outcomes mediate the relationships between CSR 
governance and CFP. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Corporate Social Responsibility in the banking industry 
 
 
 
Summary: 2.1. Introduction; 2.2. Economic crises and bank social 
responsibility; 2.2.1 Technical and ethical aspects of economic crises; 
2.2.2 Bank social responsibility and stakeholder trusts; 2.3 Banking 
industry and socio-economic development; 2.4 Previous literature on 
CSR banking; 2.4.1 Motives of bank social responsibility. 2.4.2 The 
impact of bank social responsibility on economic performance; 2.4.3 The 
effects of bank social responsibility on stakeholders; 2.4.4 Bank social 
disclosure. 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Despite the first traces of banking social responsibility (BSR) can be found since the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (Soana, 2011), it still represents a timely and highly 
relevant issue. As argued by Sholtens (2009), bank social responsibility has become a 
well-established concept in the last few years. Goyal and Joshi (2011) suggest that 
socially responsible banking focuses on the satisfaction of the needs in the real economy 
and society, taking also into account their social, cultural, ecological, and economic 
sustainability.  
In recent years, the banking industry is becoming increasingly aware of its role as a global 
system in service to society. Socially responsible banking initiatives include programs 
supporting financial inclusion (e.g. impact investing and microfinance), investments in 
clean energy, support for causes related to human rights (Lee, 2008; Prior and Argandona, 
2009). In 2012, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) noted that banks 
are increasingly engaged in CSR, through initiatives ranging from the disclosure of their 
environmental and social risk assessment standards, the promotion of sustainable projects 
to the provision of sustainable products.  
Several authors argue that, differently from other sectors that adopt a reactive approach 
to CSR (Decker, 2004), banks have become one of the most proactive investors in CSR 
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(Marın et al. 2009; Perez and Rodrıguez del Bosque 2012; Aramburu and Pescador, 
2017). 
The high interest devoted by prior investigations to bank social responsibility is also due 
to the peculiarities that characterize the banking business, that makes it worthy of special 
attention (e.g. Wu et al., 2017).  
Acting as financial intermediaries, banks provide several services, such as the 
organization of the payment system, the pricing of financial assets, the credit distribution, 
the management of financial risks, which have a huge impact on society (Greenbaum and 
Thakor, 2007). Due to the relevance of banking activity for society and economic 
development, banks represent a highly regulated industry (Yamak and Suer, 2005). Banks  
are also frequently considered as knowledge-intensive organizations (Saengchan, 2008; 
Curado, 2008). Moreover, considering the intangible nature and the high technical content 
of the bank's products, the banking business is characterized by higher information 
asymmetries than other sectors (de Andres and Vallelado, 2008). 
Thus, given that the banking sector differs from other economic sectors, also the relevance 
and the effects of CSR engagement are different (Lentner et al., 2015). 
Banks through lending decisions influences the distribution of resources in the real 
economy. In this sense, being able to decide whether to finance more or less socially 
responsible companies, banks have also an indirect social responsibility. They have to 
monitor not only the socio-environmental impact of their operations but also the profile 
of the financed companies (Thompson and Cowton, 2004). 
Moreover, given the high involvement of banking industry in activities such as low-
income lending, monitoring of money laundering and corruption, it is straightforward that 
the concept of social responsibility assumes a different weight for banks compared to 
other firms. 
However, in addition to the peculiarities of banking activities, there are several other 
reasons that make the study of BSR a particularly relevant issue. 
First, the recent economic crises and corporate scandals have increased skepticism and 
scrutiny of the community towards the banking system. In this context, banks CSR 
engagement has frequently been considered a means to recover the stakeholders’ loss of 
trust.  
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Second, given the strong connections existing between banking activities and society 
(Levine, 2005; Shen and Lee, 2006; Beck et al., 2010), CSR engagement may represent 
for banks the opportunity to demonstrate that they are operating consistently with the 
societal values and beliefs.   
Third, nevertheless bank social responsibility has become very popular among academics 
(Scholtens, 2009), the empirical evidence is still scarce (e.g. Wu et al., 2017) and it still 
appears a less investigated area compared to literature on CSR adopting non-banking data 
(Carnevale et al. 2012; McDonald, 2015). 
Thus, in line with the abovementioned arguments, the current Chapter is organized as 
follows. Section 2.2 describes the characteristics of the recent economic crisis and 
discusses the role of CSR to recover the loss of confidence towards the banking industry. 
Section 2.2 illustrates the bank social responsibility in light of the socio-economic role of 
banks. Finally, section 2.3 reviews the main empirical studies on bank social 
responsibility. 
 
 
2.2 Economic crises and bank social responsibility  
 
 
A reason that has pushed financial institutions to increase their engagement in CSR sinks 
its roots in the financial imbalances that have characterized the global economy in the last 
years. The recent financial crisis and the growing number of banks bailouts have 
witnessed not only the failure of markets regulations but have also brought out the 
fragility of the beliefs and moral standards adopted within banks’ business models. These 
events have posed more than ever the banking system under the scrutiny of a wide public, 
including regulators, policymakers, clients, employees, investors (Black and Strahan, 
2001). In this context, the engagement in CSR activities may represent for banks the 
opportunity to reorganize their businesses and to regain the trust of stakeholder. 
In line with these arguments, this section includes two subsections and has a twofold 
objective. First, the subsection 2.2.1 describes the main causes of two recent economic 
crises that hurt advanced economies, namely, the financial and sovereign debt crises. In 
particular, it provides a brief overview, showing that the causes of crises can be ascribed 
to several contributing and interacting factors, which involve technical, behavioral and 
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ethical aspects. The subsection 2.2.2, instead, discusses how banks’ engagement in CSR 
can be considered a valuable strategy to recover the trust of stakeholders. 
 
 
2.2.1 Technical and ethical aspects of economic crises 
 
 
The financial crisis of 2008, which reached its apical point with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, was a complex event that is still affecting the global economic equilibrium. 
Among its most relevant causes, there was the combination of a credit boom and a 
housing bubble. As documented by Acharya and Richardson (2009), during the period 
2002-2007, the ratio of debt to national income increased from 3.75 to 4.75. This trend 
was probably favored by the Federal Reserve’s cut of interest rates and by some American 
Government’s initiatives, such as the American Dream Downpayment Initiative (2003), 
which intended to subsidize the down payments and closing costs of first-time home 
buyers. These elements, coupled with the high use of leverage in housing purchase, and 
with the average scant ability of borrowers to pay back mortgages, laid the foundations 
for the explosion of the financial crisis. 
Another factor that created fertile ground for the explosion of the crisis refers to the 
obsession of financial intermediaries for profit maximization, which has led them to 
finance borrowers with low creditworthiness, to increase financial innovation and risky 
speculation. These latter aspects, associated with the deregulation of the US capital 
markets (e.g. the removal of the Glass Steagall Act), have stimulated the abuse of 
derivatives for speculative purposes. In this sense, a further contribution to make even 
more severe the effects of crisis stemmed from the large use of collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs), through which banks transferred the risk from the assets side of their 
balance sheet to other investors. In particular, the adoption of this technique, namely 
securitization, has had two main side effects. First, it has facilitated the widespread of the 
financial imbalances to the financial markets. Second, it has encouraged banks to further 
loosen the credit screening criteria.  
In this context, the opacity of CDOs was another critical element. Some tranches of 
CDOs, containing low-quality loans, received positive evaluations by rating agencies, due 
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to modeling failures or probably to conflicts of interest, as rating agencies may have been 
more interested in generating fees than doing accurate evaluations. The CDOs’ positive 
ratings appealed investors interested in the reliability of the investment, thereby further 
contributing to their widespread over the markets. The mechanism of securitization, 
which has the worthy purpose of avoiding risk's concentrations at the institutional level 
by distributing it among a large numbers of investors, has contributed to the explosion of 
the crisis to the extent to which financial institutions used it to run around capital 
adequacy regulations and to increase their level of leverage (Acharya and Richardson, 
2009).  
The succession of these events led to a loss of confidence and undermined the credibility 
of authorities, central banks and in particular towards financial institutions. 
The mitigation of the effects of the financial crisis, such as the need to support troubled 
banks, required a vast amount of public funds. The aftermaths of these events contributed 
to generating high Government debts, especially among European countries, provoking 
what has been defined as the sovereign debt crisis. This latter began at the end of 2009 
and reached its peak between 2010 and 2012. The possibility of default by some 
governments, coupled with the collapse of some financial institutions, generated a new 
wave of distrust, which contributed to the rising bond yield spreads in government 
securities.  
However, even though technical causes have played a key role, they only partially explain 
the economic imbalances. In fact, a more complete understanding of the economic crises 
requires to go beyond the purely technical aspects, analyzing the ethical and behavioral 
issues that have contributed to their explosions (e.g. Lins et al., 2017). 
In this sense, several authors have argued that unethical behaviors have emerged both at 
an individual level and at an organizational level during the last crises (Agle and Caldwell, 
1999; Lewis et al., 2010; Gangi and Trotta, 2015). With reference to individual ethics, 
Argandona (2012) highlights how greed, excessive confidence in personal skills, lack of 
prudence, obsession for wealth maximization, moral hazard have been ethically 
questionable attitudes, that have frequently characterized the behavior of market 
operators in recent years. 
However, individual behaviors influence and in turn are influenced by the ethical 
dimension of the organizations to which they belong. In fact, on the one hand, the 
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decisions and attitudes of individuals contribute to determine the ethics of the 
organization. On the other hand, the organization itself directs individual behaviors. In 
this direction, recent crises have highlighted, for example, a lack of organizational 
leadership, the lack of professional competence, the excessive trust of analysts in 
mathematical models of assets analysis, frequently difficult to interpret by managers. 
Some authors argue that both individual and organizational ethical issues are not isolated 
events, they rather represent the manifestation of a shortage of ethical values, which 
involve the whole social system of several developed countries (Argandona, 2012; Lewis 
et al., 2010). 
 
 
2.2.2 Bank social responsibility and stakeholder trusts 
 
 
The last economic crisis, the deterioration of the economy along with numerous bank 
management scandals and ethically questionable behaviors has fueled a challenging 
environment for the banking sector. This latter has been assigned with the major 
responsibilities for the economic turmoil of the last years. The dynamics that 
characterized the recent economic crises have created skepticism towards the banks’ 
business models, subjecting these latter, more than ever, to the scrutiny of the 
stakeholders and the community in general. 
The adoption of unethical practices by several banks and the lack of transparency in 
government bailouts have generated anger and loss of confidence of stakeholders towards 
the whole banking system (e.g. Forcadell and Aracil, 2017). Banks have been frequently 
criticized for their inability to take account of the impact on society of their strategies and 
operations (e.g. Cornett et al., 2016). 
These issues represent a priority agenda item for the G7, G20, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and central banks. The adoption of prudent business models by financial 
institutions is crucial to prevent destabilizing events (ICCR, 2012). The restoring of the 
eroded trust represents for banks an important issue that has attracted the attention of 
governments and industry committees. In this sense, some examples include the De la 
Rosière report of the European Commission (2009), the reports of the US Financial Crisis 
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Inquiry Commission (2011) and the Vickers Commission (2011) or the document 
"Restoring Trust" of the Advisory Committee on Future of banks in Netherlands. 
In this context, CSR engagement may represent a means which favors financial 
sustainability and stability (Lenter et al., 2015). Prior literature widely recognizes how it 
can help to create social capital and rebuild trust in organizations (Benabou and Tirole, 
2010; Kim et al., 2012; Gao et al., 2014). Several authors have pointed out how 
organizations with greater social capital present better economic results (La Porta et al., 
1997; Knack and Keefer, 1997) 3. The engagement in socially responsible initiatives 
represents for banks one of the most valuable ways to improve their image towards the 
public (e.g. Fassin and Gosselin, 2011; Mattila et al., 2010; Ruiz et al., 2014; Cornett et 
al., 2016).  
In this sense, Lins et al. (2017) note how, during periods of crisis, CSR becomes even 
more relevant to improve the level of stakeholders’ trust in corporations. The positive 
effects of CSR are particularly remarkable in the banking industry (Forcadell and Aracil, 
2017; Mattila et al., 2010; Ruiz et al., 2014). In fact, the characteristics of banking activity 
and the intangible nature of banking products make their reputation one of the most 
important assets. More than other industry, banks need to be perceived as trustworthy 
(Fassin and Gosselin, 2011), in order to effectively carry out their business4. In this 
context, CSR programs are for banks a way to recover their reputation, signaling to the 
community that they are operating consistently with societal expectations (Chemmanur 
and Fulghieri, 1994).   
 
 
2.3 Banking industry and socio-economic development 
 
Another reason, that makes the analysis of the bank’s social responsibility a relevant 
theme, refers to the role that the banking system plays in social and economic 
                                                          
3 Social capital here is intended as the propensity of economic agents to contribute positively to the 
develoment of community and social life (Putnam 2000; Scrivens and Smith, 2013).  
4 Previous empirical investigations acknowledge how better bank’s reputation are associated to better 
economic performance, in terms of higher profitability and quality of borrowers (e.g. Bushman and 
Wittenberg-Moerman, 2012), or in terms of better stock returns (Ross, 2010). 
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development. The recognition of the positive effects that a well-functioning banking 
system can have on economic growth dates back to Adam Smith (1776). 
Acting as intermediaries, banks favor the transfer of resources between operators, reduce 
information asymmetries, enforce contracts, reduce transaction costs. Following the 
previous literature (Levine, 2005, Merton and Bodie, 2004; Shen and Lee, 2006), it is 
possible to identify some fundamental functions that make the banking industry crucial 
for economic development. First, banks produce information and facilitate the allocation 
of capital. Indeed, there may be high costs associated with gathering and understanding 
of information on possible investments. The individual savers may not have the 
knowledge and resources necessary to evaluate companies, managers and market 
conditions and allocate capital. Banks reduce the costs associated with the collection and 
processing of information, improving the capital allocation choices and accelerating 
economic growth (Levine, 2005; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990).  
Second, banks perform a monitoring and governance function on financed companies. As 
providers of capital, banks monitor and orient managers' investment decisions, potentially 
improving the efficiency with which firms allocate resources. Several previous studies 
argue that a well-functioning financial system, through the improvement of corporate 
governance mechanisms (e.g. Bencivenga and Smith, 1993), boosts firms productivity, 
favors capital accumulation and promotes economic development. As recognized by 
Levine (2005), the influence that the banking industry has on the performance of 
companies have broad ramifications on economic growth of countries. Third, banks take 
a central position in the reduction and management of risk. They provide the vehicles for 
trading and diversifying risk. Again, the ability of banks to pool, allocate and diversify 
risk favor economic growth, affecting resource allocation and savings rates.  
Fourth, the banking system collects savings from a multitude of subjects and use them to 
finance the economy. Drawing from the fundamentals of banking theory, banks act as 
intermediaries between depositors and borrowers (Diamond 1984). The savers provide 
the resources to make loans and the banks, providing the expertise for the assessment of 
the creditworthiness of borrowers, proceed to allocate the collected capital. Banks that 
are able to effectively collect savings from individuals can have a huge impact on 
economic development (e.g. Levine, 2005; Sirri and Tufano, 1995). The collection of 
resources from many different individuals and the investment in diversified portfolios of 
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assets allows the reallocation of funds towards higher return investments, with positive 
effects on economic growth (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997).  
Fifth, several authors recognize that banks can promote labor specialization (Galetovic, 
1996) and technological innovation (Greenwood and Smith, 1996). In particular, with 
reference to this latter aspect, banks can promote innovation by identifying those 
companies that are more likely to succeed in introducing new products and processes 
(Schumpeter, 1912; King and Levine, 1993; Galetovic, 1996; Blackburn and Hung, 1998; 
Acemoglu et al., 2003). This should improve the allocation of resources among 
competing firms, thereby generating positive ramifications on economic growth (De la 
Fuente and Marin, 1996). 
Empirical studies also confirm the existence of a positive link between the development 
of the banking system and economic growth. In this sense, King and Levine (1993), for 
instance, using data on 80 countries over the 1960-1989 period, demonstrated that long-
term growth is closely linked to the degree of development of the financial system. Beck 
and Levine (2004) adopting a panel dataset for the period 1976–1998 find that stock 
markets and banks have a positive influence on economic growth. A more recent study 
conducted by Akinci and Queralto (2014), on OECD member countries for the period 
1980-2011, also find a positive long-run relationship between financial development and 
economic growth. 
In light of the above arguments, it appears straightforward that the safety and well- 
functioning of the banking system can sustain economic prosperity and generate several 
benefits for society (Levine, 2005; Shen and Lee, 2005; Beck et al. 2010). 
Given the close connections existing between banks and socio-economic development ( 
Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Scholtens, 2009; Achua, 2008), more than other sectors, the 
banking industry is called to respond to the community about the way in which the 
activities are carried out. Moreover, considering that the banks determine how public 
resources are invested, their capital allocation decisions are subject to high levels of 
attention by stakeholders. Authors recognize that bank's responsibility is highly 
scrutinized by Government, customers, shareholders, staff, community (Khan, 2010). As 
argued by Simpson and Kohers (2002) and Thomson and Cowton (2004), banks have not 
only direct responsibilities towards society but also an indirect responsibility to the extent 
to which they finance companies poorly engaged in socially responsible issues.  
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In this context, the undertaking of CSR activities for banks represents one of the most 
effective ways to demonstrate and communicate how they include social issues within 
their strategies and operations. Over the years, the general perception that the public has 
of banks' engagement in social and environmental issues has become increasingly 
important (Barako and Brown, 2008). Nowadays, scholars widely recognize how banks’ 
undertaking of CSR policies allows to shape public perceptions and to build 
organizational legitimacy (e.g. Perez and Del Bosque, 2012). 
 
 
2.4 Previous literature on bank social responsibility 
 
The current section reports the empirical studies analyzing CSR in the banking industry. 
In particular, the section is organized in four subsections that review the previous 
empirical studies concerning: (a) the motives of banks' engagement in socially 
responsible initiatives; (b) the impact of BSR on bank's economic performance, (c) the 
effects that BSR produces on stakeholders, (d) the banks' disclosure of CSR activities. 
 
 
2.4.1 Motives of bank social responsibility 
 
In recent years, some studies have attempted to deepen whether banks' engagement in 
CSR is driven by regulatory constraints, or by other motivations (e.g. Pomering and 
Dolnicar, 2009). In this direction, for example, Angus-Leppan et al. (2010) suggest that 
the reasons that bring banks to engage in CSR can be linked to leadership style. More 
specifically, on the one hand, suggests that strategic CSR is preferred by autocratic 
leaders. On the other hand, they argue that implicit CSR, framed as the personal or 
organizational values and beliefs, is likely to be preferred by authentic leaders.  
A few years later, Wu and Shen (2013), examining 162 banks in 22 countries, suggest 
that banks engage in CSR for three motives, namely, strategic, altruism, and 
greenwashing. In addition, they note that depending on the motivation behind 
engagement in CSR, it changes its impact on financial performance. In particular, the 
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authors find that the strategic, altruistic and greenwashing approach to CSR has a positive, 
non-negative and no impact on financial outcomes, respectively. 
 
2.4.2 The impact of bank social responsibility on economic performance 
 
The empirical analysis of the impact that the banks’ engagement in CSR activities has on 
their economic results represents one of the most investigated topics in the field of studies 
on CSR in the banking industry. 
In this area, a first set of studies refers to the effects that bank social responsibility has on 
financial performance. In particular, one of the first studies was proposed in 2002, by 
Simpson and Kohers. The authors, analyzing a sample of 385 US commercial banks, 
noted that the bank’s engagement in CSR has a strong positive impact on its financial 
performance. A few years later, Soana (2011), considering a sample of 21 international 
banks rated by Ethibel, showed no statistically significant relationship between social and 
financial performance. 
In 2013, Wu and Shen analyzed the relationship between BSR and financial performance 
taking into account the possible motivations that may induce banks to engage in CSR. 
More specifically, they suggest that the impact is positive, non-negative, and non-existent 
depending on whether CSR programs are driven by strategic, altruistic and greenwashing 
motives, respectively. 
Among the most recent studies, it is noteworthy the analysis conducted by Cornett et al. 
(2016). They examine the relationship between social responsibility and financial 
performance of a sample of US commercial banks, around the years of the financial crisis. 
Contrary to the authors' expectations, the study shows that larger banks are significantly 
more engaged in CSR initiatives than smaller ones. Shen et al. (2016), instead, using a 
sample of banks from 18 countries, demonstrate that those engaged in CSR over perform 
banks not engaged, both in terms of profitability and in terms of quality of credit. 
Specifically, they highlight a positive relationship between CSR and profit indicators and 
a negative relationship between CSR and non-performing loans. Another relevant study 
was proposed by Esteban-Sanchez et al. (2017). Unlike previous studies, they examine 
the impact that specific dimensions of CSR have on financial performance. In this sense, 
the authors find that the adoption of CSR practices in corporate governance and within 
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the management of employees lead to better financial performance. On the contrary, they 
point out that the product responsibility dimension does not positively influence the 
financial indicators. Finally, they suggest that attention to the community's social issues 
also represents a positive predictor of financial performance during times of crisis. Wu et 
al. (2017), instead, after having classified a sample of 194 depository-type banks in four 
categories, based on their degree of CSR, show that the higher is the engagement in CSR, 
the better is their financial performance. Gangi et al. (2018a) focusing on a sample of 72 
European banks, highlight that bank’s engagement in socially responsible issue is a 
positively related to financial performance’s indicators and negatively related to 
nonperforming loans.  Fijałkowska et al. (2018), applying several panel regressions 
analysis focusing on a sample of 20 major public banks belonging to the central and 
eastern European countries, demonstrate that BSR does not determine changes in the 
banks' financial results. Gangi et al. (2018b), instead, considering the mediating role of 
the absorption of CSR-knowledge, show that BSR positively influences the bank’s 
financial performance. Finally, Gangi et al. (2018c), adopting an international sample of 
142 banks,  document the positive impact of corporate governance mechanisms on bank’s 
environmental management and a less exposure to risk among socially responsible banks. 
Unlike the studies cited so far that focus mainly on financial performance, Bouvain et al. 
(2013) investigate the impact that the CSR has on bank’s brand value. In particular, 
focusing on a sample of 84 banks from East Asia and USA, the authors highlight that the 
brand value is positively associated with the adoption of CSR practices towards 
employees, in Japan and South Korea, with the attention towards community, in China, 
and with the respect for the environment and the "green" issues in the USA.  
Goss and Roberts (2011), instead, analyze the relationship between corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and bank debt. They find that businesses with CSR concerns on 
average tend to pay higher interest rates on bank debt. 
In summary, despite some exceptions showing the existence of neutral link (e.g. Soana, 
2011), it is possible to state that most of the studies conducted in recent years converge 
in suggesting the existence of a positive link between BSR and economic outcomes. 
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2.4.3 The effects of bank social responsibility on stakeholders 
 
Another line of research on CSR banking refers to the analysis of the effects that bank's 
engagement in socially responsible initiatives has on its stakeholders. Accordingly, the 
current subsection reviews the empirical evidence produced in recent years with reference 
to the most investigated bank’s stakeholder categories, namely consumers, employees 
and the community (McDonald, 2015). 
 
• Customers  
 
In particular, among the abovementioned categories, previous literature 
recognizes how customers are particularly sensitive to CSR programs (e.g. 
Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004). In this direction, Chang et al., (2009) suggest that 
the promotion of bank’s initiatives in the social domain, defined by the authors as 
"social marketing", influences the perception of customers in two ways. On the 
one hand, it increases the perceived quality of the bank’s products, on the other 
hand, it reduces the level of perceived risk. Similarly, Poolthong and 
Mandhachitara (2009) and Mandhachitara and Poolthong (2011), focusing on the 
retail banking sector in Thailand and using a survey-based approach, show how 
the bank's engagement in CSR policies has a significant and positive impact on 
perceived quality of banking products and on customers' loyalty. Matute-Vallejo 
et al. (2011), instead, applying structural equation modelling to a sample of 300 
customers of banks and saving banks in the Spanish context, demonstrate that the 
satisfaction and the commitment of customers mediate the relationship between 
bank social responsibility and customer loyalty.  Also Alafi and Al Sufy (2012) 
confirm that in the Jordan banking industry CSR is associated with higher 
customer satisfaction. Moreover, they note that customer satisfaction mediates the 
relationship between CSR and financial performance. Other studies have 
investigated CSR influence on customers by distinguishing different CSR 
dimensions. For instance, Garcia de los Salmones et al. (2009), framing CSR as a 
marketing tool and administering a survey to a sample of real customers, highlight 
that the impact of ethical and philanthropic responsibilities of the bank on the 
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client loyalty are mediated by trust and corporate identification, respectively. A 
few years later, McDonald and Lai (2011) analyze whether consumers in the 
Taiwanese banking sector prefer CSR initiatives oriented towards them or those 
oriented towards the community and the environment. The authors find that 
behavioral intentions and customer attitudes are positively influenced by 
environmental policies and "customer-centric" policies, showing how these latter 
have a stronger significant impact. Other authors point out that customers' 
psychological features (Perez and Rodríguez del Bosque, 2013a) and motivational 
attributes (Perez and Rodríguez del Bosque, 2013b) assume a key role in 
explaining customers' perceptions of CSR policies.  
Looking at more recent studies, Aramburu and Pescador (2017), analyzing 572 
personal surveys in the Basque Country, show that corporate reputation mediates 
the relationship between social responsibility and customer loyalty. They also 
show how the type of bank does not moderate the relationship. 
In summary, although research in this area is still scant (Deng and Xu, 2018), the 
abovementioned empirical investigations seem to indicate that the bank's CSR 
activities positively influence consumer perceptions. 
 
• Employee  
 
The influence that the undertaking of socially responsible practices has on internal 
stakeholders, and in particular towards employees, is gaining momentum among 
researchers and academics (e.g. Kim et al., 2010; Rodrigo and Arenas, 2008). 
Authors recognize that CSR engagement may play a crucial role in employee 
attachment to their firm (Lee et al., 2013). 
With reference to the banking industry, Gilder et al. (2005) show that, within the 
Dutch ABN-AMRO bank, employee volunteering has positive effects on their 
attitudes and behavior towards the organization. Ruiz-Palomino et al. (2012), 
instead, using a sample of employees from Spanish commercial banks, find that 
the organization's ethical culture positively influences employee job satisfaction, 
their commitment and their intention to remain within the organization. 
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In a more recent study, Valentine and Godkin (2017), applying a mediation 
analysis to a sample of subjects employed in a southern regional branch of a 
national banking institution demonstrated that perceived CSR increased employee 
commitment and reduces their turnover intentions. In summary, even if the 
empirical evidence in this area is limited, the few previous investigations seem to 
suggest that the bank's engagement in social responsibility positively influences 
the attitudes of employees. 
 
 
• Community 
 
Some empirical studies have focused on the contribution that the banking industry 
can make to social issues. In this direction, for instance, Ragodoo (2009) focuses 
on a sample of 19 banks of Mauritius. The author finds that despite the local 
banking industry devotes about 1.2 percent of its profits to CSR, its contribution 
to alleviating poverty is lower than in other sectors, such as the hotel industry or 
sugar production. Barroso et al. (2012), instead, examine how a sample of Spanish 
savings banks contributes to international development. In this sense, the authors 
point out an increasingly relevant role of these savings banks in cooperation for 
development, mainly due to stakeholder pressures. 
 
 
 
2.4.4 The banks' disclosure of CSR activities 
 
A considerable amount of investigations, in the field of study on CSR banking, concerns 
the disclosure of banks' engagement in socially responsible issues. 
The relevance of the bank's social disclosure is linked to the high visibility of the banking 
industry (e.g. Khan, 2010). In a historical period in which the credibility of the banking 
system has been severely undermined, banks are called more than ever to demonstrate 
their fulfillment of social obligations (Menassa and Brodhacker, 2017). Authors widely 
recognize that CSR programs are one of the main avenues for banks to re-engage with 
communities (e.g. Pomering and Dolnicar, 2009). In this context, the disclosure of CSR 
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initiatives becomes an important means to communicate with stakeholders (Menassa, 
2010) and to legitimize their business. 
In line with these arguments, in recent years, a growing body of studies has analyzed the 
CSR disclosure in the banking industry.  
A first group of studies concerns the effects that the characteristics of the organization 
produce on the CSR disclosure of banks. In this sense, for instance, Hamid (2004) shows 
that size, listing status and age of Malaysian banks significantly influence their disclosure 
practices, while, profitability measures are not significantly related to CSR disclosure. 
Branco and Rodrigues (2008), instead, considering the size and the industry affiliation as 
proxy of the bank's visibility, show that banks with a higher visibility are more concerned 
with improving their image through CSR initiatives' disclosure than banks with less 
visibility. Barako and Brown (2008), focusing on the banking industry in Kenya, find that 
a greater presence of women and independent directors on board significantly improves 
social disclosure. In the Bengali context, Khan (2010), analyzing the annual reports of 
private commercial banks for the years 2007-2008, finds no significant relationship 
between the women representation on board and CSR reporting. By contrast, he 
demonstrates that non-executive directors and the presence of foreign nationalities on the 
board have a positive impact the CSR reporting. More recently, focusing on the annual 
reports of 11 Tunisian listed banks during the period from 2007 to 2012, Chakroun et al. 
(2016) highlight that age, financial performance, and state shareholding represent the 
main predictors of CSR disclosure. 
A second group of studies, instead, analyzes the effects of CSR disclosure on the market 
value or performance of banks. 
In this area, it is noteworthy the study of Carnevale et al. (2012). They show that, in the 
European context, only in some countries social reporting has a positive impact on the 
stock price, while in others it generates negative effects on the market value of the bank.  
Menassa (2010), instead, adopting a content analysis of the annual reports of 24 Lebanese 
commercial banks, suggests the existence of a strong association between the social 
disclosure, the banks' size and financial performance. Another relevant study, which 
applies a content analysis to the annual reports of 169 German banks, was proposed by 
Menassa and Brodhacker (2017). In particular, the authors find that the sampled banks 
dedicate more space, within their reports, to product, customers and human resource 
76 
 
disclosures than other areas. Moreover, they show that the bank's disclosure of CSR 
activities significantly affects both ROE and net profits. 
Other investigations have focused on how social reporting activitìes are perceived by 
stakeholders. For example, Khan et al. (2009) suggest that the users of banks' annual 
reports are in favor of reporting and they would appreciate more CSR reporting. Perez 
and del Bosque (2012), instead, conducting a qualitative research based on banking 
service providers, point out that due to the fear of a negative reaction from public or to a 
business tradition not oriented toward communication banks do not seem to fully take 
advantage of CSR disclosure. 
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CHAPTER 3. Outline of the empirical research  
 
 
 
Summary: 3.1. Introduction; 3.2. Characteristics and objectives of the 
empirical research; 3.3. Data collection method; 3.4. Sample description.    
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the empirical research. In particular, the chapter is 
organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the characteristics and objectives of the empirical 
analysis performed within in chapter 4 and chapter 5. Section 3.3 shows the data collection 
procedure. Section 3.4 describes the adopted sample of banks.     
 
 
 
3.2. Characteristics and objectives of the empirical research  
 
 
The empirical analysis investigates the determinants and effects of bank’s social responsibility 
(BSR). It is organized in two chapters, namely Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
Chapter 4 analyzes the factors determining the BSR. In particular, drawing from several 
theoretical perspectives, such as slack of resource theory, agency theory, stakeholder theory the 
chapter proposes a descriptive and multivariate empirical investigation, which aims to identify if 
and how CG and FP affect several dimensions of BSR. On the other hand, Chapter 5 focuses on 
the effects of BSR. More specifically, considering different theoretical views, the study analyzes 
the impact that different measures of BSR have on client loyalty. The chapter intends to contribute 
to the recent and developing line of studies analyzing the impact of BSR on bank’s economic 
outcomes (e.g. Cornett et al. 2016; Esteban-Sanchez et al., 2017). Given that loyalty of bank’s 
client is frequently considered closely linked to banks’s profitability (e.g. Bolton et al., 2004; 
Chiou and Droge, 2006), the study answers to the call by earlier studies for deeper investigations 
on the mechanisms connecting BSR to financial performance (e.g. Wu and Shen, 2013).   
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3.3. Data collection method 
 
The bank-level data adopted to perform the empirical analysis come from several sources. In 
particular, data on CSR have been collected from Asset4-ESG database. Consistently with the 
objective of the work, the analysis excludes the banks for which the database does not report data 
on CSR. Asset4-ESG provides 229 scores, calculated through 645 data points, which indicate the 
level of corporate engagement in environmental, social and governance dimensions. As 
recognized by prior literature, Asset4-ESG provides transparent, auditable and objective 
information, that allow to measure the level of companies’ engagement in CSR activities (Ferrero-
Ferrero et al., 2015; Schafer et al., 2006). Moreover, as noted by Mervelskemper (2015; p.4), 
reflecting the information contained in corporate sustainability reports, news and questionnaires, 
the scores provided by Asset4-ESG  allow to avoid the biases resulting from the use of only self-
reported information. As recognized by previous literature (e.g. Griffin and Mahon, 1997), 
multiple sources of information allow to produce a more comprehensive metric of CSR 
engagement.  
With reference to financial performance indicators, the study considers the data provided by 
Worldscope database. Finally, for macroeconomic data, the study refers to the World Bank’ 
database.  
 
3.4 Sample description  
 
The empirical investigation focuses on an international panel of 148 banks from 2010 -2015, 
identified through Thomson Reuters Eikon. The adoption of panel data, to test the research 
hypotheses, makes empirical evidence more robust. Combining the characteristics of cross-
section data and time series data, panel data improve the examination of companies’ performance 
over time, through the analysis of observations of the same companies over several consecutive 
years. In contrast to time-series or cross-sectional data, they allow to capture unobserved 
heterogeneity and undetected differences among banks (Baltagi and Griffin, 1984). 
Moreover, the decision to focus on a single industry may also enhance the reliability of the 
empirical evidence (Simpson and Kohers, 2002). In fact, since different industries may face with 
different stakeholder claims (Rowley and Berman, 2000) and considering that CSR 
conceptualizations vary across industries (Decker, 2004), multi-industries investigations may 
generate confusing and less reliable findings (Griffin and Mahon, 1997).  
Looking at the composition of the sample, Table 1 shows the distribution by country of the 
sampled banks. The geographical distribution of banks appears homogeneous, since the 26.35 % 
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comes from Asia, the 33.79% from Europe, the 31.76% from North America and around the 8 % 
from the United Kingdom and Australia. At the country level, instead, USA and Japan and Italy 
present the largest number of banks, with the 25.68%, 14.86%, and 7.43%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Sample distribution by country. 
Country Freq.  % 
 
Asia 
Hong Kong 3 2,03 
Israel 4 2,7 
Japan 22 14,86 
Republic of Korea 7 4,73 
Singapore 3 2,03 
Tot. 39 26,35 
 
Europe  
Austria 2 1,35 
Belgium 2 1,35 
Denmark 3 2,03 
France 3 2,03 
Germany 3 2,03 
Greece 5 3,38 
Republic of Ireland 3 2,03 
Italy 11 7,43 
Norway 1 0,68 
Portugal 2 1,35 
Spain 6 4,05 
Sweden 4 2,7 
Switzerland 5 3,38 
Tot. 50 33,79 
 
North America 
Canada 9 6,08 
USA 38 25,68 
Tot. 47 31,76 
Australia 6 4,05 
United Kingdom 6 4,05 
Tot.  148 100 
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CHAPTER 4 – Determinants of Bank Social Responsibility  
 
Summary: 4.1. Introduction; 4.2 Theoretical background and research 
hypotheses; 4.2.1 Financial performance and bank social responsibility; 
4.2.2 Corporate governance and bank social responsibility; 4.2.2.1 
Board size; 4.2.2.2 Board independence; 4.2.2.3 Board diversity; 
4.2.2.4 Board activity; 4.3 Methodology; 4.3.1 Variables; 4.3.1.1  
Dependent Variables; 4.3.1.2  Independent variables; 4.3.1.3 Control 
variables 4.3.2 Tobit regression model; 4.4 Results; 4.4.1 Descriptive 
analysis; 4.4.2 Multivariate analysis; 4.5 Conclusions. 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Over the last decades, scholars have devoted a growing interest towards corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). The World Bank identifies CSR as the commitment of businesses 
to contribute to sustainable economic development by working with stakeholders to 
improve their lives, in ways that are good for the business and development (Starks, 
2009). Following Renneboog et al. (2008), the core of CSR involves environmental, 
social, and governance issues. In its simplest form, CSR refers to the corporations’ 
responsibilities towards society (Rao and Tilt, 2016, p.327). 
The empirical research on CSR mainly follows two directions. On one hand, scholars 
examine the effects of engagement in CSR on business performance (e.g. Barnett and 
Salomon, 2012), on the other hand, they focus on the determinants of CSR (e.g. Surroca 
et al., 2010). The first line of studies represents the dominant focus of CSR research and 
it mainly aims to verify whether it is possible to profit from social responsibility (Wood, 
2010). The second direction of research, which has been relatively much less investigated 
(Julian and Ofori-Dankwa, 2013), analyzes the factors that favor firms to do good for 
society.  
The current study can be placed in this second stream. The purpose of the chapter is to 
investigate the antecedents that contribute to explain the CSR engagement in the banking 
industry. More in particular, the work investigates if and how (1) the financial 
performance and (2) the corporate governance (CG) characteristics of banks affect the 
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bank social responsibility (BSR). The study argues that the investigation of such 
relationships presents peculiarities for banks that require to be patterned distinctively 
from other industries.  
With reference to the investigation of financial performance and CSR in the banking 
context, several studies, in the last few years, have empirically analyzed how banks 
engagement in socially responsible initiatives affects their financial outcomes. For 
examples, Bolton (2013) finds a positive relationship between CSR and banks’operating 
performance. Wu and Shen (2013) ascertain how the bank's strategical engagement in 
CSR is associated with higher profitability measures. Cornett et al., (2016) show that 
biggest banks invest more in CSR activities than smaller banks and that in general banks 
appear financially rewarded to be socially responsible. Shen et al. (2016) highlight that 
profitability ratios are higher in banks with better social performance. Esteban-Sanchez 
et al. (2017) find that during the periods of crisis banks with better relationships with 
community present better financial performance. Wu et al. (2017) considering various 
degrees of CSR engagement demonstrate that the higher is the bank's engagement in CSR, 
the better is the financial performance. However, while scholars, in general, converge that 
banks social responsibility favors the achievement of better financial performance, there 
are only a few studies investigating the banks’ financial performance as antecedent of 
their engagement in CSR (Chih et al., 2010). In this sense, it can be said that the research 
agenda on financial determinants of CSR at bank‐level is still in its infancy. 
On the other hand, with reference to the CG, the current study argues that the analysis of 
the relationship, between the CG characteristics and banks’ engagement in socially 
responsible initiatives, represents a highly relevant issue for several reasons. Haan and 
Vlahu (2016) argue that the investigation of the impact that CG mechanisms have on 
business performance may assume distinctive traits in the banking industry and, thus, 
worthy of special attention. In particular, they assert that some of the empirical 
regularities found in the previous studies on corporate governance of non-financial firms 
might not hold for banks, due to the peculiarities that characterize banks in terms of 
capital structure, high regulation, and opacity of the business. As recognized also by 
Fernandes et al., (2017), banks have unique attributes that interfere with the way in which 
the usual corporate governance mechanisms work. Moreover, the relevance of banks for 
the development of the economic system (e.g. Levine, 2005; Beck et al., 2010) and the 
90 
 
significant costs that the failures in bank governance can cause (Fernandes et al., 2017), 
make the investigation of the CG mechanisms in the banking context highly specific 
(Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015). There are many studies on corporate governance, yet only 
a few papers focus on banks’ corporate governance (e.g., Adams and Mehran, 2005; 2012; 
Caprio et al., 2007; de Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Pathan, 2009) and even fewer studies 
analyze the relationship between CG and CSR (Rao and Tilt, 2016). In order to fill these 
voids, the current work investigates the impact that several characteristics of the bank’s 
board of directors (size, independence, diversity, activity) have on bank’s engagement in 
CSR. Thus, in an effort to advance research on CSR banking, this research contributes to 
the extant literature in several ways. First, considering the impact of several financial 
performance indicators (ROA, ROE, Net Interest Income, Margin of Interest) and several 
CG characteristics (board size, board independence, board diversity, board activity) on 
banks engagement in CSR, the chapter enriches the debate on CSR banking. 
Second, in order to better capture the wide spectrum of responsibilities that CSR 
engagement may encompass, the empirical analysis considers several measures of CSR. 
In particular, consistently with the categorization of Jain and Jamali (2016, p.256), in 
addition to two measures of bank social responsibility (BSR), the study includes a proxy 
of bank environmental responsibility (BER). This approach allows to respond to calls of 
researchers to examine the link between various CSR activities and business performance 
(e.g. Maignan and Ferrell 2004; Aguilera et al. 2007). 
Third, the current research adopts a more recent and longer panel of banking data (from 
2010 to 2015) than similar previous studies (Chih et al., 2010). Moreover, the 
consideration of a large international sample allows to avoid the small sample biases, that 
can be linked to the analysis of specific geographical areas or periods, and to obtain more 
reliable results (Wu and Shen, 2013). Finally, because of the adoption of limited 
dependent variables, ranging from 0 to 100, the current work adopts the Tobit regression 
model. This latter, in this case, is considered the best econometric approach to obtain 
reliable results (Long, 1997).  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 includes the literature 
review and the hypotheses. Section 3 explains the adopted empirical strategy. Section 4 
shows the results. Finally, section 5 discusses the implications and limitations of the 
study. 
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4.2 Theoretical background and research hypotheses  
 
This section is divided into two main subsections. Subsection 2.1, drawing from the slack 
of resource theory, intends to theoretically frame the relationship between banks financial 
performance and CSR engagement. In the recent few years, wide scientific interest has 
been dedicated to the influence that CSR has on bank’s financial performance (e.g. Wu 
and Shen, 2013; Wu et al., 2017; Esteban-Sanchez et al., 2017), by contrast scarce 
evidence exists about the role of financial performance as determinant of banks 
engagement in socially responsible activities. 
Subsection 2.2, instead, referring primarily to the agency theory and stakeholder theory 
reports the theoretical foundation of the relationship between CG characteristics and CSR. 
Nevertheless this latter relationship has already been investigated, the extant literature 
cannot be considered exhaustive (Jain and Jamali, 2016). In fact, despite the rich debate 
on the effects that board characteristics have on financial performance, much less 
attention has been devoted to how specific board attributes influence CSR (Rao and Tilt, 
2016). Moreover, the main part these studies are referred to non-bank data (Chang et al., 
2017), calling for further investigations analyzing the interconnections existing between 
CG and CSR in the banking industry (Fernandes et al., 2017). Figure 1 provides a 
representation of the theoretical and empirical framework. 
 
4.2.1 Financial performance and bank social responsibility  
 
The slack resources theory has been one of the main theoretical foundations to study 
corporate responses to stakeholder pressures (Xiao et al., 2018). Following Nohria and 
Gulati (1996), slack may be identified in the pool of resources that an organization has in 
excess to the minimum necessary to produce a given level of output. Firms may 
accumulate resources in terms of financial availabilities, experienced managerial and 
technical staff, technologies, unused capacity (Voss et al., 2008). In general, authors argue 
that the slack of resources may be used to solve organizational problems, to undertake 
expanding strategies, to pursue more risky and innovative goals (Bourgeois, 1981; Nohria 
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and Gulati, 1996). Voss et al. (2008), considering the degree of resource rarity and 
absorbability, distinguish four specific measures of exceeding resources: financial, 
operational, customer and human resources. Among these latter, authors have dedicated 
a particular attention towards the financial slack5 as antecedent of CSR expenditures (e.g. 
Ullmann, 1985; Brammer and Millington, 2004; Julian and Ofori-Dankwa, 2013). The 
grounding tenet is that the availability of excess funds allows firms to consider CSR 
investments as expenses that they can afford (Waddock and Graves, 1997). Given that 
CSR is considered an area strongly subject to managers discretion, the undertaking of 
socially responsible initiatives often depends on the availability of excess financial 
resources (McGuire et al. 1988). Perez-Batres et al. (2012) aver that financial resources 
are a fundamental requisite to invest in socially responsible initiatives. Hence, in 
summary, the slack of resource approach asserts that better financial performance results 
in more available resources that enhance the firms’ propensity to invest in the social 
domain (e.g. Preston and O’Bannon, 1997; Seifert et al., 2004; Surroca et al., 2010). 
Consistent with the previous arguments, the study hypothesizes: 
 
H1. The bank financial performance positively impacts on the bank engagement in CSR. 
 
4.2.2 Corporate governance and bank social responsibility 
 
Beginning with the CSR conceptualizations, prior literature mainly refers to CSR as the 
impact that business activities have on society (Aramburu and Pescador, 2017). 
Following the definition provided by the European Commission (2011), CSR involves 
the process aimed to integrate social, environmental, ethical and human rights concerns 
into business operations and strategy in close collaboration with their stakeholders. A 
similar definition is provided World Bank’s, according to which CSR refers to how 
business activities contribute to the sustainable economic development and how they 
                                                          
5 Kraatz and Zajac (2001) define the financial slack as the level of liquid assets that is available to an 
organization. Profitability levels are generally considered asindicators of financial slack resources 
(Waddock and Graves, 1997; Xiao et al., 2018). 
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impact on the quality of life of stakeholders (Starks, 2009). McWilliams and Siegel (2001) 
identify CSR in those actions that generate some social good and that goes beyond the 
financial goals and the legal requirement. According to Hill et al. (2007), CSR concerns 
the economic, legal, moral, and philanthropic actions of firms that affect the quality of 
life of relevant stakeholders. 
On the other hand, Cadbury (2000) defines CG as the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled. This definition of CG includes two main aspects, the first 
regarding how managers exert their functions, the second referred to the control and 
compliance aspect of business management (MacMillan et al., 2004).  
The CG conceptualizations have been subject of a significant evolution. The traditional 
perspective, also known as narrow view, refers to CG as a system of laws useful to shape 
the relations among board members, shareholders and managers, to maximize firms’ 
financial performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Saravanamuthu, 2004). This CG view 
may be theoretically linked to agency theory (Dalton et al, 2007). According to agency 
theorists, managers may have divergent interests from shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) and may act to pursue their own interest (Barnea and Rubin, 2010). In 
this context, CG becomes the system through which shareholders can monitor and lead 
managers’ actions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Thus, within the agency theory schemes, 
the primary objective of CG systems is to favor the shareholder wealth maximization 
(Gill, 2008). From this angle, the undertaking of CSR initiatives is justified to the extent 
to which they entail benefits in terms of economic efficiency (McWilliams and Siegel, 
2001). 
However, the recent literature appears more steered towards a broader view of CG (Gill, 
2008; Windsor, 2006). The broad view of CG, in addition to legal and contractual 
frameworks that define the exercise of power within a company, encompasses the 
business responsibilities also towards non-financial stakeholders (MacMillan et al, 2004; 
Page, 2005). This perspective appears in line with one of the most adopted theoretical 
position to explain the relationship between CG and CSR – the stakeholder theory. The 
main argument of the stakeholder theory is that the survival of the firm depends on its 
capability to manage the relationships with stakeholder (Freeman, 1984). The theorists of 
the stakeholder view argue that corporation’s managers have to satisfy not only the 
shareholders’ claims, but also those of any other individual that affects or may be affected 
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by the organization’s actions (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Jones (1995), identifying 
the company as a nexus of contracts, states that the creation of good relationships with 
the various stakeholder groups allows to minimize the contracting costs. According to 
this theoretical interpretation, the objective of the company’s managers is to go beyond 
the shareholders’ wealth maximization and undertake those policies improving the 
stakeholder-company interactions (Post et al., 2002). Consistently with this view, authors 
assert that CG is a fundamental part of CSR and includes a set of mechanisms that allow 
to better satisfy the stakeholder claims (e.g. Jo and Harjoto, 2011). This position, also 
known as conflict resolution hypothesis (e.g., Calton and Payne 2003; Harjoto and Jo 
2011), states that effective CG systems, along with CSR engagement, allow to mitigate 
the conflicts between managers and stakeholders. Jamali et al. (2008), in an effort to 
identify the possible overlaps between CG and CSR, drawing from the theoretical model 
of Hancock (2005) identify CG as a pillar of CSR. In this sense, CG represents one of the 
basic foundations to undertake solid and integrated CSR activities. Good CG system 
should favor the business management for the benefits of all stakeholders, financial as 
well as non-financial (Windsor, 2006). 
With reference to the banking system, that represents a highly leveraged and regulated 
industry with high information asymmetries (Haan and Vlahu, 2016), the functioning of 
CG mechanisms is even more important than other industries (de Andres and Vallelado, 
2008). Fernandes et al. (2017) argue that the analysis of the relationship between banks 
board attributes and business performance represents a highly relevant topic, even 
because the empirical regularities found among non-financial firms might not be 
confirmed in the banking context. Thus, identifying CSR as an outcome of boards’ 
decisions, it appears relevant to understand if and how banks’ board attributes influence 
the undertaking of CSR initiatives (Rao and Tilt, 2016). 
In light of these arguments and consistently with the objective of the study, the next 
subsections review the literature linking various board characteristics with the 
engagement in CSR. Specifically, the subsections 4.2.2.1, 4.2.2.2, 4.2.2.3 and 4.2.2.4 
discuss the prior literature referred to the impact on CSR engagement of board size, board 
independence, board diversity and board activity, respectively. 
 
4.2.2.1 Board size 
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The board of directors is one of the most important elements of corporate governance 
mechanisms in overseeing that businesses are properly managed by their agents (Said et 
al., 2009). Two main schools of thought have been developed with reference to the 
possible effects that can be exerted by the size of the board.  
On one hand, previous studies find that large boards may generate problems of 
coordination and control, less decision-making flexibility (de Andres and Vallelado, 
2008; Pathan, 2009), lack of unanimity (Rao et al., 2012). In this sense, the agency theory 
perspective contends that small-sized boards are less likely to face free-rider problems 
(Dalton et al., 1998) and communication issues (Jensen, 1993). In this context, managers 
might be more oriented towards short-term profit, who can steer firms to reduce CSR 
investments (Jain and Jamali, 2016; Walls and Hoffman, 2013). 
On the other hand, the authors argue that boards with more members are able to provide 
greater support for managers' decisions (Kent and Stewart, 2008). The higher numbers of 
directors on a board may reduce the discretionary power of managers and enhance the 
effectiveness of the decision-making processes (de Andres and Vallelado, 2008). The 
stakeholder theory logic predicts that large boards may better represent the diverse 
interests of stakeholders (Hillman and Keim, 2001; Kock et al., 2012). Larger boards 
imply better social capital (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and increased CSR investments 
(Siregar and Bachtiar, 2010). This lack of a convergence regarding the relationship 
between board size and CSR engagement calls for further investigations. Given these 
premises, the study hypothesizes: 
 
H2.1 The size of the bank’s board of directors affects the bank’s engagement in CSR. 
 
4.2.2.2 Board independence 
 
In the wake of the numerous recent corporate scandals, issues related to the control of 
corporate boards by independent directors has received considerable attention (Harris and 
Raviv, 2006). As for the size of the board, also with reference to board independence, the 
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existing literature has produced divergent positions (Bhagat and Black, 2002; John and 
Senbet, 1998). Indeed, a part of the previous studies argues that a higher portion of 
independent directors may bring several benefits. Outside directors have less conflict of 
interest in monitoring managers and may more effectively curtail agency problems 
(Harris and Raviv, 2006). They may also enrich the board decision-making with relevant 
external expertise. Authors find that a higher percentage of independent board members 
may help to ensure managerial compliance with a wider range of stakeholder 
responsibilities (Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). Prior literature, examining the relationship 
between board structure and CSR, has found that socially responsible firms present a 
higher portion of independent directors than non-socially responsible firms (Webb, 2004). 
However, even though in general prior literature supports the existence of a positive 
association between board independence and CSR outcomes, there is also some evidence 
of mixed results (Jain and Jamali, 2016). In fact, other studies assert that appointing 
outside directors may also have some drawbacks. For examples, inside directors may 
bring to the board information that outside directors might find hard to collect (de Andres 
and Vallelado, 2008). Executive directors may also facilitate the flow of information 
between board directors and management (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Coles et al., 2008). 
The abovementioned theoretical positions and empirical investigations indicate a trade-
off between the advantages and disadvantages related to the proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board (de Andres and Vallelado, 2008). In line with these arguments, the 
study hypothesizes: 
 
H2.2 The higher percentage of external directors of the bank’s board of directors affects 
the bank engagement in CSR. 
 
4.2.2.3 Board diversity 
 
Among the various board characteristics, the board diversity is gaining increasing 
attention of researchers and academics (Catanzariti and Lo 2011). According to Van der 
Walt and Ingley (2003), the board diversity refers to the combination of attributes, 
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characteristics, and expertise of the individual board members. A few years later, Kang 
et al. (2007) define board diversity as the variety in the composition of the board of 
directors.   
However, despite this growing interest in the topic, prior literature has mainly 
investigated the impact that board diversity has on financial performance and reporting 
(Carter et al. 2003; Rose 2007), while, scant research examines how it affects CSR 
engagement (Buse et al. 2016; Rao and Tilt, 2016).      
Following van Knippenberg and Schippers, (2007), diversity may have several 
dimensions ranging from age to nationality, from the religious background to political 
and sexual preferences. 
In general, one of the main argument in favor of diversity of board members argues that 
it may bring heterogeneous perspectives to the decision-making process and may generate 
different and alternative proposals, that can play a crucial role in the definition and 
planning of complex decisions like those regarding CSR (Robinson and Dechant, 1997; 
Rao and Tilt, 2016). Other authors also argue that diversity may have a negative or null 
effect on decision-making processes (Westphal and Milton, 2000). However, despite 
some exceptions, the main part of prior investigations indicates that the benefits of 
diversity are more than the potential detriments (Rao and Tilt, 2016). 
Among the others, one of the most discussed types of diversity in the boardroom 
decisions, at a practical and theoretical level, is the gender diversity (Carter et al., 2003). 
First of all, the several legislative and voluntary initiatives, undertaken in various 
countries (such as China, France, India, Italy, Norway, Sweden), to promote the female 
representation on board suggest that the presence of woman may have a significant impact 
on companies performance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Moreover, few recent empirical 
studies also confirm that having gender diversity of directors may generate benefits not 
only in terms of financial outcomes but also in the form of extra-financial performance. 
For examples, Bear et al. (2010) highlight a positive relationship between the number of 
female directors and CSR, due to an increased sensitivity and a more participative 
decision-making orientation. Kruger (2009) found that organizations with a higher 
number of female directors tend to be more committed to social and community-related 
issues. Braun (2010), instead, demonstrated that woman entrepreneurs are more likely to 
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be engaged in environmental issues than male entrepreneurs. Some evidence also show 
that female directors are more able to define trust relations with stakeholders and to better 
respond to their claims (Galbreath, 2011). 
Thus, in light of the abovementioned arguments, gender diversity of directors represents 
a critical characteristic of a bank’s CG, that may favor the bank commitment in socially 
responsible initiatives. Accordingly, the study hypothesizes:  
 
H2.3 The greater diversity of the bank’s board of directors positively impacts on the bank 
engagement in CSR. 
 
4.2.2.4 Board activity 
 
Another relevant aspect of banks CG is the internal functioning of the board (de Andres 
and Vallelado, 2008). In particular, among the several factors that may affect the board 
functioning, there is the attendance and frequency of board meetings (Vafeas, 1999). 
Once again, prior literature has found contrasting results between the intensity of board 
activity and corporate performance (Fernandes et al., 2017).  
Authors assert that the intensity of board activity represents a crucial element to improve 
the effectiveness of boards (Conger et al. 1991). As witnessed by previous literature, a 
higher intensity of board activity would indicate a more effective monitoring of 
management, with beneficial effects on the performance of the organization (Grove et al, 
2011). According to Adams and Ferreira (2007), the attendance at board and committee 
meetings is one of the most relevant things that directors can do to be diligent. Attending 
board meetings allows directors to obtain necessary information to better fulfill their 
functions. 
Board meetings provide to directors the possibility to monitor the management, to discuss 
and exchange ideas about the business strategies. Consequently, the higher the meeting 
frequency and attendance, the more significant is the advisory role of the board. This is 
particularly true in the banking industry, where the complexities of the business require a 
more effective and active role of the board (de Andres and Vallelado, 2008). 
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By contrast, other studies argue that board meetings may have also some disadvantages. 
Because of their limited time they are not meaningful to effectively exchange ideas among 
directors or with managers (Jensen, 1993).Additionally, board meetings are not without 
costs, such as managerial time, travel expenses and meeting fees of directors (Fernandes 
et al, 2017). With reference to banks, their boards are on average larger, requiring a higher 
meeting frequency in order to be effective (Adams and Mehran, 2003). 
In light of the aforementioned arguments, the study predicts:  
 
H2.4 The higher attendance of the bank’s board meetings affects the bank engagement in 
CSR. 
 
4.3 Methodology6 
 
4.3.1 Variables 
 
 
The current section reports the description of the variables included in the empirical 
analysis. More in particular, it describes the dependent variables, the independent 
variables and controls, in the subsections 4.3.1.1, 4.3.1.2 and 4.3.1.3, respectively. 
Definitions of variables are also summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
4.3.1.1  Dependent Variables  
 
 
In order to measure BSR, the current research uses the scores provided by ASSET4-ESG 
database. This latter has been widely adopted by prior literature to investigate CSR-
related topics  (Veleva and Ellenbecker, 2001; Schafer et al., 2006; Ortas et al., 2013; 
Ferrero-Ferrero et al., 2015; El Ghoul et al., 2017). In particular, based on the ASSET4-
ESG’scores, the study considers three measures of engagement in CSR.  
The first indicator (BSR_1) is the average of the scores indicating the bank’s performance 
in the environmental, social and governance issues. As robustness check, the empirical 
analysis also computes the BSR indicator leaving out the governance score. This second 
                                                          
6 Data collection and sample description are reported in chapter 3. 
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indicator is labeled as BSR_2. Finally, consistently with recent literature, which devotes 
growing attention to environmental component of CSR engagement (e.g. Lisi, 2015; 
Maletic et al., 2015), the study proposes a third measure, namely bank environmental 
responsibility (BER), as proxy of banks’ engagement in environmental related issues.    
 
 
 
4.3.1.2  Independent variables  
 
 
Consistently with the objective of the chapter, the study adopts as independent variables 
a set of financial performance measures and CG characteristics. 
With reference to the financial performance indicators, the research uses a set of 
accounting-based measures. These latter, compared to market-based indicators are 
considered to better explain what is actually occurring within the organization (Lopez et 
al., 2007). In particular, in addition to the return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE), in line with previous investigations (e.g. Wu et al. 2017), the empirical analysis 
also includes specific measure of bank’s financial performance, such as the net interest 
income (NII_TA) and the margin of interest (MI_TA). As recognized by Barnett and 
Salomon (2012), the adoption of multiple variables of financial outcomes should allow 
to better capture the different aspects of performance. 
On the other hand, in order to evaluate the impact that CG has on bank’s engagement in 
CSR, consistently with previous investigations (Pathan et al., 2009; Fernandes et al., 
2017), the study adopts a set of board of directors’ characteristics as proxy of the 
functioning of the CG mechanisms. In this sense, first, the analysis considers the number 
of board members (B_size). Prior investigations argue that the board size is a key element 
in the decision whether or not undertaking CSR initiatives (e.g. Prado-Lorenzo and 
García-Sanchez, 2010; Fuente et. al 2017). Second, as a proxy of the board independence 
(B_ind), the study uses the number of independent directors divided by the number of 
board directors. Previous literature, on one hand, argues that a higher percentage of 
independent directors should better support the board decision-making process, 
representing the interests of different stakeholders (Harjoto et al. 2015). On the other 
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hand, previous studies suggest that internal directors may have access to information that 
independent directors might find hard to achieve (de Andres and Vallelado, 2008). 
Third, the empirical analysis considers the number of female directors divided the number 
of total board directors (B_Div), because previous studies suggest that female directors 
present a more participative decision-making orientation (Bear et al., 2010) and a higher 
sensitiveness to social and environmental issues (Kruger, 2009). Fourth, the research 
includes the average overall attendance percentage of board meetings as proxy of the 
board activity (B_Act). Previous investigations consider the intensity of board activity 
closely linked to the effectiveness of the board's decision-making process (e.g. Conger et 
al., 1991; Kanagaretnam et al., 2007). 
 
 
4.3.1.3 Control variables  
 
Consistent with previous studies (Harjoto and Jo, 2011; Jo and Harjoto, 2012), the 
analysis includes several bank-level, institutional and macroeconomic control variables, 
in order to avoid biased results. In particular, with reference to the banks characteristics, 
the study controls for: the CEO compensation policy (CEO_comp), since it may be 
closely related to the definition of corporate objectives; the degree of bank’s leverage 
(DebTc); and the log transformation of total assets (logTA) as proxy of the bank’s size.  
Moreover, in line with prior literature (e.g. Shen and Chang; Wu and Shen, 2011; 2013), 
the empirical investigation also considers a set of institutional controls, such as the degree 
of restriction of banks in securities (ResSec), insurance (ResIns) and real estate (ResRE) 
activities (Barth et al., 2012). Finally, the investigation includes the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (H-index) as proxy of market structure (Bikker and Haaf 2002; Bikker 
and Spierdijk, 2010). 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Tobit regression model  
 
 
In order to investigate the determinants of bank engagement in CSR, the study proposes 
the following regression model: 
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CSR  i, t = β0 +  β1 FP i, t-1 + β2 Bsize i, t-1 + β3 Bact i,t-1 + β4 Bind i, t-1 + β5 Bdiv i, t-1  + β6 
Bdiv i, t-1  + β 7 X i,t-1 + β 7 Year i, t-1 +  β 7 Country i,t-1 + ε i,t    
 
     
where CSR  i, t indicates the level of engagement in CSR of bank i at time t. With reference 
to independent variables FP denotes bank’s financial performance; Bsize indicates the 
number of board members; Bact is the percentage of attendance percentage of board 
meetings; Bind indicates the number of independent directors divided the number of total 
board directors; Bdiv represents the number of female directors divided the number of 
total board directors; X is the vector of control variables; ε is the error term. All the 
independent variables included in the model are one year lagged. 
This choice is consistent with previous studies suggesting the existence of a lagged 
relationship between firm characteristics and levels of CSR engagement (Ullmann, 1985; 
Waddock and Graves 1997, Orlitzsky et al., 2003).   
Given that the dependent variables included in the empirical model take a value from zero 
to 100, similarly to previous investigations (e.g. Fuente et al., 2017), the current study 
adopts a panel data methodology for doubly censored variables. More specifically, the 
econometric analysis is based on a Tobit regression, which in contrast to ordinary least 
square regression allows for special consideration of both ends of the rating scale, 
indicating censoring at zero for the companies with less interest in engaging in CSR and 
100 for those with the maximum engagement.  
 
4.4 Results 
 
4.4.1 Descriptive analysis  
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the analyzed sample, while Table 3 provides a 
descriptive comparison of the banks characterized by a low engagement in BSR with the 
banks characterized by a high engagement in BSR. 
Table 3 reports significant differences between the two considered groups. In particular, 
except for ROE, low-BSR banks present (on average) higher indicators of financial 
performance (ROA, NII_TA, MI_TA) than high-BSR banks. Looking at CG 
characteristics, banks with low BSR are characterized by a lower number of directors on 
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board (B_Size), a lower percentage of meeting attendance (B_Act), and a lower number 
of independent (B_Ind) and female directors (B_Div), than high-BSR banks. With 
reference to control variables, it is noteworthy that banks with high CSR are on average 
bigger and with an higher leverage than low-BSR banks. 
 
 
4.4.2 Multivariate analysis  
 
 
Table 4 displays the pairwise correlation analysis. It shows that the coefficients of all the 
variables included in the regression models are lower than 0.7, indicating that 
multicollinearity does not affect the estimates of the research (Ratner, 2009). 
Table 5, 6 and 7 show the results of the Tobit regression analysis. The objective of the 
empirical models is to determine the influence of financial performance and certain board 
characteristics on the bank’s decision to engage in CSR. The F test is used to test the level 
of representativeness of the empirical models. The p-values are statistically significant at 
the 99% confidence level, indicating that the fitness of the equations adopted to explain 
the effects of financial performance and CG characteristics is accepted. T-statistics 
referred to variables’ coefficients are adjusted for robust standard errors. 
Looking at Table 3, the models (1) and (2) show that the indicators of profitability (ROA 
and ROE) are not statistically significant, while models (3) and (4) suggest that NII_TA 
and MI_TA are positive and significant predictors of bank’s decision to engage in socially 
responsible initiatives. Thus, the analysis partially confirms the first research hypothesis 
(H.1). These findings support the theoretical arguments of slack of resource thesis (Nohria 
and Gulati, 1996). Moreover, the results are consistent with previous empirical 
investigations on non-banking data, suggesting that a higher availability of resources 
provide the opportunity for companies to invest more in the social performance domain 
(e.g. Waddock and Graves, 1997). The findings are, instead, not in line with Chih et al. 
(2010), who highlight that financial firms with poor ROA are more engaged in CSR and 
with Julian and Ofori-dankwa (2013), who demonstrate that greater financial resource 
availability leads to less CSR in sub-Saharan firms.  
Considering the CG characteristics, the models included the Table 3 indicate that B_Size 
does not affect the bank’s engagement in CSR. Thus, the analysis does not confirm the 
hypothesis H. 2.1.  
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The empirical models also suggest that B_Ind, B_Div have a positive significant impact 
on BSR, confirming the hypotheses H. 2.2 and H. 2.3, respectively.  These findings are 
in line with the studies of Webb (2004) and Chang et al. (2017), who find that the board 
independence and the board diversity are positively associated with the firm’s 
engagement in CSR. The results are also consistent with the investigation of Cornett et 
al. (2016), according to which banks with more females and minorities on the board of 
directors have higher overall CSR scores. 
With reference to B_Act, the coefficients of the regression analysis suggest that the 
percentage of meeting attendance positively and significantly affects the bank’s 
engagement in socially responsible issues, thereby confirming the hypothesis H. 2.4. It 
appears in line with the study of Grove et al. (2011), according to which the intensity of 
the board activity improve corporate performance.  
As robustness check, the study provides additional evidence adopting different measures 
of CSR engagement (Table 4 and 5). In particular, the research highlights similar results 
considering as dependent variable BSR_2 (Table 4) and BER (Table 5), except for the 
board independence (B_Ind) which reports not statistical significant coefficients across 
all the performed regression models. 
 
 
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Over last years, CSR engagement has become a strategic decision, due to the high 
relevance that environmental and social issues have acquired among the various 
stakeholder groups. This is particularly true in the banking industry, where the definition 
of trusty and long-term relationships with stakeholders is crucial to effectively carry out 
the business activities. CSR programs represent for banks the opportunity to improve their 
reputation, signaling that their activities are in line with societal expectations (e.g. 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). 
The current chapter analyzes if and how the availability of financial resources and several 
characteristics of the board of directors affect the banks’ decision to engage in CSR 
activities. For this purpose, the research applies a descriptive and Tobit regressions to an 
international panel of 148 banks, from 2010-2015. The empirical analysis highlights that 
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the bank’s financial performance and some characteristics of the board of directors 
significantly influence BSR.  
These findings contribute to a better understanding of the determinants of banks 
engagement in CSR activities. In particular, highlighting the positive impact of financial 
performance on BSR, the study supports the slack of resource hypothesis. These results 
suggest that banks with better financial performance tend to invest more in socially 
responsible initiatives. With reference to CG, the prior literature suggests that banks 
boards of directors assume a crucial role, in orienting managers-decision making 
processes (de Andres and Vallelado, 2008). Previous studies recognize that banks' 
business models may be characterized by higher complexity, opacity, and regulation, 
making the functioning of corporate governance mechanisms even more relevant than in 
other industries (e.g. Beck et al, 2005; Macey and O’Hara, 2003).  
Looking at the empirical evidence referred to board characteristics, the study finds several 
significant relationships. First, the research demonstrates that banks with a higher 
percentage of independent directors on board are more engaged in CSR initiatives. It may 
be due to several reasons. External directors may support the interests of different 
stakeholders, thereby inducing the bank to engage in CSR activities to address a wider 
range of stakeholder expectations (Luoma and Goodstein, 1999). Independent directors 
have less conflict of interest in monitoring managers (Harris and Raviv, 2006). This may 
create more favorable conditions for the undertaking of CSR programs. 
Second, the empirical analysis highlights that the higher number of female directors on 
the bank’s board favors the BSR. A higher gender diversity of board members may lead 
to more heterogeneous perspectives on board, favoring the definition of complex 
decisions like CSR (e.g. Rao and Tilt, 2016). Third, the study indicates that a higher 
percentage of meeting attendance has a positive impact on the bank’s CSR engagement. 
Given that board meetings provide the opportunity to board members to come together, 
it may allow to better discuss and exchange ideas on the bank’s undertaking of CSR 
strategies.  
The findings have several implications. The results may interest banks’ depositors and 
investors interested in CSR profile of the bank. The better understanding on the 
functioning mechanisms of banks’ boards should attract the attention of regulators and 
policymakers that, through the definition of corporate governance codes and best 
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practices recommendations, intend to promote the banks' engagement in socially 
responsible issues. The results of the study are relevant also in light of recent legal reforms 
requiring to boards of directors of listed companies to know and approve CSR programs.  
The research has some potential limitations. First, it adopts only one source of data to 
measure BSR. Future investigations may adopt different indicators of bank’s engagement 
in CSR activities, or alternatively may analyze the determinants of a specific dimension 
of BSR, such as the CSR policies undertaken towards the customers, employees and other 
stakeholder groups. Moreover, the study adopts only accounting-based indicators, further 
analysis may enlarge the empirical evidence, including market measures of financial 
performance. Future studies might also introduce mediating variables, verifying if the 
relationship between board characteristics and BSR is mediated by cultural or 
institutional factors. 
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Table 1. Variables description 
Variables Symbol Source Description 
Dependent Variables       
Indicator 1 of CSR BSR_1 Asset 4 
The average between the Environmental score and the Social and Corporate governance score 
provided by Thomson Reuters. 
Indicator 2 of CSR BSR_2 Asset 4 
The average between the Environmental score and the Social score provided by Thomson 
Reuters. 
Indicator 3 of CSR BER Asset 4 The Environmental score provided by Thomson Reuters. 
Indipendent Variables       
Return on Assets Roa Worldscope Return on Assets 
Return on Equity Roe Worldscope Return on Equity 
Net Interest Income NII_TA Worldscope Net Interest Income divided by Total Assets  
Margin of interest MI_TA Worldscope Intermediation Margin (Net Interest Income + Non Interest Income) divided by Total Assets  
Board Size B_Size  Asset 4 The total number of board members.  
Board activity B_Act  Asset 4 The average overall attendance percentage of board meetings as reported by the company. 
Board indipendence B_Ind  Asset 4 The number of independent directors divided the number of total board directors. 
Board Diversity B_Div  Asset 4 The number of female directors divided the number of total board directors. 
Control Variables       
CEO compensation CEO_comp  Asset 4 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO’s compensation is linked to total shareholder return. 
Size logTA   Natural Logaritm of the number of Total Assets. 
Leverage DebTc    Total Debt divided by Total Capital 
Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index 
H-index World Bank Higher HHI indicates less market competition and more monopoly or oligopoly. 
Restriction Securities 
ResSec 
Barth et al. 
(2012) 
The degree of restriction on banking activities in securities, ranging from 1 (less restriction) to 4 
(higher restriction) 
Restriction Insurance 
ResIns 
Barth et al. 
(2012) 
The degree of restriction on banking activities in insurance, ranging from 1 (less restriction) to 4 
(higher restriction) 
Restriction Real estate 
ResRE 
Barth et al. 
(2012) 
The degree of restriction on banking activities in real estate, ranging from 1 (less restriction) to 4 
(higher restriction). 
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Figure 1 Conceptual and empirical framework. 
 
 
- NII (+)
- NonII (+)
- ROA (+)
- ROE (+)
Bank Social Responsibility
- Board Size (+/-)
- Board independence (+/-)
- Board diversity (+)
-Board activity (+/-)
Financial Performance
Slack of resource theory
Corporate Governance
Agency theory
Stakeholder theory
109 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics        
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
BSR_1 878 54.099 27.544 4.480 95.580 
BSR_2 878 55.175 31.777 6.100 96.055 
BER 878 54.386 35.038 8.430 95.060 
Roa 656 0.726 1.200 -12.420 8.430 
Roe 717 0.665 0.11995 -0.88 0.98 
NII_TA 727 1.854 0.966 -3.855 5.279 
MI_TA 727 3.345 1.684 -0.948 17.214 
B_Size  730 13.525 4.631 2.000 30.000 
B_Act  514 88.029 10.754 50.000 100.000 
B_Ind  730 55.739 32.188 2.080 95.300 
B_Div  730 15.007 12.223 0.000 50.000 
CEO_comp  730 0.412 0.493 0.000 1.000 
logTA  740 19.816 2.574 14.839 26.546 
DebTc  740 64.461 22.179 0.700 107.550 
ResSec 696 1.974 0.933 1.000 3.000 
ResIns 696 2.241 0.611 1.000 4.000 
ResRE 696 2.767 1.110 1.000 4.000 
H-index 888 0.546 0.208 -0.150 1.260 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics (Banks with low/high BSR_1)  
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the study, grouped by the level of CSR engagement. 
Banks with low CSR are those that present a CSR indicator lower than the median of the full sample. Banks with high CSR are 
those that present a CSR indicator higher than the median of the full sample.   
Variable Banks with low BSR_1   Banks with high BSR_1 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max   Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
BSR_1 439 29.55 13.85 4.48 55.21   439 78.65 10.89 55.40 95.58 
Roa t-1 311 0.75 0.93 -3.30 8.43   345 0.71 1.40 -12.42 4.99 
Roe t-1 354 0.05 0.11 -0.80 0.80   363 0.07 0.12 -0.88 0.98 
NII_TA t-1 359 1.99 1.10 -3.86 5.28   368 1.72 0.79 -2.70 4.59 
MI_TA t-1 359 3.45 1.98 -0.95 17.21   368 3.24 1.32 1.29 13.20 
B_Size t-1 359 12.38 4.63 4.00 30.00   371 14.64 4.36 2.00 30.00 
B_Act t-1 208 83.46 10.48 50.00 100.00   306 91.13 9.80 50.00 100.00 
B_Ind t-1 359 49.72 33.75 2.08 95.30   371 61.57 29.49 2.08 94.90 
B_Div t-1 359 9.71 9.84 0.00 41.67   371 20.13 12.13 0.00 50.00 
CEO_comp t-1 359 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00   371 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
logTA t-1 363 19.30 2.80 15.53 26.32   377 20.32 2.23 14.84 26.55 
DebTc t-1 363 56.09 23.30 0.70 100.17   377 72.52 17.65 13.50 107.55 
ResSec 307 2.30 0.94 1.00 3.00   389 1.72 0.85 1.00 3.00 
ResIns 307 2.21 0.54 1.00 3.00   389 2.26 0.66 1.00 4.00 
ResRE 307 3.24 1.03 1.00 4.00   389 2.39 1.02 1.00 4.00 
H-index 439 0.52 0.18 0.07 0.92   449 0.57 0.23 -0.15 1.26 
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Table 3. Correlation analysis  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 BSR_1 1.000                                   
2 BSR_2 0,966 1.000                                 
3 BER 0,937 0,976 1.000                               
4 Roa -0,058 -0,098 -0,108 1.000                             
5 Roe 0,104 0,052 0,027 0,730 1.000                           
6 NII_TA -0,501 -0,571 -0,559 0,292 0,192 1.000                         
7 MI_TA -0,266 -0,332 -0,326 0,164 0,172 0,751 1.000                       
8 B_Size  0,199 0,224 0,193 -0,095 -0,105 -0,071 0,089 1.000                     
9 B_Act  0,473 0,478 0,460 -0,064 0,044 -0,529 -0,390 -0,004 1.000                   
10 B_Ind  -0,001 -0,086 -0,084 0,217 0,371 0,307 0,239 -0,283 -0,071 1.000                 
11 B_Div  0,397 0,325 0,325 0,102 0,259 -0,092 -0,076 -0,051 0,137 0,304 1.000               
12 CEO_comp  0,235 0,148 0,177 0,054 0,151 0,042 0,048 -0,153 0,051 0,375 0,256 1.000             
13 logTA  0,677 0,731 0,711 -0,004 0,075 -0,431 -0,232 0,177 0,322 -0,096 0,135 0,042 1.000           
14 DebTc  0,426 0,488 0,482 -0,182 -0,267 -0,552 -0,326 0,229 0,345 -0,359 -0,000 -0,214 0,4094 1.000         
15 ResSec -0,467 -0,544 -0,529 0,312 0,260 0,745 0,492 -0,280 -0,466 0,542 0,010 0,177 -0,2826 -0,6069 1.000       
16 ResIns 0,190 0,205 0,185 -0,200 -0,205 -0,074 -0,027 0,315 0,096 -0,104 0,167 -0,127 0,3050 0,2507 -0,070 1.000     
17 ResRE -0,456 -0,532 -0,525 0,177 0,050 0,695 0,512 -0,028 -0,500 0,339 0,024 -0,016 -0,3074 -0,4468 0,841 0,269 1.000   
18 H-index 0,212 0,235 0,196 -0,129 0,015 -0,163 -0,050 0,395 0,059 0,071 0,147 -0,046 0,0935 0,1739 -0,240 0,257 -0,136 1.000 
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Table 3. Tobit regression analysis.  
This table presents Tobit regression coefficients and in parentheses associated t-statistics. The dependent 
variable in the Models 1-4 is the indicator 1 of Bank Social Responsibility (BSR_1).*, **, and *** denote 
coefficient estimates significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. A significant 
F-Statistic illustrates that the models are significant and the independent variables do affect the indicators of 
financial performance. 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
BSR_1 BSR_1 BSR_1 BSR_1 
Roa t-1 0.113       
  (0.13)       
Roe t-1   0.0362     
    (0.53)     
NII_TA t-1     2.381***   
      (2.61)   
MI_TA t-1       1.336*** 
        (2.74) 
B_Size t-1 -0.274 -0.250 -0.342 -0.340 
  (-0.95) (-0.92) (-1.27) (-1.26) 
B_Act t-1 0.284*** 0.226*** 0.232*** 0.231*** 
  (3.26) (2.65) (2.62) (2.64) 
B_Ind t-1 0.0793* 0.106** 0.108** 0.103** 
  (1.66) (2.35) (2.27) (2.13) 
B_Div t-1 0.234*** 0.307*** 0.267*** 0.266*** 
  (2.75) (3.90) (3.24) (3.34) 
CEO_comp t-1 4.595*** 4.131*** 4.268*** 4.215*** 
  (3.77) (3.56) (3.63) (3.59) 
logTA t-1 9.393*** 9.312*** 9.987*** 9.766*** 
  (19.14) (19.67) (21.15) (21.16) 
DebTc t-1 -0.0288 -0.0334 -0.0498 -0.0534 
  (-0.66) (-0.84) (-1.27) (-1.40) 
H-index -0.559 0.341 -0.147 0.0848 
  (-0.19) (0.12) (-0.05) (0.03) 
ResSec -18.67*** -18.50*** -20.42*** -19.79*** 
  (-3.92) (-4.04) (-4.23) (-4.22) 
ResIns 5.934 7.491* 5.741 6.534 
  (1.48) (1.89) (1.33) (1.49) 
ResRE 8.019** 6.820** 7.415** 7.478** 
  (2.38) (2.05) (2.16) (2.26) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept -137.7*** -134.8*** -144.5*** -142.8*** 
  (-10.21) (-10.36) (-10.57) (-10.40) 
          
F 96,47*** 98,25*** 106,54*** 104,67*** 
Pseudo R2 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,15 
No. of Obs. 411 454 451 451 
113 
 
Table 4. Tobit regression analysis. 
This table presents Tobit regression coefficients and in parentheses associated t-statistics. The dependent variable 
in the Models 5-8 is the indicator 2 of Bank Social Responsibility (BSR_2).*, **, and *** denote coefficient 
estimates significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. A significant F-Statistic 
illustrates that the models are significant and the independent variables do affect the indicators of financial 
performance. 
Variables 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
BSR_2 BSR_2 BSR_2 BSR_2 
Roa t-1 -0.139       
  (-0.14)       
Roe t-1   0.00922     
    (0.11)     
NII_TA t-1     1.482   
      (1.53)   
MI_TA t-1       1.211** 
        (2.13) 
B_Size t-1 -0.350 -0.293 -0.380 -0.397 
  (-1.04) (-0.90) (-1.15) (-1.20) 
B_Act t-1 0.312*** 0.283*** 0.285** 0.276** 
  (2.86) (2.66) (2.58) (2.54) 
B_Ind t-1 0.0612 0.0715 0.0903 0.0867 
  (1.05) (1.33) (1.57) (1.50) 
B_Div t-1 0.261*** 0.333*** 0.283*** 0.285*** 
  (2.66) (3.78) (3.05) (3.17) 
CEO_comp t-1 3.794** 2.810* 2.906* 2.899* 
  (2.42) (1.84) (1.86) (1.88) 
logTA t-1 11.88*** 12.24*** 12.91*** 12.78*** 
  (21.18) (21.91) (22.63) (22.67) 
DebTc t-1 -0.0537 -0.0926* -0.113** -0.110** 
  (-1.10) (-1.80) (-2.13) (-2.19) 
H-index -0.670 -0.138 -0.503 -0.460 
  (-0.19) (-0.04) (-0.16) (-0.14) 
ResSec -32.37*** -32.79*** -34.81*** -34.62*** 
  (-5.34) (-5.54) (-5.65) (-5.77) 
ResIns 2.372 2.372 0.908 1.067 
  (0.60) (0.62) (0.21) (0.25) 
ResRE 15.47*** 15.05*** 15.90*** 15.99*** 
  (3.60) (3.58) (3.65) (3.78) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept -171.5*** -174.2*** -183.4*** -182.5*** 
  (-11.34) (-11.93) (-12.14) (-12.12) 
          
F 158,06*** 161,34*** 166,51*** 167,35*** 
Pseudo R2 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 
No. of Obs. 411 454 451 451 
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Table 5. Tobit regression analysis. 
This table presents Tobit regression coefficients and in parentheses associated t-statistics. The dependent 
variable in the Models 9-12 is the indicator 2 of Bank Environmental Responsibility (BER).*, **, and *** 
denote coefficient estimates significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. A 
significant F-Statistic illustrates that the models are significant and the independent variables do affect the 
indicators of financial performance. 
Variables 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
BER BER BER BER 
Roa t-1 0.256       
  (0.23)       
Roe t-1   0.0303     
    (0.33)     
NII_TA t-1     2.325**   
      (2.06)   
MI_TA t-1       1.021 
        (1.55) 
B_Size t-1 -0.443 -0.516 -0.551 -0.537 
  (-1.21) (-1.45) (-1.55) (-1.51) 
B_Act t-1 0.483*** 0.478*** 0.478*** 0.483*** 
  (3.28) (3.29) (3.19) (3.25) 
B_Ind t-1 0.0583 0.0499 0.0533 0.0489 
  (0.96) (0.87) (0.87) (0.80) 
B_Div t-1 0.355*** 0.403*** 0.388*** 0.385*** 
  (2.72) (3.54) (3.17) (3.20) 
CEO_comp t-1 5.746*** 4.277** 4.612** 4.539** 
  (2.92) (2.24) (2.38) (2.35) 
logTA t-1 14.05*** 14.54*** 15.16*** 14.94*** 
  (20.84) (22.41) (23.07) (22.98) 
DebTc t-1 -0.0742 -0.137** -0.148** -0.155*** 
  (-1.23) (-2.40) (-2.57) (-2.76) 
H-index 2.023 2.897 2.532 2.833 
  (0.55) (0.82) (0.71) (0.80) 
ResSec -33.39*** -33.72*** -35.65*** -34.88*** 
  (-5.26) (-5.49) (-5.46) (-5.61) 
ResIns -7.957* -7.601* -10.67** -9.646** 
  (-1.86) (-1.77) (-2.29) (-2.03) 
ResRE 17.99*** 17.20*** 17.82*** 17.84*** 
  (4.01) (3.89) (3.86) (4.02) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept -216.3*** -218.8*** -226.6*** -224.9*** 
  (-12.11) (-12.59) (-12.72) (-12.61) 
          
F 159,1*** 152,45*** 162,94*** 164,04*** 
Pseudo R2 0,15 0,14 0,14 0,14 
No. of Obs. 411 454 451 451 
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CHAPTER 5 – Effects of Bank Social Responsibility on Client Loyalty  
 
 
 
Summary: 5.1. Introduction; 5.2 Theoretical background and research 
hypotheses; 5.2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility and Stakeholder 
management; 5.2.2 Corporate social responsibility and client loyalty; 
5.2.3 Community relations; 5.2.4 Product responsibility; 5.3 
Methodology; 5.3.1 Variables; 5.3.2  Two-step Heckman selection model; 
5.4 Results; 5.4.1 Descriptive analysis; 5.4.2 Multivariate analysis; 5.5 
Discussions and Conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Over the past few years, banks have invested an increasing amount of resources in CSR 
(Peterson and Hermans, 2004; Marin and Ruiz, 2007). The directions of banks socially 
responsible policies are multiple. They include the supply of microfinance schemes, the 
removal of the barriers to credit access (Hermes et al., 2005), the community involvement 
(Decker, 2004), the reduction of the negative environmental impacts and the promotion 
of a sound environmental management (Lee, 2008), the financial support to causes related 
to human rights (Prior and Argandona, 2008).  
Concurrent with the growing engagement of banks in socially responsible practices, the 
investigation of bank social responsibility (BSR) has gained the attention of academics 
and researchers (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Maignan and Ferrell, 2004; McDonald, 
2015).  
A substantial part of the scientific attention has investigated whether adopting corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) may improve the banks financial performance (e.g. Simpson 
and Khoers 2002; Soana 2011; Wu and Shen, 2013; Shen et al. 2016; Esteban-Sanchez et 
al. 2017; Bussoli and Conte 2018; Fijałkowska et al. 2018). The main part of these studies 
highlights the existence of a positive impact of CSR engagement on banks’ financial 
outcomes. However, as argued by Bhattacharya et al. (2009), a more precise 
understanding of the underlying processes that drive these returns is necessary. In this 
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sense, the current chapter intends to answers to the call by earlier studies (e.g., Wu and 
Shen, 2013) for deeper investigation on the mechanism connecting CSR to FP of banks. 
In particular, this work argues that a better comprehension of how CSR activities 
influence stakeholders may help to clarify how banks CSR engagement spread its effects.  
Prior literature recognizes how the positive stakeholder perceptions of CSR activities are 
instrumental to positive financial returns (Barnett 2007; Bhattacharya et al. 2009; Peloza 
2009; Peloza and Shang 2011; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006). The stakeholder view argues 
that the good management of stakeholder relationships represents a fundamental part of 
CSR (Dahlsurd 2008). Organizations are dependent on stakeholders in order to obtain the 
necessary resources for their survival and prosperity (Wu and Shen, 2013). Barnett and 
Salomon (2012) highlight that the CSR engagement may conduct to benefits higher than 
its costs to the extent to which the organization owns the adequate capacity to influence 
stakeholder. Also Porter and Kramer (2006) recognize that the achievement of benefits 
from the implementation of CSR is circumscribed to the strategic management of 
stakeholder claims. 
However, nevertheless the management of stakeholders claims appear as a central point 
in the literature on business social responsibility, scant empirical evidence exists on the 
effects that CSR produce on the different stakeholder categories within the banking 
industry (McDonald and Rundle-Thiele, 2008; Carnevale et al. 2012). The understanding 
of the impact on banks’ stakeholders of CSR investments remains an important and still 
largely unresolved issue (Lacey, 2015; Aramburu and Pescador, 2017). 
Against this backdrop, among the various bank’s stakeholders, the present study focuses 
on clients. Specifically, the research empirically analyzes the impact that BSR has on 
client loyalty  7 (CL). For CL, the study refers to the tendency displayed by a large number 
of customers to keep buying products from the same organization over time and to 
associate positive images to firm's products (Jacoby and Kyner 1973; Keller 1993; 
Maignan et al., 1999). 
The chapter contributes to the knowledge of the phenomenon for several reasons. First, 
by examining how CSR activities spread their effects towards banks clients, it enriches 
the literature that attempts to deepen the mechanisms linking the banks CSR engagement 
                                                          
7 In this chapter the terms “client loyalty” and “customer loyalty” are used interchangeably. 
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and economic results (e.g. Shen et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2017). CL is considered closely 
related to the organization´s financial outcomes (Garcia de los Salmones et al. 2009). As 
argued by Brine et al. (2007) CSR branding can draw consumers away from competitors 
and thereby improve profitability. The comprehension of CL represents a key aspect in 
driving long-term corporate profitability (Bolton et al., 2004; Chiou and Droge, 2006). 
Second, differently from previous studies, that have examined how CSR is perceived by 
stakeholder adopting cross-sectional, experimental, and/or artificial settings (Lacey and 
Kennett-Hensel, 2010), the current research enriches the empirical evidence through the 
analysis of an international panel of 148 banks, from 2010 to 2015.  
Third, the empirical analysis considers the influence that several types BSR have on CL. 
This approach allows to respond to calls of researchers (e.g. Maignan and Ferrell 2004; 
Aguilera et al. 2007) to examine the differential effects of various CSR activities on 
business performance. Consistently with the literature arguing that the various 
stakeholder groups may have different expectations about CSR engagement (McDonald 
and Lai, 2010), this paper intends to verify how several dimensions BSR affect CL.  
Fourth, the research assesses the impact that CSR on CL by differentiating for the banks' 
size. Prior literature recognizes that the size may influence the level of CSR engagement 
(Russo and Perrini, 2010). As argued by Cornett et al. (2016), large banks are more likely 
to be considered “too-big-to-fail”. Consequently, they might take less attention to the 
aftermaths of their business policies and might be less oriented to undertake socially 
responsible practices. On the other hand, small banks might be more interested in 
engaging in CSR, in order to achieve the support of stakeholders, especially during 
periods of financial distress. Therefore, the current study further deepens the empirical 
analysis, to verify if the implementation of socially responsible practices matters more 
for small banks rather than for large banks. 
Fifth, given that the relationship between CSR and banks performance may be affected 
by the endogeneity issue (Wu and Shen. 2013; Cornett et al., 2016). In line with previous 
investigations (Jo and Harjoto 2011, 2012; Wu and Shen, 2013; Shen et al., 2016), the 
current research mitigates the endogeneity bias, applying the two-stage Heckman model 
(1976, 1979). 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 includes the literature 
review and the hypotheses. Section 3 explains the adopted empirical strategy. Section 4 
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shows the results. Finally, section 5 discusses the implications and limitations of the 
study. 
 
5.2. Theoretical background and research hypotheses  
 
5.2.1 Corporate social responsibility and stakeholder management  
 
CSR definitions often refer to the impact that business activities have on society 
(Aramburu and Pescador, 2017). According to Renneboog et al. (2008), CSR can be 
broadly identified in the corporate decisions fostering social, corporate governance, 
ethical and environmental issues. The European Commission (2011) argues that CSR 
involves a process aimed to integrate social, environmental, ethical concerns into business 
operations and strategy. CSR has also been defined as the company’s activities and status 
related to its perceived societal or stakeholder obligations (Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006). 
As noted by Dahlsurd (2008), the main part of CSR conceptualizations refer to the 
management of stakeholders issues.  
The core of stakeholder theory argues that the survival and sustainability of the firm 
depend on its capability to manage the relationships with stakeholder (Freeman, 1984; 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Post et al. (2002) recognize how the several 
interdependencies existing between the firm and its stakeholder are critical to the 
successful functioning of the organization. Jones (1995), identifying the company as a 
nexus of contracts, argues that the creation of good relationships with the various 
stakeholder groups allows to minimize the contracting costs. From this angle, the 
objective of the company’s managers is to go beyond the shareholders’ wealth 
maximization and to undertake those policies improving the stakeholder-company 
interactions (Post et al. 2002). In summary, stakeholder theorists state that managers have 
to satisfy a variety of stakeholders (e.g. workers, customers, suppliers, local community, 
organizations, and media) who can influence or are influenced by the firm’s objectives 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
The logic that leads to identify the stakeholder view as prevalent theoretical framework 
in the CSR literature (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Dahlsurd, 2008) is that socially 
responsible practices allow to foster favorable and trust relationships with key 
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stakeholders (Barnett, 2007; Werther and Chandler, 2010; Barnett and Salomon, 2012). 
As recognized by Clarkson (1995), CSR initiatives can be considered relationship-
building activities with stakeholders. Also Bhattacharya et al. (2009), identifies CSR 
policies as crucial part of the dialogue between organizations and their community of 
stakeholder. In this sense, the link between the undertaking of socially responsible 
practices and the firm’s achievement of better economic results (Gallardo-Vazquez and 
Sanchez-Hernandez, 2014; O’Rourke, 2003) is represented by the valuable goodwill 
related to the trusting relations with stakeholders (Surroca et al., 2010).  
However, nevertheless it is widely acknowledged that banks proactively engage in CSR 
(Marin et al. 2009) to address the stakeholders claims, there is a dearth of research 
analyzing the impact that BSR has on specific categories of stakeholder. It is still unclear 
how different stakeholder groups perceive CSR activities. Among the various stakeholder 
groups, the current work focuses on banks clients. Customers are considered to be 
particularly sensitive to CSR initiatives (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004; McDonald and Lai, 
2010) and have gained a dominant attention of scholars investigating how CSR generate 
value for stakeholders (Peloza and Shang, 2011).  
Hence, consistent with the objective of the study, the subsequent three paragraphs (5.2.2, 
5.2.3, 5.2.4) intend to theoretically frame the impact that BSR has on the loyalty of the 
clients. The study of this relationship represents a timely and hot topic within the banking 
industry, on which previous studies have produced less empirical evidence (Aramburu 
and Pescador 2017).  
 
 
5.2.2 Corporate social responsibility and client loyalty 
 
 
In parallel with the growing engagement of banks in CSR, academics and practitioners 
have dedicated relevant attention to the consumers’ perception of CSR issues (Deng and 
Xu, 2018). For examples, Mandhachitara and Poolthong (2011) find that CSR has a 
positive impact on customers attitudinal loyalty in the Thai banking industry; Matute-
Vallejo et al. (2011) highlight that socially responsible practices and price fairness may 
favor the achievement of customer loyalty; Alafi and Al Sufy (2012) find that the 
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customer satisfaction of Jordanian banking customers is positively influenced by socially 
responsible initiatives; Aramburu and Pescador (2017), through the administration of a 
personal survey to bank customers in the Basque countries, demonstrate that banks 
reputation partially mediate the relationship between CSR and customer loyalty.  
However, nevertheless the academic research witnesses the generally positive influence 
of socially responsible initiatives on consumers´ company perceptions (Bhattacharya and 
Sen 2004), the favorable reaction to CSR initiatives is not so obvious, and in some 
circumstances, consumers may have negative responses (Deng and Xu, 2017). In this 
sense, authors argue that it is still unclear how consumers react to CSR initiatives 
(Oberseder et al. 2014), especially in the banking industry (Mc Donald and Lai, 2010; 
Aramburu and Pescador, 2017). Moreover, the abovementioned studies are often 
anchored to specific contexts, and empirical evidence at the global level is still missing.  
In the last years, legitimacy theory has gained momentum in understanding how CSR is 
perceived among stakeholders (Stanaland et al., 2011). Drawing from the Suchman´s 
definition (1995), legitimacy can be defined “the perception that organization’s actions 
are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values and beliefs”. Organizations are called to undertake those activities that are 
consistent with the values and norms of society (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006), to ensure 
that their activities are legitimated by outside parties (Deegan, 2000). In this perspective, 
the undertaking and reporting of CSR initiatives may be read as an attempt to enhance 
their degree of legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders (Stanaland et al., 2011; Perez and 
del Bosque 2012; Aramburu and Pescador, 2017). Branco and Rodriguez (2006) noted 
how organizations belonging to industries with high visibility, such as the banking 
system, exhibit greater concern to improve their social legitimization.  
Another frequently adopted theoretical interpretation key to study the relationship 
between CSR and consumers´ behavior is the social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 
1985). According to this perspective, when individuals self-define their social identity, 
they classify themselves into social categories to which they feel a sense of belonging 
(Tajfel, 1988). The individual that considers the behavior and the values of an 
organization as part of self, identifies her/himself with the organization (Scott and Lane, 
2000). Consumer-company identification occurs to the extent to which there is an 
overlapping between the consumers’ perceptions of themselves and their psychological 
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perceptions of the company (Du et al., 2007). As argued by Bhattacharya and Sen (2004), 
good consumer-company relationships often derive from consumer identification with 
that company. The identification with an organization generates psychological and 
emotional connections (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001), that may trigger the consumer 
willingness to contribute and to pay more in order to realize the organization’s goals 
(Deng and Xu, 2017). Scholars have frequently asserted that CSR engagement expresses 
the values of the firm allowing stakeholders to set up the self-identification process 
(Lichtenstein et al., 2004; Maignan and Ferrell, 2004; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001). 
Marin et al. (2009) and Deng and Xu (2017), drawing on social identity theory and 
adopting a survey-based approach, find that CSR actions may generate higher customers’ 
loyalty and a more positive evaluation of the company.  
A further relevant link between CSR initiatives and corporate outcomes is represented by 
the reputation (Brønn and Vrioni, 2001). This latter, at the firm level, has been defined as 
the “cognitive representation” that stakeholders have achieved about the capability of the 
organization to provide valuable outcomes (Fombrun et al., 2000). From the resource-
based view (RBW) perspective (Barney, 1991), reputation can be considered as an 
intangible asset that favors the achievement of the competitive advantage (Barney, 2002; 
Dowling 2004; Melo and Garrido-Morgado, 2012). Given the intangible nature of 
financial services, the correct management of the reputational goodwill appears 
particularly relevant for banks (Gaultier-Gaillarda and Louisot, 2006; Walsh and Beatty 
2007). Researchers have recognized that socially responsible activities may help to 
improve reputation among stakeholders (McDonald and Lai 2011; Wu and Shen, 2013; 
Wu et al., 2017) and to enhance the customers’ loyalty (Heikkurinen, 2010; Bhattacharya 
and Sen 2004; Bravo et al., 2009).  As acknowledged also by Stanaland et al. (2011), the 
undertaking of CSR initiatives may strongly and positively affect the customers´ 
perceptions of the organization. In the perspective of the signaling theory (Connely, 
2011), CSR initiatives can be considered as signals that the bank sends to stakeholders, 
in order to build a positive reputation (Deephouse, 2000) and customers´ loyalty (Hsu 
2012; Aramburu and Pescador, 2017).  
Accordingly, drawing from the stakeholder view, legitimacy theory, social identity 
theory, signaling theory and taking into account the benefits that CSR activities may 
generate in terms of increased reputational capital, the study hypothesizes: 
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H.1 The CSR engagement has a positive impact on client loyalty in the banking industry 
 
 
5.2.3 Community relations 
 
As witnessed by Netemeyer (2004), businesses engaged in social activities build a 
positive image, which in turn is likely to have a positive effect on customer loyalty. The 
community relations performance belongs to the social aspect of CSR. Esteban-Sanchez 
et al. (2017) argue that community relations involve elements such as philanthropic 
activities, avoiding bribery and corruption, respect of business ethics, protection of human 
rights and public health. The European Banking Federation (EBF, 2013) defines the 
community dimension of CSR as the contribution of banks to the community where their 
businesses are established. 
Previous studies recognize that the investments in the social area may shape the 
perceptions of stakeholders, thereby guiding their behaviors (Aramburu and Pescador, 
2017). With specific reference to the financial sector, the support to community represents 
a crucial area of CSR engagement and it is gaining great attention by banks, in terms of 
publications, discussions, advertising and public relations efforts (Garcia de los Salmones 
et al., 2009).  
Considering the characteristics of banking business and its growing impact on society 
(Lauesen, 2013; De la Cuesta-Gonzalez et al. 2006), the bank's engagement in social 
related activities is likely to influence the consumers´ perceptions (Hassan et al. 2013; 
Marin et al. 2009). Lacey and Kennett-Hensel (2010) argue that the customers’ 
perceptions of the organization’s social responsibility drive their trust and loyalty. In light 
of these arguments, the second research hypothesis predicts: 
 
H.2 The engagement in socially responsible policies towards community has a positive 
impact on client loyalty in the banking industry  
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5.2.4 Product responsibility 
 
Authors demonstrate that CSR can positively affect customers’ behaviors toward the firm 
and its offering (Lichtenstein et al. 2004; Mandhachitara and Poolthong 2011). 
The consumer reactions to socially responsible products are not only rational but also 
emotional (Vallejo, 2011). Prior literature shows that consumers are willing to pay more 
for products provided by organizations socially responsibly engaged (Barone et al., 2000; 
Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001). According to the analysis conducted in 2018 by 
Findomestic - BNP Paribas Group - consumers are willing to spend up to 10% more, in 
order to purchase a sustainable product. 
 Other scholars argue that customers are more likely to buy products of firms that invest 
in CSR, as they attribute a better reputation to these firms (Brown and Dacin, 1997; Auger 
et al. 2008). Also Mohr and Webb (2005) demonstrate that clients´ purchase intentions 
are more favorable for products of companies perceived as committed in philanthropic 
and environmental activities.  
The consumers’ identification with the product characteristics will define psychological 
and emotional connections with the supplier organization, which will push them to put 
more efforts to achieve the goals of that organization (Deng and Xu, 2017). For some 
customers, the act of purchasing is not only a consumption experience but represents also 
an opportunity to be part of a community or social group with similar beliefs (Daub and 
Ergenzinger 2005). Peloza and Shang (2011) witness that socially responsible products 
provide a broader spectrum of value to customers, that goes beyond the materialistic 
aspects. The value that customers perceive depends on what they are looking in a product, 
and it affects the relationship between quality and price (Zeithaml, 1988). Maignan et al. 
(1999) argue that CSR may generate value for customers in several ways, such as 
attention to individual needs, transparency of products and services, respect of strict 
product safety standards. The higher perceived value by customers may favor their trust 
in the organization and enhance their loyalty. In line with these arguments, the study 
hypothesizes:   
 
H. 3 Socially responsible products have a positive impact on client loyalty in the banking 
industry 
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5.3 Methodology8 
 
5.3.1 Variables 
 
 
The current section aims to describe the dependent, independent and control variables 
adopted in the empirical analysis. The description of the variables is also summarized in 
Table 1.  
First, as dependent variable, the research adopts a measure of loyalty of banks' clients, 
obtained through Asset4-ESG database. This latter identifies the CL as the loyal 
relationship with clients that the bank defines through customer satisfaction programs, 
price policies and avoiding anticompetitive behaviors.  
With reference to independent variables, the study refers to the CSR scores provided by 
Asset4-ESG. These latter are considered to provide transparent, auditable and comparable 
CSR information (e.g. Ferrero-Ferrero et al., 2015), that are widely used by academics 
and investment analysts (Cheng et al., 2014). 
In order to test the research hypotheses, in addition to an overall measure of BSR, the 
empirical analysis includes two further dimensions of BSR, namely the community 
relations (Comm) and product responsibility (PrResp). In particular, the community 
relations dimension measures the bank’s capacity to maintain its license to operate as 
good citizen, respecting business ethics and taking care of social issues, such as the 
protection of public health or the fight to bribery and corruption. The product 
responsibility, instead, refers to the bank’s proposition of services integrating customer’s 
health and safety, taking care of clients privacy, providing accurate product information 
and labeling.  
Finally, the study also adopts several control variables, in order to avoid biased results. 
Similarly to previous investigations (Wu et al., 2017; Cornett et al., 2016), the first set of 
controls refers to bank-level data. In particular, the analysis controls for bank’s 
profitability (ROA); degree of leverage (DebTc), computed dividing the bank’s debt by 
its total capital; bank’s size (logEmployees), considered as log transformation of number 
of employees; loan to deposit ratio (TL_TDep); capital expenditures (Capex); bank’s 
                                                          
8  Data collection and sample description are reported in chapter 3. 
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coverage (NPL_Lres), calculated as the nonperforming loans divided by the loan loss 
reserves.  
The second set of variables controls for institutional and macroeconomic factors. In 
particular, considering the scores provided by Barth et al. (2012), the analysis includes 
the degree of restriction of banks in securities (ResSec), insurance (ResIns) real estate 
(ResRE) and auxiliaries (ResAux) activities. The study considers the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (H-index) as proxy of market competition, and the gross domestic 
product per capita (GDPper) to capture country economic heterogeneity. The empirical 
models consider the banks' typology, including a dummy variable which classifies banks 
in four categories, namely, asset management and custody banks, diversified banks, 
regional banks, thrifts, and mortgage banks. Finally, the analysis includes year and 
country dummies to control for time effects and cross-countries differences, respectively. 
 
 
5.3.2  Two-step Heckman selection model 
 
 
In order to examine the impact of the BSR of the sampled banks on client loyalty, the 
study applies the two-step Heckman selection model (1979). The adoption of this 
empirical approach allows to address the bias of endogeneity. In fact, several previous 
studies have witnesses that the relationship between CSR and economic outcomes can be 
biased by endogeneity (e.g. Cornett et al., 2016). In other terms, for example, it is possible 
that better banks tend to engage more in CSR initiatives. These banks might present better 
relationships with customers, regardless of their commitment to CSR. 
If this is the case, the analysis of the relationship might show the existence of a positive 
link with the indicators of economic performance, even in the absence of a real 
relationship. In this context, the application of an ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
analysis would not treat the endogeneity, thereby generating biased estimates. For this 
reason, in order to correct the bias of endogeneity, similarly to previous investigations (Jo 
and Harjoto, 2011, 2012), the present study applies the Heckman's two-stage estimation 
procedure (1979). Specifically, the first step of the Heckman model is characterized by 
the application of a probit regression, formalized as follows: 
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y i,t =α + Z i,t + β i,t + ε i,t        (1) 
  
 
where y represents a dummy variable which assumes value 1 for bank i that engages in 
high CSR (above the median value of the sample) in year t and 0 if it engages in low CSR 
(below the median value of the sample). Zit is the vector of explanatory variables, 
including firm characteristics. β i,t is the coefficients of the predictors, and ε is the random 
error term. The above probit regression model, namely “decision equation”, estimates the 
probability that the bank i engages in high or low CSR.  
The estimates obtained through the probit analysis are used to calculate the inverse Mills’ 
ratio (IMR). This latter is included as an additional explanatory variable in the second 
step of the Heckman model (1979). In particular, the second step is an OLS estimation, 
namely "performance equation", formalized as follows:    
 
y j,k = α +  β CSR j,k + γ Xj,k + δ IMRj,k + ε j,k          (2) 
 
   
where, yj,k indicates the client loyalty indicator of bank j at time k, CSR j,k is the corporate 
social responsibility measure of bank j at time k; X j,k  represents the vector of control 
variables; and ε is the random error term. β, γ and δ are the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables.  
 
5.4 Results 
 
 
5.4.1 Descriptive analysis  
 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics and difference tests of the variables included in 
the empirical investigation. In particular, the table compares banks with a low level of 
engagement in CSR with banks that present a high level of engagement in CSR. It is 
possible to note that high CSR banks present higher CL than banks with low CSR. This 
difference appears statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.00. High CSR banks are 
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also more indebted, larger and present a slightly lower percentage of total loans on total 
deposits. With reference to macroeconomic and institutional factors, banks with high 
CSR are collocated in countries with lower levels of restriction on securities (ResSec), 
real estate (ResRE) and auxiliary activities (ResAux) and characterized by higher levels 
of market competition (H-index) than low CSR banks.  
Table 3, instead, provides the descriptive statistics and difference tests by size groups. In 
particular, it shows that large banks present higher CL and are more engaged in CSR. 
They are also characterized by lower profitability (ROA) and a higher degree of leverage. 
  
    
5.4.2 Multivariate analysis  
 
 
Table 4 reports the estimates referred to the decision equation (probit analysis) of the two-
step Heckman model. The empirical models (1-6) aim to evaluate the bank’s propensity 
to engage in CSR activities. In particular, the analysis shows that the size is a statistically 
significant predictor of the bank’s decision to engage in BSR (1-2), in the community 
dimension of BSR (3-4) and of bank’s product responsibility (5-6). These results are in 
line with previous investigations suggesting that the firm’s size is positively related to the 
engagement in CSR activities (e.g. Cornett et al., 2016). The models 1 and 2 also report 
that the higher is the level of restriction on securities and other auxiliary bank’s activities, 
the lower is the bank’s propensity to engage in CSR. The models 5 and 6 also report that 
the total loans to deposit ratio (TL_Tdep) is a significant positive predictor, while, Capex 
negatively affects the bank’s product responsibility.  
Table 5, instead, reports the empirical analyses referred to the impact that bank’s 
engagement in CSR initiatives has on client loyalty. In particular models 7 and 8 indicate 
that BSR has a statistically significant and positive impact on CL. These results, 
suggesting that the higher is the BSR the higher is the loyalty of banks clients, confirm 
the first research hypothesis (H.1). The findings are in line with previous empirical 
investigations demonstrating the positive reactions of banks’ customers to socially 
responsible initiatives (e.g. Matute-Vallejo, 2011; Aramburu and Pescador, 2017). 
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Looking at models 9 and 10, it is possible to note that the community dimension of BSR 
does not affect CL. Thus the empirical analysis does not confirm the second research 
hypothesis (H.2). These results are not in line with the study of Esteban-Sanchez et al. 
(2017), according to which the bank’s relations with community affect the banks' 
economic outcomes. Finally, the study confirms the third research hypothesis (H.3). In 
fact, the models 11 and 12 show that the bank’s product responsibility has a significant 
positive impact on CL. With reference to control variables, the models 7 and 8 show a 
significant and positive impact of profitability on CL. Similar evidence is reported by 
models 9 and 10. Models 7, 8 and 11, instead, indicate that the more indebted and higher 
are the capital expenditures, the higher is the loyalty of bank’s clients. 
Finally, Table 6 and 7 report the empirical analysis referred to large banks and small 
banks, respectively. In particular, with reference to large banks, Table 6 shows that, 
among the CSR indicators, only product responsibility (Model 15) has a significant and 
positive effect on CL, whilst the overall measure of bank social responsibility (BSR) and 
the community dimension (Comm) do not affect CL. Table 7, instead, reports that both 
overall BSR (Model 16) and product responsibility (Model 18) have a statistically 
significant impact on CL, in small banks. 
 
5.5 Discussion and Conclusions  
 
The widespread of CSR within the banking industry makes it important to understand 
how the bank's implementation of socially responsible initiatives is perceived by 
stakeholders. Among the various categories of stakeholders, this chapter focuses on 
bank's clients, empirically investigating how various measures of BSR influence client 
loyalty. According to prior literature, loyalty is one of the most representative behaviors 
through which clients express their satisfaction with corporate performance (Garcia de 
los Salmones et al. 2009; Aramburu and Pescador, 2017). Moreover, as reported by 
Mandhachitara and Poolthong (2011), client loyalty is no longer just a marketing goal, 
but also a basis for the achievement of a competitive advantage.  
The results show that the bank’s engagement in CSR activities enhances client loyalty. 
Moreover, the findings indicate that the empirical evidence in small banks is stronger than 
in large banks.  
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The study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. It enriches the understanding 
of how the bank’s engagement in CSR spreads its effects among the various stakeholder 
groups. Given that the understanding of client loyalty is considered a key element in 
driving corporate profitability (Bolton et al., 2004; Chiou and Droge, 2006; Garcia de los 
Salmones et al., 2009), the analysis answers to previous studies (Bhattacharya et al., 2009; 
Wu and Shen, 2013) calling for a better understanding on the mechanisms connecting 
CSR and financial performance. As recognized also by Barnett (2007) and Barnett and 
Salomon (2012), the possibilities to profit from CSR strongly depends on the firm’s 
ability to generate positive stakeholder relations with stakeholders. Adopting several 
measures of CSR, the research also comes in response to calls to identify how specific 
socially responsible activities influence customers (Bhattacharya et al., 2009). Moreover, 
differently from previous investigations that examine how bank's customers react to CSR, 
in circumscribed geographical contexts (Matute-Vallejo et al., 2011; Aramburu and 
Pescador, 2017), the current chapter analyzes an international sample of 148 banks, from 
22 countries. Finally, further developing the empirical analysis by banks size, the study 
helps to better understand if socially responsible activities matter more for small banks or 
large banks.   
The study has several implications. First, the results confirm the role of CSR initiatives 
as a means to restore the corporate reputation. It provides important indications for 
managers who seek to maintain and develop the dialogue with customers. Second, the 
results should attract the attention of policymakers and authorities. The economic growth 
of countries is closely related to the well-functioning and competitiveness of the banking 
system. The study shows that economic benefits can result from the implementation of 
programs incentivizing BSR.  
The research also has some limitations. First, it adopts a single measure of client loyalty. 
Further investigations may define other indicators of client loyalty through the 
administration of surveys to banks’ client. Second, other variables related to customers’ 
reactions can be included in future investigations such as customer trust, the perception 
of the bank’s image or bank’s reputation. Further research may also investigate how bank’ 
engagement in CSR is perceived by other stakeholder categories, such as employees or 
shareholders. Finally, future studies may empirically analyze the mediating role of 
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stakeholders’ reactions on the relationship between BSR and the bank’s financial 
performance.        
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Table 1. Description of variables. 
 
Variables Symbol Source Description 
Dependent Variables       
Client Loyalty CL Asset 4 Bank’s client loyalty 
Indipendent Variables       
Bank Social Responsibility BSR Asset 4 The level of bank’s engagement in Environmental, Corporate Governance and 
Social areas. 
Community Relations Comm Asset 4 Bank’s socially responsible policies towards community.  
Product Responsibility PrResp Asset 4 Integration of socially responsible considerations in banks’ products.  
Control Variables       
Return on Assets ROA Worldscope Retrn on Assets 
Leverage DebTc Worldscope Totsl Debt divided by Total Capital 
Size logEmployees Worldscope Natural Logaritm of the number of employess 
Loan to Deposit ratio TL_TDep Worldscope Total Loans divided by Total Deposits 
Capital expenditures Capex Worldscope Capital expenditures normalized by total assets 
Coverage  NPL_Lres Worldscope Nonperforming Loans divided by Loan Loss Reserves 
Restriction Securities ResSec Barth et al. (2012) The degree of restriction on banking activities in securities 
Restriction Insurance ResIns Barth et al. (2012) The degree of restriction on banking activities in insurance 
Restriction Real estate ResRE Barth et al. (2012) The degree of restriction on banking activities in real estate 
Restriction Auxiliaries Activities ResAux Barth et al. (2012) The degree of restriction on banking activities in auxiliaries activities 
GDP per capita GDPper World Bank Gross Domestic Product based on current price/population 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index H-Index World Bank Higher HHI indicates less market competition and more monopoly or oligopoly 
Banks Typology Banks_type GICS Classification by banks type 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics by BSR.  
 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the study, grouped by the level of CSR engagement. Banks with low CSR are those that 
present a CSR indicator lower than the median of the full sample. Banks with high CSR are those that present a CSR indicator higher than the median of the  
full sample.   
 
Variable 
Banks with low CSR Banks with high CSR Diff.Test 
Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max t-test 
BSR 439 29.55 13.85 4.48 55.21 439 78.65 10.89 55.40 95.58 -58.39*** 
CL 439 44.51 25.14 3.37 96.48 439 82.55 19.42 13.19 97.94 -25.09*** 
PrResp 439 34.42 24.13 3.71 92.59 439 69.64 22.42 12.03 97.55 -22.40*** 
Comm 439 34.10 13.63 11.07 73.70 439 70.73 18.30 19.19 96.25 -33.63*** 
ROA 380 0.75 0.86 -6.04 8.43 49 0.73 1.32 -12.42 6.40 0.14 
DebTc 439 55.95 22.71 0.70 104.71 449 72.49 17.13 13.50 107.55 -12.26*** 
logEmployees 410 8.44 1.06 3.87 11.14 439 10.19 1.55 3.47 12.59 -19.10*** 
TL_TDep 427 119.65 140.06 3.13 1,652.64 441 118.59 48.30 54.99 515.25 0.14 
Capex 389 0.23 0.69 0.00 5.88 414 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.80 3.19*** 
ResSec 307 2.30 0.94 1.00 3.00 389 1.72 0.85 1.00 3.00 8.49*** 
ResIns 307 2.21 0.54 1.00 3.00 389 2.26 0.66 1.00 4.00 -1.13 
ResRE 307 3.24 1.03 1.00 4.00 389 2.39 1.02 1.00 4.00 10.89*** 
ResAux 307 3.41 0.93 1.00 4.00 389 2.61 1.13 1.00 4.00 10.00*** 
GDPper 439 46,113.70 10,005.81 21,229.35 75,800.02 449 43,322.32 12,626.65 21,229.35 89,590.81 3.64*** 
H-Index 439 0.52 0.18 0.07 0.92 449 0.57 0.23 -0.15 1.26 -3.26*** 
NPL_Lres 369 168.45 100.90 0.00 859.07 397 171.10 97.07 6.74 764.02 -0.36 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics by bank size.  
 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the study, grouped by bank size. Banks with low CSR are those that present a CSR  
indicator lower than the median of the full sample. Banks with high CSR are those that present a CSR indicator higher than the median of the full sample.   
 
Variable 
Small Banks  Large Banks  Diff.Test 
Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max t-test 
CL 420 49.90 27.35 3.37 97.7 458 76.03 25.49 5.39 97.94 -14.65*** 
BSR 420 36.43 21.86 5.24 92.54 458 70.31 21.62 4.48 95.58 -23.07*** 
PrResp 420 37.70 24.44 3.71 95.65 458 65.17 26.95 4.85 97.55 -15.76*** 
Comm 420 37.85 18.09 12.19 95.23 458 65.77 21.67 11.07 96.25 -20.62*** 
ROA 362 0.86 0.09 -3.3 8.43 427 0.63 1.29 -12.42 4.99 2.85*** 
DebTc 425 56.36 23.54 0.70 98.08 463 71.62 16.87 3.84 107.55 -11.17*** 
logEmployees 425 8.06 0.99 3.47 9.38 424 10.63 0.91 93.87 12.59 -39.47*** 
TL_TDep 406 106.70 59.72 3.13 549.01 462 130.02 130.25 54.99 1652.64 -3.31*** 
Capex 372 0.24 0.70 0.00 5.88 431 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.80 3.44*** 
ResSec 309 2.18 0.94 1.00 3.00 387 1.81 0.89 1.00 3.00 5.41*** 
ResIns 309 2.15 0.58 1.00 3.00 387 2.31 0.63 1.00 4.00 -3.47*** 
ResRE 309 3.02 1.12 1.00 4.00 387 2.56 1.06 1.00 4.00 5.53*** 
ResAux 309 3.23 1.04 1.00 4.00 387 2.75 1.14 1.00 4.00 5.74*** 
GDPper 425 46451.15 11,190.15 21229.35 89590.81 463 43096.97 11530.12 21229.35 89080.12 4.39*** 
H-index 425 0.51 0.18 -.15 1.26 463 0.58 0.22 -.15 1.26 -5.16*** 
NPL_Lres 349 169.87 103.08 0.00 859.07 417 169.79 95.35 6.74 764.02 0.010 
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Table 4. Propensity to engage in BSR  
This table shows the coefficient of estimates from the Probit model (columns 1-6). The dependent variable 
is represented by the bank social responsibility (BSR), community responsibility (Comm) and product 
responsibility (PrResp). In these models, the dependent variables BSR_0_1, Comm_0_1, PrResp_0_1 are 
dummy variables which are set on 1 if a firm exhibits a score above the median, 0 otherwise.  *, ** and 
*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
BSR_0_1 BSR_0_1 Comm_0_1 Comm_0_1 PrResp_0_1 PrResp_0_1 
              
ROA 0.119 0.110 -0.0383 -0.0362 0.0724 0.0967 
  (0.79) (0.73) (-0.48) (-0.45) (1.00) (1.31) 
DebTc -0.00172 -0.00101 0.00196 0.000822 -0.00646 0.000298 
  (-0.17) (-0.10) (0.33) (0.13) (-1.22) (0.05) 
logEmployees 1.278*** 1.228*** 0.660*** 0.581*** 0.245*** 0.251*** 
  (10.08) (8.74) (8.23) (5.81) (4.63) (3.21) 
TL_TDep 0.000771 0.00149 0.00280 0.00364 0.0107*** 0.0123*** 
  (0.23) (0.45) (0.93) (1.21) (3.86) (4.13) 
Capex -1.255 -1.249 -0.328* -0.369 -0.177** -0.218** 
  (-1.36) (-1.35) (-1.75) (-1.55) (-2.03) (-2.56) 
ResSec -4.247*** -4.602*** 0.777 -1.365 -1.365 -1.218 
  (-2.92) (-2.93) (0.55) (-1.01) (-1.25) (-1.08) 
ResIns -0.111 0.0102 4.164** 5.969*** -2.928* -1.419 
  (-0.06) (0.01) (2.29) (3.29) (-1.67) (-0.76) 
ResRE 5.088*** 5.640*** -0.617 1.671* -3.461*** -1.894* 
  (3.06) (3.35) (-0.65) (1.90) (-4.16) (-1.85) 
ResAux -3.017*** -2.910*** -1.485* -1.458* 4.448*** 2.798** 
  (-2.93) (-2.90) (-1.81) (-1.81) (4.85) (2.53) 
GDPper 0.0000567 0.0000544 0.0000146 0.0000126 -0.0000447 -0.0000426 
  (1.25) (1.20) (0.29) (0.25) (-0.95) (-0.90) 
H-Index 3.971** 3.697* -0.500 -0.551 -0.439 -0.502 
  (2.00) (1.93) (-0.63) (-0.70) (-0.71) (-0.84) 
NPL_Lres -0.00802*** -0.00839*** -0.00119 -0.00144 -0.00205*** -0.00154** 
  (-4.89) (-4.39) (-1.25) (-1.39) (-2.94) (-2.04) 
              
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Banks_type No Yes No Yes No Yes 
              
Intercept -11.39** -15.57*** -9.582* -18.88*** 5610 -3158 
  (-2.26) (-3.07) (-1.85) (-3.68) (1.13) (-0.60) 
No. of Obs. 448 442 462 459 489 489 
Pseudo R-Squared 0,6369 0,6374 0,4627 0,4675 0,3376 0,3542 
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Table 5. Two-step Heckman model 
This table presents 2-step Heckman (1979) regression coefficients and in parentheses associated t-
statistics. In a 1st step, we run the probit model with same specification in Table 4. The Inverse 
Mills ratio estimated from the 1st-step regression is used in the second stage with the CSR indicator 
and control variables. The dependent variable in the second stage is the Client loyalty (CL).*, **, 
and *** denote coefficient estimates significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. A significant Wald chi-square illustrates that the models are significant and the 
independent variables do affect the indicators of financial performance.  
Variables 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
CL CL CL CL CL CL 
BSR 0.277** 0.319**         
  (2.09) (2.33)         
Comm     0.126 0.135     
      (1.51) (1.56)     
PrResp         0.338*** 0.338*** 
          (3.39) (2.91) 
ROA 3.275*** 3.456*** 3.632*** 3.999*** 1.456 1.044 
  (2.90) (3.04) (3.23) (3.43) (1.01) (0.6) 
DebTc 0.199** 0.231** -0.0454 -0.0412 0.294** 0.242 
  (2.28) (2.42) (-0.42) (-0.36) (2.4) (1.58) 
logEmployees 0.548 1.18 -0.474 -1.114 0.5 0.0702 
  (0.41) (0.79) (-0.35) (-0.67) (0.3) (0.03) 
TL_TDep 0.0292 0.033 0.00939 -0.000739 -0.129 -0.156 
  (0.55) (0.62) (0.19) (-0.01) (-1.61) (-1.58) 
Capex 24.10** 23.45** 7.281 8.005 -13.49* -13.39 
  (2.32) (2.23) (0.71) (0.73) (-1.87) (-1.61) 
ResSec 0.273 -0.775 -21.68 -17.95 -2.738 -2.007 
  (0.02) (-0.04) (-1.13) (-0.93) (-0.11) (-0.07) 
ResIns -41.58 -31.25 -13.87 -28.8 -3.788 -10.4 
  (-1.46) (-1.06) (-0.42) (-0.80) (-0.10) (-0.22) 
ResRE 7.968 9.229 5.31 0.403 10.11 10.75 
  (0.67) (0.78) (0.46) (0.03) (0.69) (0.64) 
ResAux -6.77 -7.22 7.367 10.58 -6.353 -7.7 
  (-0.64) (-0.69) (0.66) (0.94) (-0.49) (-0.51) 
GDPper -0.000621 -0.000645 0.000155 0.0000633 0.000294 0.000349 
  (-0.80) (-0.83) (0.17) (0.07) (0.29) -0.3 
H-Index 8.202 8.35 5.67 7.455 5.991 7.004 
  (1.03) (1.05) (0.65) (0.83) (0.48) -0.48 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Banks_type No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Intercept 132.9 102.3 105.1 151.1 49.59 71.22 
  (1.64) (1.22) (1.11) (1.51) (0.48) (0.56) 
IMR 9.989** 10.32** -6.409 -14.59** -22.93** -26.13** 
  (2.32) (2.31) (-1.19) (-2.30) (-2.14) (-2.02) 
Wald Chi-square 151.89*** 154.96*** 179.21*** 178.97*** 106.46*** 81.22*** 
No. of Obs. 509 509 509 509 509 509 
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Table 6. Two-step Heckman model (Large banks) 
This table presents 2-step Heckman (1979) regression coefficients and in parentheses associated t-statistics for 
large banks. In a 1st step, we run the probit model with same specification in Table 6. The Inverse Mills ratio 
estimated from the 1st-step regression is used in the second stage with the CSR indicator and control variables. 
The dependent variable in the second stage is the Client loyalty (CL).*, **, and *** denote coefficient estimates 
significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. A significant Wald chi-square 
illustrates that the models are significant and the independent variables do affect the indicators of financial 
performance. 
Variables (13) (14) (15) 
  CL CL CL 
BSR 0.231     
  (1.14)     
Comm   0.157   
    (1.64)   
PrResp     0.321*** 
      (2.98) 
ROA 3.356*** 4.054*** 2.850** 
  (2.87) (3.47) (2.30) 
DebTc 0.0182 -0.0320 -0.0264 
  (0.12) (-0.21) (-0.15) 
logEmployees -1792 0.247 0.207 
  (-0.69) (0.08) (0.09) 
TL_Tdep -0.0106 -0.00256 -0.0582 
  (-0.17) (-0.04) (-0.71) 
Capex 14.76 8788 -11.21 
  (1.32) (0.77) (-0.96) 
ResSec -51.01** -27.50 -48.72 
  (-1.98) (-0.95) (-1.60) 
ResIns 52.41 -0.536 41.36 
  (1.13) (-0.01) (0.78) 
ResRE 10.69 18.30 16.15 
  (0.85) (0.14) (1.17) 
ResAux 14.15 10.20 9302 
  (1.02) (0.70) (0.61) 
GDPper 0.00164 0.000387 0.00170 
  (1.32) (0.27) (1.25) 
H-Index 2.710 -5.936 -3.460 
  (0.28) (-0.53) (-0.29) 
Country Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Banks_type Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept -59.19 74.15 -50.85 
  (-0.46) (0.51) (-0.35) 
IMR 12.86** 15.48* -10.24 
  (2.02) (1.83) (-0.79) 
Wald Chi-square 154.50*** 201.20*** 143.57*** 
No. of Obs. 302 302 302 
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Table 7. Two-step Heckman model (Small banks) 
This table presents 2-step Heckman (1979) regression coefficients and in parentheses associated t-statistics for 
small banks. In a 1st step, we run the probit model with same specification in Table 8. The Inverse Mills ratio 
estimated from the 1st-step regression is used in the second stage with the CSR indicator and control variables. 
The dependent variable in the second stage is the Client loyalty (CL).*, **, and *** denote coefficient estimates 
significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. A significant Wald chi-square illustrates 
that the models are significant and the independent variables do affect the indicators of financial performance. 
Variables (16) (17) (18) 
  CL CL CL 
BSR 0.839***     
  (2.86)     
Comm   0.027   
    (0.07)   
PrResp     0.64* 
      (1.68) 
ROA -11,82* -10.79 -24.70** 
  (-1.86) (-0.86) (-1.99) 
DebTc 0.46* -0.62* 0.33 
  (1.92) (-1.95) 0.87 
logEmployees -14.49 14.99 -1.08 
  (-1.51) (1.57) (-0.18) 
TL_TDep -0.027 0.31 -0.16 
  (-0.19) (1.23) (-0.83) 
Capex 95.37*** 52.29 -17.81 
  (3.70) (1.32) (-1.08) 
ResSec -23.67 -2.20 32.38 
  (-0.64) (-0.02) (0.53) 
ResIns 0.382 -72.75 43.86 
  (0.00) (-0.30) (0.52) 
ResRE 27.06 -19.87 42.79 
  (0.26) (-0.08) (1.29) 
ResAux -2.52 19.45 -62.28 
  (-0.002) (0.10) (-1.29) 
GDPper 0.0009 -0.0008 0.0005 
  (0.26) (-0.12) -0.25 
H-Index 9.11 4.35 176.39* 
  (1.06) (0.23) (1.65) 
Country Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Banks_type Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 37.96 146.51 -132.16 
  (0.10) (0.825) (-0.54) 
IMR -8.18 -20.33* -26.76 
  (-1.50) (-1.84) (-1.49) 
Wald Chi-square 168.53*** 36.77* 37.96** 
No. of Obs. 207 207 207 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The current thesis has had the objective to frame the theme of the CSR in the banking 
industry. In particular, in addition to the discussion of the theoretical foundations and 
peculiarities of the phenomenon, the work provides empirical evidence on determinants 
and effects of bank’s engagement in CSR. There are several reasons that justify the 
analysis of bank social responsibility (BSR) and make it a timely and relevant issue. 
First, the last financial crisis has strongly bumped the reputation of the banking industry. 
Banks have been assigned the main responsibilities of the financial turmoil. The adoption 
of ethically questionable conduct by some large banks has led to a loss of confidence 
towards the overall banking system. In this context, BSR may represent for banks a means 
to demonstrate that they are operating in line with societal expectations. Several authors 
argue that BSR helps banks to restore their image and reputation, and to build trusty and 
long-term relationships with stakeholders. Given the characteristics of banking activity 
and the intangible nature of financial services, the correct management of reputational 
goodwill appears even more crucial than in other sectors (Gaultier-Gaillarda and Louisot, 
2006, Walsh and Beatty 2007). 
Second, the investigation of the bank's engagement in socially responsible issues acquires 
relevance in light of the role that the banking industry assumes for the socio-economic 
development of countries. The execution of banking activities requires the use of public 
resources and collocates banks in the middle of several social connections. The most basic 
bank's function is the collection of funds among a large number of savers and their use to 
finance households and companies. The banking industry is also involved in activities 
with a strong social impact such as financial education, the inclusion and financial support 
to disadvantaged minorities, the fight against corruption and money laundering. For all 
these reasons, banks have higher responsibilities towards society and are subject to higher 
visibility than other sectors.   
Finally, despite the relevance of the phenomenon, the investigation of CSR in the banking 
industry appears still scant compared to other sectors (McDonald, 2015, Wu et al., 2017).  
Thus, given the above arguments, the current work has aimed to enrich the knowledge on 
BSR.  
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In particular, the first chapter analyzes the concept of CSR, focusing on its historical 
evolution, definitional aspects, and theoretical perspectives.  
The second chapter describes the peculiarities that characterize the CSR in the banking 
industry, discussing the aspects that justify the investigation of the phenomenon. The third 
chapter provides an overview of the characteristics of the empirical research proposed in 
chapters 4 and 5, describing the data collection procedure and the sample of banks 
examined.  Chapter 4, drawing from several theoretical perspectives, analyzes the impact 
of the financial performance and characteristics of the board of directors on BSR. Finally, 
chapter 5 analyzes the impact that BSR has on the loyalty of bank's clients. 
The work contributes to the extant literature in several ways.  
First, the study shows that better financial performance favors greater BSR. These 
evidence, if considered together with previous investigations that have suggested the 
existence of a positive CSR impact on financial performance (Wu and Shen 2013; Cornett 
et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2017), suggest the possible existence of a virtuous circle (Waddock 
and Graves, 1997), in which BSR and financial performance feed each other. 
Second, the results show that some corporate governance characteristics, such as board 
diversity, the presence of non-executive directors and a greater intensity of board activity 
favor BSR. 
These findings should attract the attention of policymakers that intend to promote BSR 
through the definition of corporate governance codes and best practices. The results may 
be relevant also for investors and investors interested in the bank's socially responsible 
profile. 
Third, the work highlights that BSR positively affects client loyalty. These results should 
encourage banks to invest in CSR programs in order to build loyal and long-term 
relationships with customers. Moreover, the study should also attract the attention of 
authorities involved in the definition of measures to promote the well-functioning and 
competitiveness of the banking system, since client loyalty is considered a key aspect in 
driving profitability (Bolton et al., 2004; Chiou and Droge, 2006), and a basis for the 
achievement of a competitive advantage (Mandhachitara and Poolthong 2011). 
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